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This is my third foreword to our annual report which again is
a clear reflection of the activity of our Director and all of the
other staff. The range of work is wide, from tuberculosis to
leptospirosis to cryptosporidiosis, with perhaps the most
encouraging being the reduction in meningitis following the
introduction of an effective vaccine for Meningococcus C.
A major advance for all of us was our move into new premises
earlier this year, which allowed our staff to escape from a
variety of premises, with the disadvantages that separating
staff entails.
The Department of Health and Children has indicated its
intention of establishing the NDSC Board on a statutory basis,
and the Board has given many meetings to considering this.
When so established the Board can employ its own staff and
directly utilise its subvention from the Department of Health
and Children.
The establishment of the Board will mean that a new board
will be appointed by the Minister so that, among other things,
this is likely to be my last foreword! It only remains for me to
thank the present Board members, our Director, and all the
staff at NDSC for their contribution towards making such a
success of our first few years.
Professor Dermot Hourihane
Chairman
Board of the National Disease Surveillance Centre
Foreword
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Introduction
This is the third annual report from the National Disease
Surveillance Centre (NDSC) in Ireland. This annual report
builds on work covered in the previous reports and includes a
new section on sexually transmitted infections in Ireland and
also a section on the response to threats of deliberate release
of biological agents in 2001. There has been a resurgence of
sexually transmitted infection in Ireland beginning in the early
90’s and culminating in a dramatic increase in syphilis
predominately among men who have sex with men in Dublin.
This outbreak has highlighted the need for improved
surveillance of sexually transmitted infections in Ireland to
inform policy and prevention strategies for sexual health.
In the aftermath of September 11 2001, many countries
including Ireland developed contingency plans to address the
threat of deliberate release of biological agents. The core
lesson learnt in Ireland, as in all other countries, was that of
the crucial importance of health protection. Whether
outbreaks of infectious disease are natural or man-made, very
similar processes, namely strong disease and risk factor
surveillance systems, the capacity to undertake prompt
epidemiological investigation, strong laboratory capacity and
effective systems of public heath management are necessary
to manage them.
It was with great sadness that staff of NDSC learned of the
untimely death of Marie O’Shea – Senior Technologist in the
microbiology laboratory at James Connolly Memorial Hospital.
Marie worked on the CIDR Development Committee during
2001 and her contribution was greatly appreciated.
The staff at NDSC would like to express their appreciation to
all the health professionals who worked on NDSC Scientific
Advisory Committees during the past year.
Dr Darina O'Flanagan
Director
National Disease Surveillance Centre
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Management Board
Dermot Hourihane
Professor of Histopathology, T.C.D.
Consultant Histopathologist, St James’s Hospital (Retired)
Mary Cafferkey
Consultant Microbiologist, The Children’s Hospital,
Temple Street, Dublin 1
John Devlin
Deputy Chief Medical Officer,
Department of Health and Children.
Dora Hennessy
Principal Officer, Department of Health and Children
(Left in 2001)
Elizabeth Keane
Director of Public Health, Southern Health Board
John Magner
Programme Manager, South Eastern Health Board
Brian Mullen
Principal Officer, Department of Health and Children 
Brian O’Herlihy
Director of Public Health, Eastern Regional Health Authority
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Scientific Advisory 
Committee
Edmond Smyth           
Faculty of Pathology (Chair) 
Karina Butler
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Paed)
Luke Clancy
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland 
Catherine Cosgrove
Environmental Health Officers Association
Eilish Creamer
Infection Control Nurses Association 
Stephen Flint
University of Dublin School of Dental Science 
Hugh Larkin
Dept. of Veterinary Medicine, UCD
Nuala O’Connor
Irish College of General Practitioners 
Noel Shanaghy
Academy of Medical Laboratory Science
Lelia Thornton
Faculty of Public Health Medicine
Patrick Wall
Food Safety Authority of Ireland
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Subgroups and Committees
Computerised Infectious Disease 
Reporting Development Committee 
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
John Brazil
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Rosaleen Corcoran
Director of Public Health, NEHB
Stephen Dempsey
Senior Technologist, Coombe Women’s Hospital 
(Joined in 2001)
Mary Diver
Laboratory Information Systems Manager, NWHB
Margaret Fitzgerald
Chief Specialist Epidemiology, FSAI
Margaret Fitzgerald
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Left in 2001)
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Cathal Kearney
Principal Environmental Health Officer, WHB
Fiona Kenny
Medical Microbiologist, Sligo General Hospital
Hugh Magee,
Statistician, IMU, Department of Health and Children
Stephen Murchan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Left in 2001)
Dermot Nolan
Irish College of General Practitioners
Brendan O’Reilly
Senior Technologist, Microbiology Lab, Cork University
Hospital (Joined in 2001)
Marie O’Shea
Senior Technologist, Microbiology Lab, James Connolly
Memorial Hospital (Left in 2001)
Thomas Quigley
Chief Consultant in Food Safety, FSPB
Fiona Ryan
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SHB
Dominic Whyte
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Left in 2001)
*Membership of committees/groups refer to 2001 only.
CIDR National Supervisory / Business Rules Committee
Ann Shannon
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, NWHB (Chair)
John Brazil
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Robert Cooke
IT Manager, EHSS
Margaret Fitzgerald
Chief Specialist Epidemiology, FSAI
Peter Finnegan
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, NEHB
Rose Fitzgerald
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, MWHB
Tony Holohan
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, DoHC
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Phil Jennings
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, MHB
Mai Mannix
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, MWHB (Left in 2001)
Patricia McDonald
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, ERHA
Declan McKeown
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, WHB
Stephen Murchan
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Maire O’Connor
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SEHB
Joan O’Donnell
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, ERHA
Kate O’Donnell
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Bernadette O’Keefe
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, NEHB (Left in 2001)
Thomas Quigley
Chief Consultant in Food Safety, FSPB
Fiona Ryan
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SHB
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CIDR Project Board Membership
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Martin Higgins
Chief Executive Officer, FSPB
Tony Holohan
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, DoHC
Fiona Kenny
CIDR Development Committee representative
Laverne McGuinness
Director of Finance/ACE, Planning and Development, NAHB
Dick McMahon
Management Services Officer, MWHB
Richard Nolan
Principal Officer, External Systems, DoHC
Orlaith O’Reilly
Director of Public Health, SEHB
CIDR Design Supplier Evaluation Group Membership
John Brazil
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Robert Cooke
IT Manager, Healthcare Applications, EHSS
Mary Diver
Laboratory Information System Manager, NWHB
Tony Holohan
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, DoHC
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Fiona Kenny
Consultant Microbiologist, NWHB
Richard Nolan
Principal Officer, External Systems, DoHC
Thomas Quigley
Chief Specialist in Food Safety, FSPB
Fiona Ryan
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SHB
Austin Seagrave
Astron Consulting
CIDR Consultancy Support Evaluation Group
Gerry Boyle
External Consultant
John Brazil
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
CIDR Project Team
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Project Manager)
Emma Baldwin
National Disease Surveillance Centre
John Brazil
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Austin Seagrave
Astron Consulting
EARSS Steering Group
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Robert Cunney
National Disease Surveillance Centre 
Lynda Fenelon
Consultant Microbiologist, St Vincent’s Hospital 
Hilary Humphreys
Consultant Microbiologist, Beaumont Hospital
Conor Keane
Consultant Microbiologist, St James’s Hospital
Stephen Murchan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Data Manager)
Olive Murphy
Consultant Microbiologist, Bon Secours Hospital
Angela Rossney
Dept. of Medical Microbiology, St James’s Hospital
Dominic Whyte
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Left in 2001)
EPI-INSIGHT Editorial Committee
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Managing Editor) 
Lorraine Hickey
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Editor)
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Louise Kyne
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Paed)
Dermot Nolan
Irish College of General Practitioners
James O’Leary
Academy of Medical Laboratory Sciences
Niamh O’Sullivan
Irish Society of Clinical Microbiologists 
Jackie Quinn
National Virus Reference Laboratory
Lelia Thornton
Faculty of Public Health Medicine
Dominic Whyte          
National Disease Surveillance Centre 
(Editor until September 2001)
Review of Infectious Disease Subcommittee
Lelia Thornton
Faculty of Public Health Medicine (Chair)
Karina Butler
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Paed)
Catherine Cosgrove
Environmental Health Officers Association 
Stephen Dempsey
Academy of Medical Laboratory Science 
Peter Harrington
Irish College of General Practitioners
Conor Keane
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Jane Murphy
Infection Control Nurses Association
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Viral Haemorrhagic Fever Subcommittee
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Karina Butler
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Paed)
Liam English
Academy of Medical Laboratory Science
Prof. Bill Hall
National Virus Reference Laboratory 
Hilary Humphreys
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Phil Jennings
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (FPHM)
Mary McCarthy
Infection Control Nurses Association
Brendan O’Hare
Consultant Anaesthetist, OLHSC, Crumlin
Alan Smith
National Disease Surveillance Centre
(Left in 2001)
Legionnaires’ Disease Subcommittee
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Declan Bedford
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (FPHM)
Marena Burd
Infection Control Nurses Association
David Coleman
School of Dental Science, Trinity College Dublin 
Al Donnelly
Environmental Health Officers Association
Tom Donnelly
Health & Safety Authority
Rosemary Hone
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Alan Smith
National Disease Surveillance Centre
(Left in 2001)
Subcommittee on Nosocomial Aspergillosis
Lynda Fenelon
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Chair)
Eibhlin Connolly
Deputy Chief Medical Officer, DoHC
Des Fitzgerald
Architectural Advisor, DoHC
Margaret Fitzgerald
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Wilf Higgins
Engineering Adviser, DoHC
Anthony Hogan
Institute of Engineers of Ireland
Shaun McCann
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Olive Murphy
Consultant Microbiologist, Bon Secours Hospital 
Eoin O’Morain
Royal Institute of Architects of Ireland
Siobhan Prout
Infection Control Nurses Association
Food Handlers Subcommittee
Margaret O’Sullivan
Faculty of Public Health Medicine
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Chair)
Colette Bonner
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, ERHA
Mary Cronin
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Dan Crowley
Cork County Council
Margaret Fitzgerald
Food Safety Authority of Ireland
Barbara Foley
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair - left in 2001)
Catherine Lawlor
Dept. of Agriculture, Food and Rural Development
Anne Maloney 
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Dan Murphy
Health & Safety Authority of Ireland
Nuala O’Connor
Irish College of General Practitioners
Tom Prendergast
Environmental Health Officers Association
Emer Ward
Infection Control Nurses Association
Subcommittee on Cryptosporidiosis
Derval Igoe
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Bartley Cryan
Irish Society of Clinical Microbiologists 
Geraldine Duffy
Teagasc 
Oliver Fogarty
Department of Environment
Tessa Greally
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (FPHM)
Lorraine Hickey
National Disease Surveillance Centre 
Mary Horgan
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland
Lenora Leonard
Infection Control Nurses Association 
Tom McCarthy
Environmental Health Officers Association 
Anthony McNally
Dublin City Council
John Mulcahy
Fingal County Council
Tom O’Connell
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Left in 2001)
Brendan O’Reilly
Academy of Medical Laboratory Science
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Subcommittee on Measles
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Mary Cafferkey
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Path)
Mary Cronin
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (FPHM)
Rita Doyle
Irish College of General Practitioners
Phil Jennings
Directors of Public Health nominee
Mary Healy
Royal College of Physicians of Ireland (Paed)
VTEC Subcommittee
Paul McKeown
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Colm Bergin
Consultant in Infectious Diseases
St James’s Hospital
Margaret Byrne
Chief Technologist
Microbiology, OLHSC, Crumlin
Margaret Fitzgerald
Food Safety Authority of Ireland 
Barbara Foley
National Disease Surveillance Centre 
Cliodhna Foley-Nolan
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SHB
Velma Harkins
Irish College of General Practitioners
Eleanor McNamara
Irish Society of Clinical Microbiologists
Bernice Martin
Environment Health Officers Association
Helen Murphy
Infection Control Nurses Association
Gerardine Sayers
Royal College of Physicians (FPHM)
Mary Waldron
Consultant Paediatrician
OLHSC, Crumlin
CJD Infection Control Subcommittee
Robert Cunney
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Nick Breen
Irish College of General Practitioners
Helen Cleary
Neurosurgical Theatre Nurse, Beaumont Hospital
Stephen Flint
Consultant in Oral Medicine, School of Dental Science,
Trinity College
Hilary Humphreys
Consultant Microbiologist, Beaumont Hospital 
Rory McConn-Walsh
Consultant Otolaryngologist, Beaumont Hospital 
Margaret Nadin
Infection Control Nurses Association 
Darina O’Flanagan
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Joan O’Riordan
Consultant Haematologist, IBTS
Oonagh Ryan
CSSD Manager, Beaumont Hospital
Michelle Tait
CSSD Manager, School of Dental Science, Trinity College
Beryl-Ann Waldron
Department of Clinical Microbiology, Beaumont Hospital
STI Subcommittee
Mary Cronin
National Disease Surveillance Centre (Chair)
Mary Cafferkey
Consultant Microbiologist, The Children’s Hospital,
Temple Street
Lisa Domegan
National Disease Surveillance Centre
Derek Freedman
Irish College of General Practitioners 
Eleanor Kehoe
Infection Control Nurses Association 
Ann Maloney
Consultant Clinical Microbiologist,
Waterford Regional Hospital
Fiona Mulcahy
Consultant in Genito-Urinary Medicine, St James’s Hospital
Nuala O’Connor
Irish College of General Practitioners
Mary O’Mahoney
Specialist in Public Health Medicine, SHB
Therese Wilson
Regional AIDS Co-ordinator, SEHB
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Darina O’Flanagan 
Director 
Emma Baldwin 
Administrative Assistant
Orla Bannon 
Senior Executive-Administrative Services
Gerry Boyle 
Administrator (Left in 2001)
John Brazil 
Information Technology Manager 
Fiona Cloak 
Surveillance Assistant 
Mary Cronin 
Specialist in Public Health Medicine
John Cuddihy
Medical Officer 
Robert Cunney 
Microbiologist 
Lisa Domegan 
Surveillance Scientist 
Margaret Fitzgerald 
Surveillance Scientist 
Barbara Foley
Surveillance Scientist 
Marie Geraghty 
Administrative Assistant (Left in 2001)
Eva Hallinan 
Administrative Assistant (Left in 2001)
Lorraine Hickey 
Medical Officer 
Myles Houlden 
IT Specialist 
Derval Igoe 
Specialist in Public Health Medicine
Sarah Jackson
Surveillance Assistant 
Stephen Keily
IT Officer 
Kirsty MacKenzie 
PA to Director 
Paul McKeown 
Specialist in Public Health Medicine
Niamh Mullins 
Medical Officer (Left in 2001)
Stephen Murchan 
Surveillance Scientist 
Olivia O’Connell 
Administrative Assistant 
Kate O’Donnell 
Surveillance Scientist 
Patrick O’Sullivan 
Specialist Registrar (Left in 2001)
Emer Ruane 
IT Officer 
Karen Savage
Administrative Assistant (Left in 2001)
Natasha Sheehan 
Administrative Assistant 
Alan Smith 
Medical Officer (Left in 2001)
Dominic Whyte 
Surveillance Scientist (Left in 2001)
Staff of the National
Disease Surveillance Centre
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Bacterial Meningitis, 2001
Key Points
In 2001,
• 396 cases of bacterial meningitis were notified 
in Ireland.
• 330 cases (including 4 imported cases) of
meningococcal disease were notified.
• Meningococcal disease notifications declined by 
36% in 2001.
• Serogroup C meningococcal disease notifications
declined by 76%.
• Meningococcal serogroup C conjugate vaccine has 
had a major impact in reducing serogroup C disease 
in Ireland.
• There were 15 deaths due to bacterial meningitis
including 12 due to meningococcal disease.
Introduction
The global burden of childhood bacterial meningitis is
considerable. In Ireland the vast majority of cases of bacterial
meningitis are due to invasive meningococcal disease (IMD).
IMD is a serious life-threatening illness caused by Neisseria
meningitidis. While the largest outbreaks and highest mortality
and morbidity occur in the developing world the disease
continues to strike, particularly the young in developed
countries. IMD is hyperendemic in Ireland and the country has
one of the highest incidence rates in Europe with serogroups
B and C accounting for the vast majority of cases.
The development of the meningococcal serogroup C
conjugate (MenC) vaccine has been a major breakthrough as
this vaccine produces long-lasting protection and is effective
in infants and toddlers. The UK was the first country to
introduce the MenC vaccine, commencing in November 1999.
One year later the MenC vaccine was introduced in Ireland
(October 2000) as part of the primary childhood
immunisation schedule. A catch-up programme was also
launched at this time with the overall aim of offering the
vaccine to everyone up to and including 22 years of age. This
catch-up programme was introduced on a phased basis with
Phase 1 targeting those most at risk (<5 year olds and 15-18
year olds). Phase 2 targeted the 5-6 year olds and finally
Phase 3 targeted children aged 7-14 years and young adults
aged 19-22 years. The catch-up programme was completed in
Ireland by March 2002.
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Materials and Methods
Enhanced surveillance of bacterial meningitis (including
meningococcal septicaemia) commenced in Ireland in 1997.
The Community Care Areas (CCAs) simultaneously notify the
Departments of Public Health and the National Disease
Surveillance Centre (NDSC) of each suspected case of
bacterial meningitis. Follow-up information on each case
notified is collected by the Department of Public Health/CCA
and forwarded to NDSC. At NDSC data are inputted to an MS
Access database. The National Meningococcal Reference
Laboratory (MRL) at The Children’s Hospital, Temple Street,
Dublin, performs active surveillance on laboratory-confirmed
cases of IMD. The NDSC database is reconciled monthly with
the MRL database and quarterly with the Departments of
Public Health databases. A final data validation is performed
with the Departments of Public Health and MRL following
year-end.
Data analysis was performed using MS Access, MS Excel and
Epi Info. Population data were taken from the 1996 census.
For surveillance purposes the diagnosis of IMD is classified as
Definite, Presumed and Possible as outlined in the
Department of Health and Children’s Working Group report.1
A summary of the case definitions are as follows:
Definite: A case where Neisseria meningitidis is detected by
culture or PCR in a normally sterile site (CSF, blood, synovial
fluid etc.).
Presumed: A case where the convalescent serology test is
positive or Gram-negative diplococci are detected in CSF or
skin-scrapings or N. meningitidis is isolated from an eye,
throat or nasal swab together with either the characteristic
purpuric rash or clinical or laboratory features of bacterial
meningitis (CSF pleocytosis).
Possible: A case with evidence of acute sepsis with or without
meningitis, together with the characteristic purpuric rash or a
case with clinical evidence of sepsis without a purpuric rash
and in whom N. meningitidis is isolated from an eye, throat or
nasal swab.
Results
Bacterial meningitis
Three hundred and ninety six cases of bacterial meningitis
(including 4 imported cases) were notified in Ireland in 2001.
Bacterial meningitis notifications declined by 32% in 2001
compared to 2000 (586 cases). In 2001, invasive meningococcal
disease (IMD) accounted for 84% of the bacterial meningitis
notifications – 330 cases (including 4 imported cases).
Streptococcus pneumoniae accounted for 5% (n=20) of the
bacterial meningitis cases notified, while Haemophilus
influenzae type b accounted for 0.5% of the cases (n=2).
Invasive meningococcal disease
Imported cases of IMD
An imported case is defined as a case where the onset of
illness occurs within two days of arrival in the country or
where the infection is known to have been acquired abroad. In
2001, four imported cases of IMD were notified in Ireland.
Three serogroup B cases were notified (2 notified by the ERHA
and 1 by the WHB) and one serogroup C case (notified by the
NWHB). Two of the imported cases were from Northern
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Ireland and one each from England and Spain. These imported
IMD cases will be excluded from subsequent analysis in this
report.
Total IMD
In 2001, 326 cases (excluding 4 imported cases) of IMD were
notified in Ireland, which is equivalent to a rate of
8.99/100,000 population. IMD notifications declined by 36%
in 2001 compared with the previous year, 513 cases
(14.15/100,000 excluding 2 imported cases) (figure 1). This is
the lowest rate recorded since the enhanced surveillance
system for bacterial meningitis (including meningococcal
septicaemia) commenced in 1997 (figure 1). Two hundred and
fifty nine (79.5%) were classified as definite, 30 (9.2%) as
presumed and 37 (11.3%) as possible cases. Ninety percent
(n=293) of cases were laboratory-confirmed and 280 of the
293 cases were confirmed by the MRL. The 13 cases not
confirmed by MRL included six microscopy and seven
throat/nasal/eye swabs. Of the 280 cases confirmed by MRL,
60% (167 cases) were by PCR, 33% (92 cases) by culture and
7% (21 cases) by serology.
IMD by serogroup
Of the 326 cases of IMD notified, the breakdown by
serogroup was as follows: 242 serogroup B (excluding 3
imported cases), 34 serogroup C (excluding 1 imported case),
three serogroup W135 (none Hajj related), one serogroup Y,
seven non-groupable (NG) and 39 had no organism detected.
Serogroup B IMD accounted for 84% of the serogrouped
cases. The incidence of serogroup B IMD dropped by 5.5% in
2001 (6.67/100,0000, 242 cases) when compared with 2000
(7.06/100,000; 256 cases) and by 16.6% when compared with
1999 (8.00/100,000; 290 cases) (figure 1). However, the
incidence rate for serogroup B IMD in 2001 was still higher
than those reported for 1997 and 1998, 5.02 and 6.15 per
100,000, respectively (figure 1).
Serogroup C IMD accounted for just 12% of the serogrouped
cases in 2001 compared to 34% of these cases in 2000. The
incidence of serogroup C IMD declined by a dramatic 76% in
2001 (0.94/100,000; 34 cases, excluding 1 imported case)
compared with the previous year (3.83/100,000; 139 cases)
(figure 1).
IMD by age and sex
The male:female ratio was 1:1.04, with females accounting for
51% of the cases. One hundred and eighty three cases of IMD
(56%) were in those <5 years of age, while 83% of the cases
were <25 years of age. The highest age-specific incidence
rates were in the less than 1 year olds (168/100,000) and 1-4
year olds (50/100,0000). The age-specific incidence rates for
serogroup B and C IMD in 2000 and 2001, are presented in
figure 2. The age-specific incidence rates for serogroup B IMD
in 2001, were similar to those seen in 2000, with the highest
rates in the <1 year olds (127/100,000) and 1-4 year olds
(39/100,000). In 2001, the age-specific incidence rate for
serogroup C IMD was highest in 1-4 year olds (5/100,000)
followed by <1 year olds (4/100,0000). Compared with 2000,
the age-specific incidence rates for serogroup C IMD in 2001
declined in all the age groups under 25 years of age (figure 2).
Meningococcal disease
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Figure 1. Incidence of invasive meningococcal disease in Ireland, 1997-2001
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Figure 2. Age-specific incidence rates of serogroup B and C IMD in Ireland, in 2000 and 2001
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Figure 5. Cumulative number of cases of serogroup C IMD in 2000 and 2001 in Ireland
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Figure 6. Serogroup C IMD 1999-2001 in Ireland in the age groups targeted (<23years) 
and not targeted (≥23 years) by MenC vaccine campaign
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Figure 3. Age standardised incidence rates of serogroup B IMD by health board in 2000 and 2001
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Figure 4. Age standardised incidence rates of serogroup C IMD by health board in 2000 and 2001
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Figure 7. Monthly number of cases of serogroup B, C, IMD and others notified between 1999 and 2001 in Ireland (blue arrow indicates introduction MenC vaccine)
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IMD by health board
In 2001, as in previous years the crude incidence rates (CIR)
and age standardised incidence rates (ASIR) for IMD varied by
health board (table 1). However, compared to the national
rates none of these differences were statistically significant.
The ASIR of serogroup B and C IMD by health board in 2000
and 2001 are presented in figures 3 and 4, respectively. For
both serogroup B and C no statistical differences were noted
between the national incidence rates and the health board
rates. Although the national incidence rate for serogroup B
declined slightly in 2001, the incidence rates increased in
some health boards, namely, the MWHB, NWHB, SHB and
WHB, whereas they declined in the ERHA and NEHB (figure
3). In 2000, the highest incidence rates for serogroup C were
in the south of the country with the SEHB and SHB reporting
ASIR of greater than 6/100,000. In 2001, the incidence rates
declined in all health boards, with no health board reporting
ASIR of greater than 1.3/100,000 (figure 4).
Impact of MenC vaccine on serogroup C IMD
Figure 5 presents the cumulative number of serogroup C cases
notified in 2000 and 2001. There was a significant flattening
of the curve in 2001, with serogroup C IMD declining by 76%.
Of the 34 cases notified in 2001 (excluding 1 imported case),
68% (23 cases) were notified in the first four months of 2001.
Serogroup C IMD declined by 79% in the age group targeted
by the campaign (<23 years), dropping from 128 cases in
both 1999 and 2000 to 26 cases (excluding 1 imported case)
in 2001, whereas in those 23 years and over the numbers of
serogroup C cases remained largely unchanged (figure 6).
Seventy-six percent (26/34) of the serogroup C cases occurred
in the target age group (<23 years) and two of these cases
had received the MenC vaccine. However, only one of these
can be classified as a vaccine failure. The other case had only
received the vaccine one day prior to onset of illness so
insufficient time had elapsed for the individual to illicit an
immune response and therefore is not regarded as a vaccine
failure.
The number of cases of non-serogroup B and non-serogroup C
has remained largely unchanged over the last number of years
and the introduction of MenC vaccine has not changed the
epidemiology of these strains to date (figure 7).
Bacterial meningitis other than IMD
Sixty-six cases (1.8/100,000) of bacterial meningitis other
than IMD were notified in 2001 (table 2). The breakdown by
aetiological agent of these meningitis cases was as follows; 20
Streptococcus pneumoniae, three Escherichia coli, three
serogroup B streptococci (GBS), two Haemophilus influenzae
type b (Hib), two Listeria monocytogenes, two Myco-
bacterium tuberculosis, one Sphingomonas paucimobilis and
33 organism unknown (table 2). The incidence rate of
bacterial meningitis other than IMD was highest in the <1
year olds (table 2). Streptococcus pneumoniae and bacterial
meningitis (organism unknown) accounted for the majority of
these cases. In relation to the Hib cases, only one of the two
cases had been vaccinated and this was classified as a vaccine
failure.
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Deaths due to bacterial meningitis
There were 15 deaths due to bacterial meningitis in 2001,
compared to 30 in 2000. Twelve of the deaths in 2001 were
due to IMD (8 serogroup B, 3 serogroup C and 1 serogroup
W135), two due to pneumococcal meningitis and one due to
other bacterial meningitis (organism unknown). The case
fatality rate (CFR) for IMD in 2001 was 3.7%. However, since
all the deaths were in definite cases the CFR for IMD was
higher at 4.6%, if only definite cases are included in the
analysis. The CFR for serogroup B IMD was 3.3% and was
highest in the <1 year olds at 9.7% (table 3). All of the eight
serogroup B deaths occurred in those <20 years of age. The
CFR for serogroup C IMD was 8.8% and was highest in the
20-24 years age group at 50% (table 3). However, this latter
figure should be interpreted with caution, as it is more a
reflection of the low number of cases (n=2) in this age group
rather than any particular increase in fatality. This is
highlighted by the fact that there was one serogroup C death
in this age group also in 2000, but there were eight cases so
the CFR was much lower at 12.5%. There were three
serogroup C deaths in 2001 compared to 11 in 2000 and five
in 1999.
Discussion
The lowest incidence of IMD since the enhanced surveillance
system commenced in Ireland in 1997 was in 2001, with rates
falling from between 12 and 15 per 100,000 in the years
previous to 2001 to 9 per 100,000 in 2001. This decline in
IMD can be attributed to the introduction of the MenC
vaccine in October 2000. As expected the MenC vaccine had
an even more dramatic impact in reducing serogroup C IMD
in 2001 with the incidence rate declining by an impressive
76% overall. Reductions in the incidence of serogroup C
disease were seen in all age groups targeted by the MenC
programme and in all health boards. Mortality due to
serogroup C disease also declined in 2001 compared with
previous years. Thus, highlighting the really positive impact
the MenC vaccine has had in reducing morbidity and
mortality due to serogroup C IMD and total IMD in Ireland. It
is important that the achievements of 2001 are built on and
that further reductions in serogroup C IMD are realised over
the coming year with the ultimate goal of eliminating
morbidity and mortality due to serogroup C disease in infants,
children and young adults. To realise this goal, it is vital that
high MenC vaccine uptake rates are achieved and maintained.
In 2000, the incidence of serogroup B IMD was highest in the
east/north-east region of the country (ERHA and NEHB) and
lowest all along the western seaboard running north south
from the NWHB down to the SHB. However, there was a shift
in 2001, with the incidence decreasing in the ERHA and NEHB
but increasing in other health boards. However, these health
board rates were not regarded as statistically different from
the national rate. As a result of this shift the regions of
highest incidence now stretch from the MHB to MWHB and
five of the eight health boards have similar incidence rates (6-
7.5/100,000), thereby giving a more homogenous appearance
to the distribution of serogroup B incidence rates between
health boards.
As in 2000, cases of serogroup W135 IMD (type 2a subtype
P1.2, 1.5) in returning pilgrims and their contacts were
Table 1. Numbers, crude incidence rates (CIR) and age standardised incidence rates with
95% confidence intervals (CI) of IMD by health board in Ireland, in 2001
Health Board Number CIR [95% CI] ASIR [95% CI]
ERHA 120 9.3 [7.6-10.9] 9.3 [7.6-11.0]
MHB 22 10.7 [6.23-15.2] 10.6 [6.15-15.0]
MWHB 28 8.8 [5.56-12.1] 8.9 [5.57-12.1]
NEHB 20 6.5 [3.67-9.39] 6.3 [3.52-9.01]
NWHB 16 7.6 [3.87-11.3] 7.7 [3.93-11.5]
SEHB 43 11.0 [7.7 – 14.3] 10.9 [7.67-14.2]
SHB 51 9.3 [6.77-11.9] 9.5 [6.87-12.1]
WHB 26 7.4 [4.54-10.2] 7.6 [4.7-10.6]
IRELAND 326 9.0 [8.01-9.97] – 
Table 2. Bacterial meningitis other than IMD in Ireland in 2001
Organism  Age group (years)                         CIR
 <1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 >25 Total 
E. coli 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0.08
GBS 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.08
Hib 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.06
L. monocytogenes 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.06
M. tuberculosis* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0.06
S. paucimobilis 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.03
S. pneumoniae 3 5 1 0 1 0 10 20 0.55
Other 
(organism unknown) 2 2 3 6 2 4 14  33 0.91
Total 13 8 4 6 4 5 26 66 1.82
ASI 26.61 3.97 1.41 1.84 1.18 1.70 1.21 1.82 –   
CIR = Crude incidence rate per 100,000    ASI = age -specific incidence rate per 100,000
* Maybe an underestimate of incidence as TB 2001 figures are not yet finalised. 
   Final TB meningitis figures will be published in TB 2001 Report.
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reported in 2001 by several countries, following the Hajj
pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. In England and Wales
there were 45 serogroup W135 2a; P1.2, 5 cases (28 with links
to the Hajj) and 8 deaths in 2000 2 and 51 cases (26 with Hajj
links) and 10 deaths in 2001.3 The three serogroup W135
cases notified in Ireland in 2001 were not Hajj related and no
serogroup W135 2a; P1.2, 5 have been reported in Ireland to
date. As a result of these outbreaks in 2000 and 2001, the
Saudi-Arabian Government made vaccination against
serogroups ACWY (quadrivalent vaccine) a visa requirement
for all pilgrims wishing to attend the Hajj or Umrah in 2002.
In comparison to IMD, the incidence of pneumococcal
meningitis remains low in Ireland (0.55/100,000), but unlike
IMD the CFR tends to be higher, 10% in 2001, with the two
pneumococcal deaths occurring in children two years of age. A
7-valent conjugate vaccine (Prevenar, PCV7) has recently been
licensed for use in Ireland in at-risk children <2 years of age. It
has enhanced immunogenicity compared with the 23-valent
polysaccharide vaccine, even in infancy. The 7-valent
conjugate vaccine is active against approximately 70% of
Streptococcus pneumoniae strains causing invasive disease.
Development of the MenC vaccine and its national
implementation in the UK and Ireland can be seen as a
significant step in the prevention of meningococcal disease.
Despite these advances serogroup B IMD still accounts for the
majority of meningococcal infections in industrialised
countries, but the development of safe, immunogenic and
effective serogroup B vaccines has been an elusive goal to
date. However, advances in new genome sequencing
technology, public and scientific interest in the disease and
pharmaceutical company investment in the development of
serogroup B vaccines would indicate that prospects for the
development of an effective serogroup B vaccine look
extremely promising.4
Table 3. Deaths due to serogroup B and C IMD by age group in Ireland, in 2001
Age group (years) Serogroup B Serogroup C
 Deaths Cases CFR (%) Deaths Cases CFR (%)
<1 6 62 9.7 0 2 0.0
1-4 1 78 1.3 0 10 0.0
5-9 0 32 0.0 0 1 0.0
10-14 0 19 0.0 1 6 16.7
15-19 1 27 3.7 0 5 0.0
20-24 0 10 0.0 1 2 50.0
≥25 0 14 0.0 1 8 12.5
Total 8 242 3.3 3 34 8.8
NDSC Annual Report 2001 – Page 19
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank all those involved in the surveillance,
prevention and control of meningococcal disease in Ireland: the Departments
of Public Health, medical officers in the Community Care Areas, the MenC
immunisation teams, the Meningococcal Reference Laboratory and the
microbiology laboratories.
References
1. The Department of Health and Children’s Working Group Report on
Bacterial Meningitis and Related Conditions, July 1999. Available at
http://www.doh.ie/publications/bm99.html
2. Hahné SJM, Gray SJ, Aguilera JF, Crowcroft NS, Nichols T, Kaczmarski EB and
Ramsay ME. W135 meningococcal disease in England and Wales associated
with Hajj 2000 and 2001. Lancet 2002; 359: 582-583.
3. Hahné SJM (CDSC, UK). 2002. Personal communication.
4. Jódar L, Feavers IM, Salisbury D and Granoff DM. Development of vaccine
against meningococcal disease. Lancet 2002; 359: 1499-1508.
NDSC Annual Report 2001 – Page 20
Key Points
• There were 395 new cases of TB in 2000 giving a 
crude incidence rate of 10.9/100,000 population.
• Forty five cases were born outside Ireland (11.4%).
• The mean age of those diagnosed with TB was 49.1
years. One-third of cases occurred in those aged 
65 years and older.
• There were 222 isolates of M. tuberculosis, three 
of M. africanum and two of M. bovis.
• There were three multi-drug resistant cases, two
M. tuberculosis cases and one M. bovis case.
• Six deaths were attributed to TB in 2000.
• Outcome data were reported in 60% of TB cases
in 2000.
Introduction
The year 2000 is the third year that national epidemiological
data on TB has been collated by NDSC. From January 1st
2000 NDSC, in consultation with the eight health boards and
the National Tuberculosis (TB) Advisory Group, implemented
an enhanced national TB surveillance system. Three hundred
and ninety five cases of TB were notified in 2000, giving a
notification rate of 10.9/100,000 population. This represents a
16% decrease on the corresponding figure in 1999 (469 cases:
12.9/100,000). Two hundred and forty one cases were male
(61%) and 154 were female (39%).
Definitions
As in previous years the case definitions used were those
recommended by the National Tuberculosis (TB) Working
Group.1
• A definite case of TB was defined as one in which infection
due to M. tuberculosis, M. bovis or M. africanum was
confirmed by culture.
• An other than definite case was defined as one, in the
absence of confirmation by culture, in which there were
signs and symptoms compatible with TB and the clinician
took the decision to treat the patient with a full course of
anti-tuberculous drugs.
Tuberculosis in Ireland,
2000
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Results
The year 2000 saw a reversal in the upward trend in the
number of cases which were seen in the previous two years
(table 1). There were 395 new TB cases in Ireland in 2000
(10.9/100,000). This was the lowest annual number of cases
ever reported in Ireland.
Geographical distribution of cases
In 2000, the highest age-standardised TB incidence rates were
seen in the Mid-Western Health Board (14.9 per 100,000
population) and the Southern Health Board (14.5/100,000).
The North Western Health Board (3.9 per 100,000) had the
lowest TB incidence rate. This rate was significantly lower
than the national age standardised TB incidence rate of
10.8 per 100,000 (figure 1).
The age-standardised TB incidence rates in each county in
2000, is shown in figure 2.
Age and sex distribution of cases
The mean age of those diagnosed with TB was 49.1 years with
a range from one to 100 years. One-third of cases (n=130)
occurred in those aged 65 years and older. The age- and sex-
specific incidence rates per 100,000 population in Ireland in
2000 are illustrated in figure 3.
Geographic origin
Forty five (11.4%) of the patients diagnosed with TB were
born outside Ireland. Twenty two were born in Europe, 14 in
Asia and nine in Africa.
Diagnostic details
Of the 395 TB notifications, 229 (58.0%) were definite cases
which were culture confirmed. Two hundred and eighty cases
were pulmonary (70.1%), 92 cases were extra-pulmonary
(23.3%) and 21 cases were pulmonary and extrapulmonary TB
(5.3%). The diagnostic breakdown in each health board is
shown in table 2.
Of the 301 TB cases with a pulmonary disease component,
144 (47.8%) were sputum positive.
Of the 229 definite culture confirmed cases, 222 (97.8%) of
isolates were M. tuberculosis, three (1.3%) were M. africanum
and two (0.9%) were M. bovis. Two isolates were not available.
Resistance
Resistance was documented in six cases out of a total of 222
M. tuberculosis isolates (2.7%). Mono-resistance to isoniazid
was recorded in two cases. Mono-resistance to pyrazinamide
was recorded in one case. There were two multi-drug resistant
(MDR-TB) cases (M.tuberculosis isolates)notified and treated
in 2000. Multi-drug resistance is defined as resistance to at
least isoniazid and rifampicin. One case of streptomycin
resistance was reported.
One of the cases where M. bovis was isolated was multi-drug
resistant while the other was resistant to isoniazid. All cases of
TB caused by M. bovis are resistant to pyrazinamide.
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Figure 1. Age-standardised TB incidence rates per 100,000 population, 1999 and 2000
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Table 1. Notified cases of TB in Ireland 1991-2000 with moving averages 1992-1999
Year Number Crude rate per 100,000 3 year moving average
1991 640 18.2 
1992 604 17.1 621
1993 598 16.9 581
1994 524 14.5 526
1995 458 12.6 468
1996 434 12.0 438
1997 416 11.5 426
1998 424 11.7 430
1999 469 12.9 439
2000 395 10.9 
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Outcome
Of the 395 cases notified in 2000 the outcome was recorded
in 235 cases (59.5%). One hundred and eighty one cases
(77.0%) completed treatment. Six patients (1.5%) were
recorded as being lost to follow up. There were 37 deaths
(9.4%) recorded amongst the 395 TB cases in 2000. Six
deaths were attributed to TB. A summary profile of the
epidemiology of TB in Ireland from 1998 to 2000 is shown in
table 3.
Discussion
In Ireland the year 2000 saw a 16% decrease in the TB
notification rate when compared to 1999. There was also a
decrease in the percentage of cases who were born outside
Ireland (11.4% vs 13.8% in 1999). This percentage remains
low when compared to that in other European countries.
Differences in age-standardised TB incidence rates persist
between health board areas. In 2000, the SHB and MWHB
had the highest rates of TB. In 1998 and 1999, TB rates were
highest in the MWHB and the WHB. Rates remain below the
national average in the NWHB. A clear north-south divide
can be seen for age standardised incidence rates for
2000 (figure 4).
There were three cases of multi-drug resistant TB in 2000
compared to the 1999 figure of two. The surveillance of drug
resistance should be greatly facilitated by the establishment
of the National TB Reference Laboratory which was set up 
in 2001.
Although outcome data is still incomplete, a big improvement
was seen in 2000 when compared to that recorded in
previous years. Sixty percent of all cases had outcome
information recorded in 2000 compared to less than 30% in
1999. This is important information that needs to be recorded
as completely as possible.
TB remains a huge problem worldwide and kills two million
people every year. Although TB rates in Ireland are at a low
level, it is important to continue and enhance our screening
and treatment programmes to ensure that our rates 
remain low.
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Table 3. Summary of epidemiology of TB in Ireland, 1998 - 2000
Parameter 1998 1999 2000
Total number of cases 424 469 395
Notification rate (per 100,000) 11.7 12.9 10.9
Foreign born TB patients 35 65 45
% culture positive patients 56.8 55.4 58.0
M. tuberculosis 234 242 222
M. bovis 6 11 2
M. africanum - - 3
% smear positive pulmonary cases 38.6 38.0 47.8
Monoresistance to isoniazid 2 4 2
Monoresistance to streptomycin 2 0 1
Monoresistance to pyrizinamide 0 0 1
Multi-drug resistant cases  0 2 3
Deaths attributed to TB 6 9 6
Table 2. Diagnostic categories of TB by health board, 2000
Health Board Pulmonary Extrapulmonary P+E Unknown Total
ERHA 107 28 8 0 143
MHB 7 8 1 0 16
MWHB 30 10 6 1 47
NEHB 18 3 0 0 21
NWHB 6 2 1 0 9
SEHB 30 9 2 0 41
SHB 52 25 3 0 80
WHB 30 7 0 1 38
Total 280 92 21 2 395
Figure 2. Age-standardised TB incidence rate per 100,000 population by county, 2000
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Key Points
• There were 299 newly diagnosed HIV infections 
in Ireland in 2001 compared to 290 in 2000.
• The majority of new diagnoses (60%) were in the
heterosexual exposure category.
• There were 12 cases of AIDS reported in Ireland in
2001. This brings the cumulative total of reported 
AIDS cases to 719.
• While the annual incidence of AIDS has decreased in
recent years, it is important to note that the annual
incidence of HIV has increased dramatically.
Background
Since the HIV epidemic began over twenty years ago, more
than 60 million people have been infected with the virus.1
HIV/AIDS is now the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan
Africa and the fourth biggest killer worldwide .1 2 By the end of
2001, an estimated 40 million people globally were living with
HIV.1 In many parts of the world, the majority of new infections
occur in young adults, with young women especially vulnerable.1
For many years the epidemiological monitoring of HIV in
Europe was based on AIDS case reporting, with back
projection to give estimates of the incidence and modes of
transmission of HIV infections. In recent years however, there
has been a decline in incidence of AIDS in western Europe
which is primarily due to the availability of new effective
antiretroviral treatments, which delay the progression from
HIV infection to AIDS.3 4 This has reduced the effectiveness of
AIDS reporting for monitoring the incidence and modes of
transmission of HIV infection. It is necessary to obtain
epidemiological information at the early stages of the disease
so that the appropriate prevention strategies can be put in
place. Quality national AIDS surveillance data are still
essential to assess the progress of the disease and to
recognise failures in the treatment of HIV infection.
As recommended in the Report of the National AIDS Strategy
Committee, 2000,5 HIV case based reporting was introduced
in Ireland on 1st July 2001. The new system replaced the
existing AIDS surveillance system.
Methods
On 1st July 2001, HIV case based reporting was introduced in
Ireland. The design of the HIV case based reporting system
HIV and AIDS Surveillance 
in Ireland, 2001
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involved all of the key players including the Department of
Health and Children (DoHC), Departments of Public Health,
the National Virus Reference Laboratory, Consultants in
Infectious Disease/Genitourinary Medicine and the Irish
College of General Practitioners. The new HIV/AIDS
surveillance report form collects information on both HIV
positive cases and cases of AIDS and replaces the AIDS
Surveillance Report form. When a HIV infection is confirmed
by the National Virus Reference Laboratory, a surveillance
report form is sent to the clinician who requested the
confirmatory test. The clinician completes the form and
returns it to the Director of Public Health of the health
board/health authority where the patient resides. The forms
are then forwarded to NDSC where national figures are
collated. AIDS cases are reported by clinicians using the new
surveillance report form. Analysis of information is carried out
by NDSC every six months and reports are provided to
clinicians, microbiologists, public health personnel, DoHC,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other interested
parties. The report is also posted on the NDSC website. Data
are collected in a format consistent with that used by the
European Surveillance System and a summary of the data is
forwarded to the European Centre for the Epidemiological
Monitoring of AIDS every six months.
Results
A: HIV Surveillance
A total of 299 cases of HIV infection were newly diagnosed in
Ireland during 2001 compared to 290 cases in 2000. The
cumulative total of HIV positive cases reported to the end of
December 2001 is 2,645.
Exposure category
Table 1 lists the number of new HIV infections in Ireland in
2001 by exposure category. Table 2 and figure 1 show the
trends in the number of newly diagnosed cases of HIV
between 1995 and 2001 in the three most common exposure
categories: heterosexuals, men who have sex with men (MSM)
and injecting drug users (IDUs). Between 1996 and 2001,
there was a 6-fold increase in the number of cases among
heterosexuals. Among MSM, the increase in the number of
new HIV diagnoses between 2000 and 2001 was small (from
72 to 73 cases), but the 80% increase observed between
1999 and 2000 (from 40 to 72 cases) was sustained. Among
IDUs, there was a 4-fold increase from 1997 to 2000. There
was a 54% decrease in the number of new diagnoses seen
between 2000 and 2001.
Sex and age group
Of the 299 newly diagnosed HIV infections, 55% were male
and 45% were female. Figure 2 shows the age distribution of
the cases by sex. The majority of cases among females were
aged between 20 and 29 years. The majority of cases in males
were aged between 30 and 39 years. Table 3 shows the age
distribution by exposure category.
Area of residence
A breakdown of HIV cases by area of residence is shown in
table 4. In 2001, 62% (184) of cases were resident in the
Eastern Regional Health Authority (ERHA) at HIV diagnosis. By
exposure category, 58% of heterosexuals, 70% of MSM and
82% of IDUs were resident in the ERHA.
Geographic origin
From July 1st 2001, data on the geographic origin of patients
were collected. Classification by geographic origin is that used
by the European Centre for the Epidemiological Monitoring of
AIDS (EuroHIV). An analysis of the newly diagnosed cases by
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Figure 1: Newly diagnosed HIV infections in Ireland among heterosexuals, 
MSM and IDUs (1995 to 2001)
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Figure 2: Age distribution of newly diagnosed HIV infections in males and females (2001)
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Table 1: Newly diagnosed HIV infections in Ireland by exposure category (2001)
                  2001
Exposure category Number %  
Heterosexual 173 57.9
MSM 73 24.4
IDU 38 12.7
Children 6 2.0
Transfusion recipient 2 0.7
Undetermined 7 2.3
Total 299 100.0
Table 2: HIV infections in Ireland among the three most common exposure categories 
(1995 to 2001)
Year Exposure category
Heterosexual MSM IDU
1995 30 33 19
1996 27 41 20
1997 40 37 21
1998 47 37 26
1999 59 40 69
2000 127 72 83
2001 173 73 38
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geographic origin is presented in table 5. In the third and
fourth quarters of 2001, a total of 138 newly diagnosed HIV
infections were reported through the case based reporting
system. Of the 82 heterosexual cases, 61 of the cases (74%)
were born in sub-Saharan Africa and 12 cases (15%) were
born in Ireland. Among MSM, 75% of the cases were born in
Ireland. Among IDUs, 91% of the cases were born in Ireland.
B: AIDS Surveillance, 2001 
There were 12 cases of AIDS reported in Ireland in 2001. This
is the lowest number of cases reported since 1986. However,
it is important to remember that there is a significant delay in
reporting AIDS cases and the number reported may not
accurately reflect the number of new diagnoses. The
cumulative total of AIDS cases reported in Ireland to
December 2001 is 719. Figure 3 compares the number of
AIDS cases reported in the last ten years with the number of
HIV cases diagnosed. While there has been a decrease in the
number of new AIDS cases reported in the last five years, the
number of new HIV diagnoses has increased dramatically.
Table 6 gives a breakdown of AIDS cases by exposure category
in 2001 and the cumulative total. In 2001, there were six
cases of AIDS reported in MSM and six cases of AIDS among
heterosexuals. Figure 4 shows the trends among the three
most common exposure categories since the beginning of the
AIDS epidemic in Ireland.
There were three reports of AIDS related deaths in 2001. This
brings the total of AIDS related deaths reported in Ireland to
date to 365.
Discussion
In recent years, the epidemiology of HIV and AIDS in Ireland
has undergone considerable change. While there has been a
decrease in the annual incidence of AIDS in Ireland in recent
years, the annual incidence of HIV infection has increased
dramatically. Clearly, monitoring trends in the AIDS epidemic
does not reliably reflect trends in HIV infection. It is essential
to have reliable information about the incidence and future
directions of HIV infection and the types of behaviour that
increase the risk of HIV transmission. In order to collect this
information, HIV case based reporting was introduced in
Ireland on July 1st, 2001. The aim of HIV case based reporting
is to ensure the collection of accurate and complete
epidemiological data on the distribution and mode of
transmission of HIV infection and to allow linkage between
reports of HIV infection and AIDS which will enable the
progression of the disease from HIV infection to AIDS to
be monitored.
The number of AIDS cases in all exposure categories has
declined since the mid 1990’s and this can be primarily
attributed to increased use of highly active antiretroviral
therapy (HAART), which has delayed disease progression.3
Over the last five years, the number of newly diagnosed HIV
infections among heterosexuals has increased six fold. There
has also been an increase in the number of newly diagnosed
cases among MSM, with the number of cases almost doubling
since 1998. The increase in this group is worrying in the
context of the current syphilis outbreak in Ireland,6 and
indications from some other European countries that the
practice of safer sex in this group is declining.7 Among IDUs,
there was a reduction in the number of newly diagnosed HIV
infections from 2000 to 2001. While this is to be welcomed
Table 3: Newly diagnosed HIV infections in Ireland by age group and exposure category 
(2001)
Age group Exposure category
Years MSM Hetero IDU Children Transfusion Undeterm. Total 
1-9 - - - 5 - - 5
10-19 - 15 - 1 - - 16
20-29 20 80 19 - - 7 126
30-39 33 55 17 - 2 - 107
40-49 12 15 2 - - - 29
50-59 7 3 - - - - 10
60-69 1 3 - - - - 4
Unknown - 2    - - - - 2
Total 73 173 38 6 2 7 299
Table 4: Newly diagnosed HIV infections in Ireland by exposure category and area of 
residence at diagnosis (2001)
Area
Exposure category ERHA         Non-ERHA       Unknown      Total
Heterosexual 100 67 6 173
MSM 51 21 1 73
IDU 31 7 - 38
Children 1 1 4 6
Transfusion recipient 1 1 - 2
Undetermined - - 7 7
Total 184 97 18 299
Table 5: Newly diagnosed HIV infections in Ireland by exposure category and geographic 
origin  (Q3 and Q4 2001)
Geographic origin
 Exposure Ireland West North sub-Saharan    Other/ Total
 category Europe Africa Africa Undeterm.
Hetero 12 1 7 61 1 82
MSM 24 3 - 2 3 32
IDU 10 1 - - - 11
Children - - - 5 - 5
Transfusion 
recipient - - - 1 - 1
Undeterm. - - - - 7 7
Total 46 5 7 69 11 138
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Figure 3: AIDS cases and HIV cases diagnosed in Ireland (1991 to 2001)
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and may reflect investment in harm reduction and treatment
services over the past number of years, the decrease must be
interpreted with caution as it remains to be seen whether it
will be sustained in future years. It must also be emphasised
that newly diagnosed infections do not represent HIV
incidence, as diagnosis may be several years after infection is
acquired.
Of the 88 children born to HIV infected mothers in 2001,
three are known to be infected. This reflects the effectiveness
of the antenatal HIV screening programme and treatment and
follow up services for HIV infected pregnant women in Ireland
in preventing transmission of the infection from mother 
to baby.
The majority of people diagnosed with HIV infection in 2001
were aged between 25-44 years. There was a difference in age
distribution between the sexes. Females were younger at HIV
diagnosis then males. This trend has been seen worldwide and
it has been suggested that women may be at risk for infection
at an earlier age due to infection by older sexual partners.8
There was a disproportionately high number of newly
diagnosed HIV infections resident in the ERHA area. In 2001,
the incidence of HIV infection (per million population) in the
ERHA area was 141.9 compared to 41.6 in non-ERHA areas. In
particular, 82% of newly diagnosed HIV cases among IDUs
were resident in the ERHA area.
Data on the geographical origin of cases were collected for
the first time in Quarter 3 and 4, 2001. This data revealed
that 74% of heterosexual cases in this time period were from
sub-Saharan Africa. This is not unexpected, given that sub-
Saharan Africa is the region of the world most severely
affected by the global HIV epidemic.2 Although it is clear that
people from sub-Saharan Africa who are infected with HIV do
not form a homogeneous group, these data highlight the need
for culturally appropriate prevention and treatment services
for migrants and ethnic minorities in Ireland.
AIDS is the leading cause of death in Africa and the fourth
leading cause of death worldwide.1 2 Of the 719 cases of AIDS
that have been reported in Ireland, fifty one percent are
reported to have died. The mortality rate from AIDS in Ireland
has dropped from 13.8 deaths per million population in 1995
to 0.8 deaths per million population in 2001. This decrease in
AIDS related deaths reflects the improved survival among
persons with AIDS due to improvements in medical care and
the effect of antiretroviral therapies.3 The use of antimicrobial
prophylaxis to delay or prevent the development of a number
of opportunistic infections may also extend survival.9
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Table 6: AIDS cases reported in Ireland by exposure category (2001 and Total)
2001 Cumulative to Dec. 2001
Exposure category Number % Number           %
IDU - - 283 39.4
MSM 6 50.0 250 34.8
Heterosexual/
risk unspecified 6 50.0 101 14.0
Haemophiliac - - 33 4.6
Children - - 25 3.5
IDU + MSM - - 10 1.4
Post transfusion - - 3 0.4
Other/undetermined - - 14 1.9
Total 12 100.0 719 100.0
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Figure 4: AIDS cases among the three most common exposure categories by year of report 
(1983 to 2001)
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Sexually Transmitted
Infections in Ireland, 2000
Key Points
• Notified STIs increased significantly in 2000 
compared to previous years.
• The 3 most commonly notified STIs in 2000 were 
ano-genital warts, Chlamydia trachomatis and 
non-specific urethritis.
• The highest increases in 2000 were for chancroid,
Chlamydia trachomatis, gonorrhoea, infectious 
hepatitis B, syphilis and trichomoniasis.
• The rising incidence of STIs in Ireland and across 
Europe is consistent with an increase in unsafe sex.
Introduction
Fourteen sexually transmitted infections (STIs) are currently
notifiable in Ireland: ano-genital warts, candidiasis, chancroid,
Chlamydia trachomatis, genital herpes simplex, gonorrhoea,
granuloma inguinale, infectious hepatitis B, lymphogranuloma
venereum, molluscum contagiosum, non-specific urethritis,
Pediculosis pubis, syphilis and trichomoniasis. The National
Disease Surveillance Centre (NDSC) took over statutory
responsibility for STIs from the Department of Health and
Children (DoHC) on July 1st 2000. Previously, the
Departments of Public Health provided STI data to the DoHC
on a quarterly basis. STI data are now provided to NDSC by
the Departments of Public Health on a quarterly basis.
The STI Subcommittee of the Scientific Advisory Committee
was established during 2000. This subcommittee is reviewing
the current system of notification of STIs. The subcommittee
will make recommendations regarding the following: the
diseases under surveillance and the data items required for
effective surveillance; the process of notification and the
systems/structures required to facilitate easy communication
of information between notifiers and public health; ensuring
patient confidentiality; and the use of surveillance information
to inform policy and prevention strategies for sexual health.
The committee are also investigating the need for screening
for chlamydia in Ireland.
This report refers to the STIs notified by quarter, health board,
age group and sex through the quarterly STI notification
system for 2000. During 2000, the number of STIs notified
has increased significantly compared to previous years.
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Materials and Methods
Aggregate STI data are collected quarterly from STI clinics
including age group, sex and diagnosis. Rates per 100,000
population are based on the 1996 population census.
Results
Notified STIs between 1989 and 2000
During 2000, 8869 cases of STIs were notified in Ireland,
compared to 6993 during 1999, representing a 26.8%
increase in STI notifications (table 1). Notified STIs have
increased by 85.5% between 1995 and 2000 and by 298%
between 1989 and 2000. Of the total 59,300 STIs notified
since 1989, 15% were notified in 2000 (figure 1). Notified
cases of ano-genital warts, chancroid, Chlamydia trachomatis,
gonorrhoea, infectious hepatitis B, molluscum contagiosum,
non-specific urethritis, Pediculosis pubis, syphilis and
trichomoniasis increased during 2000, compared to 1999.
Candidiasis and genital herpes simplex notifications decreased
during 2000, compared to 1999. No cases of granuloma
inguinale or lymphogranuloma venereum were notified during
2000 (table 1 and 2).
Notified STIs by quarter during 2000
The total numbers and rates per 100,000 of notified STIs
increased during each quarter in 2000, compared to 1999
(tables 3 and 4). In 2000, notified STIs peaked during 
Quarter (Q) 4, with decreases recorded during Q2 and Q3.
Candidiasis peaked during Q1, molluscum contagiosum during
Q2, and genital herpes simplex, gonorrhoea, syphilis and
trichomoniasis during Q3 in 2000. Pediculosis pubis peaked
during Q2 and Q4 in 2000. Ano-genital warts, chancroid,
Chlamydia trachomatis, infectious hepatitis B, non-specific
urethritis all peaked during Q4 in 2000. In 1999 the total
number of notified STIs peaked during Q2.
Notified STIs by health board 
Notified cases of STIs by health board are presented in table
5. It is important to note that STI surveillance is mainly clinic
based. People may travel from their area of residence to STI
clinics outside their area. At the time these notifications were
made there were no STI clinics in the MHB and NEHB. During
2000, 55.3% of all notified STIs were from the ERHA, 0.02%
from the MHB, 12.9% from the MWHB, 0.02% from the
NEHB, 4.6% from the NWHB, 7.7% from the SEHB, 10.2%
from the SHB and 9.3% from the WHB.
Notified STIs by age 
Notified cases of STIs by age group (years) are presented in
tables 6 and 7. Twenty-seven percent (2439) of all STIs
notified in 2000 were in the 20 to 29 year age group. Seven
percent (641) of cases were aged between 0 and 19 years,
6.5% (573) were 30 to 39 years old and 2.6% (231) were 40+
years of age. The data represented in table 6 should be
interpreted with caution, as the age group data for 56.0%
(4966) of all notified STIs in 2000 were unknown.
Notified STIs by sex 
During 2000, 4549 (51.3%) of all notified STI cases were male
and 4317 (48.7%) were female. The majority of notified cases
of candidiasis, chancroid, Chlamydia trachomatis, genital
herpes simplex and trichomoniasis in 2000 were female. The
majority of cases of gonorrhoea, infectious hepatitis B,
Table 1: Number of notified sexually transmitted infections and rate of notified sexually transmitted infections per 100,000 population for 1999 and 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection   Number of cases                                                   Rate per 100,000 population
1999 2000 Increase/Decrease % Increase/Decrease 1999 2000 Increase/Decrease
Ano-genital warts 3049 3735 686 22.5 84.1 103.0 18.9
Candidiasis 1105 1095 -10 -0.9 30.5 30.2 -0.3
Chancroid 1 16 15 1500.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Chlamydia trachomatis 869 1343 474 54.5 24.0 37.0 13.0
Genital herpes simplex 275 269 -6 -2.2 7.6 7.4 -0.2
Gonorrhoea 175 290 115 65.7 4.8 8.0 3.2
Granuloma inguinale 1 0 -1 -100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infectious hepatitis B* 2 15 13 650.0 0.1 0.4 0.3
Lymphogranuloma venereum 2 0 -2 -100.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Molluscum contagiosum 83 118 35 42.2 2.3 3.3 1.0
Non-specific urethritis 1265 1726 461 36.4 34.9 47.6 12.7
Pediculosis pubis 113 138 25 22.1 3.1 3.8 0.7
Syphilis 6 46 40 666.7 0.2 1.3 1.1
Trichomoniasis 47 78 31 66.0 1.3 2.2 0.9
Total 6993 8869 1876 26.8 192.9 244.6 51.7
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
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molluscum contagiosum, non-specific urethritis, Pediculosis
pubis and syphilis in 2000 were male (tables 8 and 9, figure 2).
Discussion
Recently concern has been raised over a resurgence of STIs,
particularly among men who have sex with men (MSM). The
rising incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis reported since
1995 across Europe is consistent with an increase in unsafe
sex, perhaps reflecting an increase in risk behaviour associated
with the availability of highly active antiretroviral therapy for
HIV infection and a loss of impact of the HIV prevention
campaigns of the 1980s and early 1990s.1 2
The three most commonly notified STIs in 2000 were ano-
genital warts, Chlamydia trachomatis and non-specific
urethritis. The most significant increases in 2000 were for
chancroid, Chlamydia trachomatis, gonorrhoea, infectious
hepatitis B, syphilis and trichomoniasis.3 Syphilis, like other
genital ulcer diseases increases the risk of transmitting and
acquiring HIV. Additionally, STIs have been shown to increase
genital HIV viral load and could affect the resistance patterns
of genital HIV-1.2
Since early 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in
syphilis amongst MSM in Dublin. This is against a low
incidence of syphilis throughout the 1990s, which in 1999
reached its lowest levels in 10 years. In response to this
increase the Director of Public Health in the Eastern Regional
Health Authority (ERHA) established an outbreak control
team in October 2000. An enhanced surveillance system was
introduced by NDSC to capture data on all syphilis cases from
January 2000.4 The enhanced surveillance data for syphilis was
not presented in this report.
The majority of STIs notified during 2000 were from the
ERHA. It is important to reiterate that people may travel from
their area of residence to STI clinics outside their area. The
data presented in this report, therefore did not necessarily
reflect numbers of infections diagnosed among residents of a
particular health board area.
The increases in STIs during 2000 are likely to be associated
with an increase in unsafe sexual behaviour, particularly
among young heterosexuals and MSM. Although the rise in
genital chlamydia infections may also reflect increased testing
for this infection. In addition, improved acceptability of STI
clinic services and greater public and professional awareness
of certain STIs may have also contributed to the increases.
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Figure 1: Total number of notified sexually transmitted infections from 1989 to 2000
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through 
the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
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Table 4: Rate of notified STIs per 100,000 population by quarter for 1999 and 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection Q1 1999 Q2 1999 Q3 1999 Q4 1999 Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000
Ano-genital warts 21.0 25.0 18.5 19.6 26.3 26.3 22.9 27.5
Candidiasis 7.4 7.3 7.5 8.3 8.7 7.2 7.5 6.7
Chancroid 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Chlamydia trachomatis 4.7 8.1 4.2 7.0 8.5 9.5 8.5 10.4
Genital herpes simplex 2.6 1.5 1.0 2.5 2.1 1.4 2.0 1.9
Gonorrhoea 0.6 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 2.6 2.5
Granuloma inguinale 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infectious hepatitis B* 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Molluscum contagiosum 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.7
Non-specific urethritis 6.7 10.7 8.4 9.1 11.7 10.6 11.1 14.1
Pediculosis pubis 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0
Syphilis 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.4
Trichomoniasis 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5
Total 45.0 56.0 42.5 49.4 61.3 59.2 57.7 66.4
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
Table 2: Number of notified sexually transmitted infections from 1989 to 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Ano-genital warts 505 917 1089 1066 1432 1532 1972 2286 2514 2886 3049 3735
Candidiasis 688 1056 1257 1157 1400 1360 1271 1321 1521 1277 1105 1095
Chancroid 2 0 0 2 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 16
Chlamydia trachomatis 174 215 164 192 315 133 245 364 462 646 869 1343
Genital herpes simplex 78 123 109 125 124 173 198 181 211 243 275 269
Gonorrhoea 27 90 73 51 24 98 91 83 98 125 175 290
Granuloma inguinale 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Infectious hepatitis B* 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 2 15
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 2 0
Molluscum contagiosum 31 39 43 44 34 56 59 34 74 84 83 118
Non-specific urethritis 600 738 549 585 756 610 781 823 1034 1083 1265 1726
Pediculosis pubis 60 70 72 70 77 69 86 79 81 105 113 138
Syphilis 12 19 20 20 8 11 11 17 16 15 6 46
Trichomoniasis 51 86 163 41 57 29 60 71 94 38 47 78
Total 2228 3353 3539 3353 4233 4073 4781 5263 6112 6503 6993 8869
Table 3: Number of notified STIs by quarter for 1999 and 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection Q1 1999 Q2 1999 Q3 1999 Q4 1999 Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2000
Ano-genital warts 762  905 671 711 953 952 832 998
Candidiasis 269 263 273 300 317 262 272 244
Chancroid 0 0 0 1 0 3 5 8
Chlamydia trachomatis 169 295 152 253 309 346 310 378
Genital herpes simplex 94 53 38 90 75 50 74 70
Gonorrhoea 21 55 59 40 54 50 96 90
Granuloma inguinale 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Infectious hepatitis B* 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 10
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Molluscum contagiosum 23 29 10 21 33 37 21 27
Non-specific urethritis 243 389 304 329 425 385 404 512
Pediculosis pubis 35 25 21 32 37 38 25 38
Syphilis 2 1 1 2 2 7 21  16
Trichomoniasis 10 15 9 13 18 15       27 18
Total 1630 2030 1541 1792 2223 2145 2092 2409
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Table 7: Rate of notified sexually transmitted infections per 100,000 population by age group (years), 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection 0-19 20-29 30-39 40+ Unknown Total
Ano-genital warts 23.6 215.4 40.4 4.7 54.5 103.0
Candidiasis 7.9 47.2 20.9 5.1 15.5 30.2
Chancroid 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
Chlamydia trachomatis 9.7 59.2 9.9 0.7 23.2 37
Genital herpes simplex 1.0 10.7 2.7 0.5 4.9 7.4
Gonorrhoea 1.2 11.4 2.3 1.1 5.1 8.0
Granuloma inguinale 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infectious hepatitis B* 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Molluscum contagiosum 0.8 5.6 1.5 0.1 1.9 3.3
Non-specific urethritis 7.3 81.6 28.1 4.0 27.2 47.6
Pediculosis pubis 1.3 7.2 1.4 0.1 1.5 3.8
Syphilis 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.1 1.0 1.3
Trichomoniasis 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.4 1.6 2.2
Total 53.5 441.5 110.9 17.0 137.0 244.6
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
Table 6: Number of notified sexually transmitted infections by age group (years), 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection 0-19 20-29 30-39 40+ Unknown Total
Ano-genital warts 283 1190 223 64 1975 3735
Candidiasis 95 261 108 69 562 1095
Chancroid 0 3 0 0 13 16
Chlamydia trachomatis 116 327 51 9 840 1343
Genital herpes simplex 12 59 14 7 177 269
Gonorrhoea 14 63 12 15 186 290
Granuloma inguinale 0 0 0 0 0 0
Infectious hepatitis B* 2 2 0 1 10 15
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Molluscum contagiosum 9 31 8 1 69 118
Non-specific urethritis 88 451 145 55 987 1726
Pediculosis pubis 16 40 7 2 54 138
Syphilis 1 5 3 2 35 46
Trichomoniasis 5 7 2 6 58 78
Total 641 2439 573 231 4966 8869
Table 5: Number of notified sexually transmitted infections by health board, 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection ERHA MHB MWHB NEHB NWHB SEHB SHB WHB Total
Ano-genital warts 1941 0 431 0 203 300 489 371 3735
Candidiasis 544 0 122 0 55 60 79 235 1095
Chancroid 13 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 16
Chlamydia trachomatis 830 0 122 0 37 146 95 113 1343
Genital herpes simplex 176 0 19 1 6 17 31 19 269
Gonorrhoea 186 2 27 0 4 17 35 19 290
Granuloma inguinale 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Infectious hepatitis B* 10 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 15
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Molluscum contagiosum 69 0 9 0 3 14 14 9 118
Non-specific urethritis 970 0 402 0 82 107 130 35 1726
Pediculosis pubis 71 0 9 1 6 15 19 17 138
Syphilis 35 0 1 0 0 3 5 2 46
Trichomoniasis 58 0 1 0 7 3 7 2 78
Total 4903 2 1146 2 407 682 905 822 8869
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Table 8: Number of notified sexually transmitted infections by sex, 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection Male Female Unknown Total
Ano-genital warts 1868 1867 0 3735
Candidiasis 158 937 0 1095
Chancroid 6 10 0 16
Chlamydia trachomatis 662 679 2 1343
Genital herpes simplex 89 180 0 269
Gonorrhoea 228 62 0 290
Granuloma inguinale 0 0 0 0
Infectious hepatitis B* 13 2 0 15
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0 0 0 0
Molluscum contagiosum 65 52 1 118
Non-specific urethritis 1324 402 0 1726
Pediculosis pubis 93 45 0 138
Syphilis 29 17 0 46
Trichomoniasis 14 64 0 78
Total 4549 4317 3 8869
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through 
the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
Table 9: Rate of notified sexually transmitted infections per 100,000 population by sex, 2000
Sexually Transmitted Infection Male Female Unknown Total
Ano-genital warts 103.8 102.3 0.0 103
Candidiasis 8.8 51.3 0.0 30.2
Chancroid 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.4
Chlamydia trachomatis 36.8 37.2 0.1 37
Genital herpes simplex 4.9 9.9 0.0 7.4
Gonorrhoea 12.7 3.4 0.0 8.0
Granuloma inguinale 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Infectious hepatitis B* 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.4
Lymphogranuloma venereum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Molluscum contagiosum 3.6 2.8 0.0 3.3
Non-specific urethritis 73.5 22 0.0 47.6
Pediculosis pubis 5.2 2.5 0.0 3.8
Syphilis 1.6 0.9 0.0 1.3
Trichomoniasis 0.8 3.5 0.0 2.2
Total 252.7 236.4 0.1 244.6
*Cases of infectious hepatitis B that are sexually transmitted may also be reported through 
the weekly infectious disease report by NDSC.
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Figure 2: Percentage of each notified STI by sex in 2000
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Hepatitis B, 2001
Key Points
• In 2001, there were 342 cases of Hepatitis B virus
(HBV) infection notified to NDSC. This is an 83%
increase in the number of notifications compared 
with 2000.
• Since 1996, there has been an increase in the number
of notifications of HBV per year and in particular,
there was a sharp increase between 1997 and 1998 
and 2000 and 2001.
• Comprehensive information on the epidemiology of
HBV and on the specific risk groups affected by HBV 
is not available. In addition, it is evident that there is
considerable under-notification of HBV in Ireland.
Introduction
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) is one of the major diseases of mankind
and is a serious global public health problem. It is estimated
that of the 2 billion people who have been infected with HBV,
more than 350 million have chronic infections.1 Chronic HBV
infection is associated with the development of chronic liver
disease, including cirrhosis, or primary hepatocellular
carcinoma in later life.
A study carried out between 1998 and 1999 estimated that the
prevalence of HBV in the Republic of Ireland was 0.51%.2
Ireland is therefore characterised as a low prevalence country
for HBV infection. HBV is a notifiable disease in Ireland and 
is notified weekly to the National Disease Surveillance 
Centre (NDSC).
Methods
Since July 2000, cases of HBV are reported weekly to NDSC
via the weekly infectious disease notification system.
Results
In 2001, there were 342 cases of HBV notified to NDSC. This
is an 83% increase in the number of notifications compared
with 2000. There was a ten-fold increase in the number of
notifications between 1997 and 2001 (figure 1).
Table 1 outlines the number of cases and the crude rate of
HBV infection reported in each health board. Three health
boards, namely the Eastern Regional Health Authority (ERHA),
Southern Health Board (SHB) and South Eastern Health Board
(SEHB), notified the majority (82%) of cases. In 2001, the
highest rate (per 100,000 population) of HBV infection
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Figure 1: Cases of HBV notified in a ten-year period from 1991 to 2001
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Figure 2: Cases of HBV notified by health board (1999-2001)
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Figure 3: Number of HBV cases (a) notified to NDSC and (b) identified by the National Virus Reference Laboratory (surface antigen positive) (1990-2000)
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occurred in the SEHB (21.5) and the SHB (17.9). Figure 2
presents the number of HBV notifications in each health
board from 1999 to 2001. With the exception of the ERHA,
there has been an increase in the number of notifications of
HBV in all health boards.
Table 2 gives a breakdown of cases by sex. Of the 342 cases
notified, 54% are male and 40% are female. Table 3 gives the
breakdown by age group. The majority of cases (47%) were in
the 25-34 year old age group.
Figure 3 compares the number of cases of HBV clinically
notified to NDSC with the number of cases of HBV identified
by the National Virus Reference Laboratory (NVRL) from 1990
to 2000.
Discussion
There were 342 cases of HBV reported to NDSC in 2001.
Since 1996, there has been an increase in the number of
notifications per year and in particular, there was a sharp
increase between 1997 and 1998, and 2000 and 2001. The
increase in certain health boards may reflect the introduction
of new screening programs for HBV in certain areas.
It is evident that there is a need for enhanced surveillance of
HBV in Ireland. Currently, comprehensive information on the
epidemiology of HBV and on the specific risk groups affected
by HBV is not available. In addition, some of the reported
cases may be chronic carriers rather than newly infected
persons and currently this information is not collected. In 
addition, the data presented here indicates that there is
considerable under-notification of HBV in Ireland.
Table 1: Number and crude rate (per 100,000 population) of HBV infection notified 
to NDSC by health board (2001)
Health Board Number of cases Crude rate (per 100,000)
ERHA 98 7.6
SHB 98 17.9
SEHB 84 21.5
MWHB 23 7.3
MHB 14 6.8
NEHB 9 2.9
WHB 8 2.3
NWHB 8 3.8
Total 342 9.5
Table 2: Cases of HBV notified by sex (2001)
Sex Number of cases Percentage
Male 185 54.1
Female 137 40.1
Not known 20 5.8
Total 342 100.0
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Table 3: Cases of HBV notified by age group (2001)
Age group (years) Number of cases Percentage
<1 2 0.6
1-4 1 0.3
5-9 6 1.7
10-14 8 2.3
15-19 19 5.5
20-24 41 12.0
25-34 162 47.2
35-44 65 19.2
45-54 15 4.4
55-64 4 1.2
>65 1 0.3
Unknown 18 5.2
Total 342 100.0
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Key Points
• The incidence of salmonellosis in Ireland appears 
to be decreasing, as evident from the weekly 
clinical notification data.
• The crude incidence rate per 100,000 population 
of salmonellosis in Ireland in 2001 was 11.8,
compared to 17.7 in 2000.
• There were 543 clinical isolates of Salmonella 
enterica referred to the National Salmonella 
Reference Laboratory (NSRL) in 2001 for serotyping,
phage typing and antimicrobial sensitivity tests.
• In 2001, S. Enteritidis took over from S. Typhimurium 
as the predominant serotype detected, followed by 
S. Virchow and S. Dublin.
Introduction
Salmonella enterica is an important human pathogen with
over 2,500 distinct serotypes recognised. Most serotypes are
zoonotic pathogens associated with foodborne illness in
Ireland and worldwide. Salmonella Typhi and Paratyphi are
exclusively human pathogens with no animal reservoir. A wide
range of domestic and wild animals may act as sources of
infection with zoonotic S.enterica. Secondary spread from
human cases of salmonellosis may occur although chronic
carriage of serotypes other than S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi 
is rare in humans. In recent years, two serotypes, namely,
S. enterica serotype Enteritidis and S. enterica serotype
Typhimurium have accounted for the majority of cases of
human salmonellosis throughout Europe.
Salmonellosis usually presents as an acute enterocolitis, with
sudden onset of headache, abdominal pain, diarrhoea, nausea
and occasionally vomiting. Fever is almost always present.
Dehydration, especially amongst vulnerable populations such
as infants, the immunocompromised and the elderly, may be
severe. S. Typhi and S. Paratyphi are associated with a severe
systemic life-threatening infection (Enteric fever), but this is
very rare in Ireland and mainly travel-associated.
Prevention, surveillance and control of Salmonella infections 
is of major public health importance. Measures have been
implemented from farm to fork in an attempt to control
spread of this zoonotic agent.
Salmonella in Ireland, 2001
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Materials and Methods
The National Salmonella Reference Laboratory (NSRL) was
established in 2000 in the Department of Medical Microbiology,
University College Hospital, Galway. This laboratory accepts
S. enterica isolates from throughout Ireland for serotyping,
phage typing and antimicrobial susceptibility testing. Molecular
typing is performed selectively in particular to clarify possible
relationships between isolates that are suspected to be
associated with an outbreak.
This report reviews data available from the NSRL and weekly
clinical notifications for the year 2001. These data enable us
to provide an overview of the epidemiology and burden of
disease caused by Salmonella infections in Ireland today.
Results
NSRL data
Demographic information
There were 543 clinical isolates of S. enterica referred to 
NSRL in 2001. The male:female ratio was 1:1. The age groups
and sex of those affected are shown in table 1.
Seasonality
There was a marked seasonality in the number of human
cases reported in 2001 with a sharp peak seen in late 
August (figure 1).
Serotyping, phage typing and antibiotic susceptibility results
The breakdown of Salmonella serotypes by health board is
shown in table 2. The total figures and crude incidence rates
(CIR) are also presented. It should be noted however, that
health board location refers to the location of the clinical
laboratory that the isolate was sent to, and may not
correspond with the geographic location of the cases.
In 2001 S. Enteritidis replaced S. Typhimurium as the
predominant serotype associated with human salmonellosis in
Ireland (table 3). The next most commonly isolated serotypes
were S. Virchow (n=16) and S. Dublin (n=12). There were
nine isolates of S. Typhi detected in 2001, all associated with
travel abroad.
Antimicrobial resistance
The antimicrobial susceptibilities of the most commonly
isolated serotypes in 2001 are presented in table 4. High
levels of resistance were found among S. Typhimurium
isolates, particularly S. Typhimurium DT1O4. Many of these
isolates were resistant to at least five antimicrobial agents,
viz. ampicillin, chloramphenicol, streptomycin, sulphonamide
and tetracycline (ACSSuT).
Results
Clinical notification data
Salmonellosis is a notifiable disease. Medical practitioners are
legally obliged to report all suspected cases. Information on
trends in salmonellosis notifications shows that the crude
incidence rate rose in the 1990s to peak in 1998, and has
been steadily decreasing since then (figure 2). The total
number of notifications in 2001 was 428 compared to 640 
in 2000, and 960 in 1999.
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Figure 1. Isolates of Salmonella enterica referred to NSRL by month, 2001
(Note: month refers to the date the isolate was received in the reference laboratory).
Table 1. Age group and sex of patients from whom clinical isolates of S. enterica 
(n=543) referred to NSRL, 2001
Age group (years) No. of isolates (%) Male Female Unknown
    0-4 104 (19) 46 49 9
  5-14 76 (14) 40 36 0
15-24 92 (17) 38 53 1
25-34 72 (13) 29 37 6
35-44 48 (9) 18 29 1
45-54 39 (7) 20 19 0
55-64 27 (5) 9 17 1
65+ 41 (8) 23 17 1
Not known  44 (8) 21 18 5
Total 543 244 275 24
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Discussion
Salmonella remains an important enteric pathogen and is
responsible for a significant burden of human illness as
evident from the data presented in this report.
The detailed typing laboratory data being generated by the
NSRL are enabling us to monitor salmonella trends more
accurately and is providing us with detailed information
regarding the epidemiology of this pathogen in Ireland.
Analysis of the serotyping results reveals that in 2001, S.
Enteritidis was the predominant serotype, followed by S.
Typhimurium. This was a change from the results of the
previous three years and now mirrors the trend seen in the
UK and most of the rest of Europe with S. Enteritidis being
the commonest serotype.
Detailed serotyping, phage and molecular typing, in
conjunction with antibiogram profiling of all Salmonella
Table 2.  Serotypes of Salmonella enterica by health board, 2001
Serotype ERHA MHB MWHB NEHB NWHB SEHB SHB WHB Total
Abony 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Agona 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
Albany 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Anatum 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Argentina 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Bareilly 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Braenderup 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Brandenburg 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
Bredeney 3 0 1 0 0 4 2 1 11
Cerro 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Coeln 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Corvallis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Derby 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
Dublin 6 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 12
Enteritidis 94 13 15 6 15 25 62 18 248
Garba 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Haardt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Hadar 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 4
Haifa 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Hato 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Heidelberg 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 7
Hofit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Infantis 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  2
Java 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Johannesburg 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
Kentucky 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4
Limete 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mbandaka 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Mikawasima 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Molade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Newington 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Newport 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
Othmarschen 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Paratyphi B 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Putten 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Rissen 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Rostock 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Saintpaul 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Schwarzengrund 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Senftenberg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Stanley 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Stanleyville 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Typhi 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9
Typhimurium 58 19 21 14 9 12 25 7 165
Uganda 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
Unnamed 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
Veneziana 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Virchow 8 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 16
Wein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Zanzibar 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 211 43 42 28 25 51 98 45 543
CIR*  16.3  20.9 13.2 9.1 11.9 13.0 17.9 12.8 15.0
*CIR = Crude incidence rate / 100,000 population
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Figure 2.  Crude rate of salmonellosis in Ireland per 100,000 population 1982-2001.
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Table 3. Serotypes of S. enterica referred to NSRL by year.
No. of isolates (%)
Serotype 1998 1999 2000 2001
S. Enteritidis 60 (8) 155 (33) 239 (36) 248 (46)
S. Typhimurium 578 (80) 200 (42) 286 (43) 165 (30)
S. Bredeney 15 (2) 55 (12) 24 (4) 11 (2)
S. Kentucky 14 (2) 12 (3) 15 (3) 4 (1)
All other serotypes 54 (7) 52 (11) 101 (15) 115 (21)
Total 721 474 665 543
Table 4. Antimicrobial susceptibilities of human Salmonella enterica serotypes isolated 
in Ireland in 2001.
     % Resistance
Serotype N Amp Chl Strep Sulph Tet Trim Nal
S. Enteritidis 248 7 0.4 5 7 12 2 24
S. Typhimurium 165 65 59 63 65 65 28 2
S. Virchow 16 6 0 0 6 6 12 69
S. Dublin 12 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
S. Bredeney 11 0 0 18 18 18 0 0
S. Heidelburg 7 29 0 0 0 0 0 14
S. Stanley 4 0 0 75 75 75 25 50
S. Kentucky 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amp = Ampicillin, Chl = Chloramphenicol, Strep = Streptomycin, 
Sulph = Sulphonamide, Tet = Tetracycline, Trim = Trimethoprim, Nal = Naladixic acid
isolates has also proved invaluable for tracing of isolates
through the food chain and enables outbreaks to be detected
in a timely fashion. In 2001, a number of clusters of unusual
Salmonella strains were detected by the reference lab in this
way e.g. a small cluster of S. Typhimurium phage type U310
isolates.
Analysis of the 2001 NSRL dataset has again emphasised 
the scale of the problem of antimicrobial resistance amongst
Salmonella isolates, particularly S. Typhimurium DT104.
This is now recognised as a global problem and to this end
the NDSC Strategy for the Control of Antimicrobial Resistance
in Ireland (SARI) is endeavouring to deal with this problem.
The incidence (per 100,000 population) of recognised
salmonellosis outbreaks and of sporadic laboratory-
confirmed salmonellosis cases associated with S. Enteritidis,
S. Typhimurium or S. Kentucky is lower in Ireland than 
in England, Northern Ireland or Scotland. It is difficult to
determine if this reflects a true difference in incidence or 
a difference in ascertainment.
The incidence rates of laboratory-confirmed human
salmonellosis have declined significantly in the past number
of years. This has coincided with an overall decrease in the
incidence of salmonellosis at EU level. The Department of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Development Salmonella
monitoring programme, the Bord Bia Egg Quality Assurance
scheme and education campaigns targeting consumers and
catering establishments may all have contributed to this
downward trend.
Control of zoonotic agents, including Salmonella enterica,
is a priority at EU level particularly with the advent of the
new European Food Safety Authority. The first Irish Zoonosis
Report will be published shortly, and for the first time report
trends on zoonoses in Ireland, merging animal, food and
clinical data.
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Campylobacteriosis in
Ireland, 2000
Key Points
• Campylobacter continues to be the most common
bacterial cause of gastroenteritis in Ireland.
• In 2000, there were 1613 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of campylobacteriosis in Ireland (compared 
to 2085 cases in 1999).
• The highest burden of illness was seen in the 0-4 
year age group.
• Campylobacteriosis was found predominantly in 
males in several age groups.
• A peak in cases was recorded in early summer
during 2000.
Introduction
Infections due to Campylobacter spp are the most commonly
isolated bacterial cause of human gastrointestinal illness, and
reports of campylobacteriosis in Ireland, the UK, and other
countries with temperate climates have been increasing since
the organism was first recognised as a human pathogen in
1972. Campylobacter jejuni is the predominant species
associated with human illness, with the remainder mostly
being C. coli.
Campylobacteriosis presents as a diarrhoeal illness. The
diarrhoea is often bloody and is frequently associated with
acute abdominal pain. Symptoms may subside after a number
of days or may persist for weeks. Rarely, some long-term
sequelae may develop such as arthritis and approximately one
in every 1000 cases leads to a severe neurological disorder
called Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS).
In 2000, NDSC conducted the first national survey of the
incidence of human campylobacteriosis in Ireland. Valuable
information was derived from that study regarding the
epidemiology of laboratory-confirmed campylobacteriosis
which supplemented further investigations in this field by the
Food Safety Authority of Ireland. This review presents the data
from the second year of this laboratory survey.
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Methods
NDSC requested laboratories and/or public health doctors to
provide disaggregated information on all laboratory-confirmed
cases of campylobacteriosis diagnosed in 2000. The following
minimum dataset was requested: identifier, date of birth/age,
sex, address and date of onset/isolation/ reporting. In regions
where laboratory surveillance systems were in place, this
information was requested from their databases. Duplicates
were removed where detected. Data were assigned a health
board and a county where address was supplied. Analyses
were carried out using MS Excel and Access.
Direct methods of standardisation were applied using the Irish
population as the standard population. Population data were
taken from the 1996 census. Species differentiation of isolates
was not requested.
Results
Information on Campylobacter was obtained from all health
boards. Information on age was missing in 11% of cases and
information on sex was incomplete in 0.2% of cases. Data on
age were not available on many cases in two health board
areas (Midland, 40%; and Western, 21%). Those without age
were not presented in age standardised charts.
Incidence
In total, 1613 cases of laboratory-confirmed campylobacteriosis
were reported in 2000, in Ireland. This gives a crude incidence
rate (CIR) of 44.5 per 100,000 population. This compared
with a CIR of 57.5 per 100,000 in 1999 (table 1).
Sex
Males accounted for 56% of cases and females 44%, where
gender data were given (table 2). This showed an overall male:
female ratio of 1.29:1. A very similar result was found in 1999,
with a ratio of male: female of 1.28:1.
Seasonality
Campylobacter has a well characterised seasonal distribution,
with a peak in early summer seen each year and this is
evident when the trend over time is examined. Table 3 shows
the cases as they occurred in each health board by month.
Figure 1 shows the occurrence of cases by week for Ireland in
2000. In 1999, a peak was seen in week 25 however, a sharp
peak in week 23 is noted for 2000.
Age standardised rates were then calculated to allow
comparisons between areas to be made without the
confounding effects of age (figure 2). In 2000, the highest
incidence was recorded in the Western region of the country,
with the lowest incidence seen in the North Eastern region. A
similar pattern was observed in 1999. Table 4 depicts the
crude incidence rates (CIR) and age standardised incidence
rates (ASIR) per 100,000 population by health board in 2000.
The age-standardised data are mapped and presented in
figure 3 below. Table 5 below shows the age distribution of
cases by health board and demonstrates that there is a large
burden of illness in children under 5 years of age, and mirrors
the results found in 1999. When we examine age-specific
incidence rates for each age group, the burden of illness in
this age group is even more evident (figure 4). Looking more
closely at those cases, the age distribution for children under
5 years is illustrated in figure 5.
Table 1. Number of cases and crude incidence rate (CIR) by health board in Ireland for 
1999 and 2000
 1999 2000 
Health Board No. of CIR (incl. 95% C.I.) No of CIR (incl. 95% C.I.)
cases cases
ERHA 591 45.6 [41.9-49.3] 472 36.4 [33.1-39.7]
Midland 83 40.4 [31.7-49.1] 63 30.7 [23.1-38.2]
Mid-Western  103 32.5 [26.2-38.8] 73 23.0 [17.7-28.3]
North Eastern  74 24.2 [18.7-29.7] 51 16.7 [12.1-21.2]
North Western 118 56.0 [45.9-66.1] 100 47.4 [38.1-56.7]
South Eastern  219 55.9 [48.5-63.3]  226 57.7 [50.2-65.3]
Southern 507 92.7 [84.7-101.0] 337 61.6 [55.1-68.2]
Western  390 110.7 [99.7-122.0] 291 82.6 [73.1-92.1]
Ireland 2085 57.5 1613 44.5
Table 2. The number of cases by health board and sex, in 2000.
Health Board Males Females Total
ERHA 270 202 472 
Midland 39 24 63 
Mid-Western 45 28 73 
North Eastern 26 25 51 
North Western 57 43 100 
South Eastern 121 105 226 
Southern 172 164 337 
Western 172 116 291 
Ireland 902 707 1613 
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Figure 1. Total cases of campylobacteriosis by week (2000) in Ireland.
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Gender distribution
The variance in gender distribution that was first noted in
1999 was again evident from analysis of the data in 2000.
In every age-group except 25-35 years and 65+, there was a
predominance of male cases. This is shown in figure 6 when
the data are adjusted for age and sex.
Discussion
These data reveal a crude incidence rate of 44.5 cases per
100,000 persons in Ireland in 2000. Overall a decrease in 
the crude incidence rate was seen in Ireland in 2000 when
compared with 1999 (57.5/100,000). This decrease was 
most notable in three health board regions/authority, viz.
the Eastern, Western, and Southern. Despite the decrease
however, campylobacteriosis remains the single biggest cause
of bacterial gastroenteric infection in Ireland. It should be
noted that these are laboratory-confirmed cases and the real
burden of illness is even higher.
Higher rates were seen for the same period in Northern
Ireland (59.75/100,000), England and Wales (101.7/100,000)
and Scotland (126.7/100,000). These data also represented a
decrease from 1999 figures for England and Wales. However,
the rates in Northern Ireland and Scotland increased.
Most cases of Campylobacter infection are sporadic and
suggested risk factors for infection have included ingestion of
undercooked poultry meats and handling raw poultry, contact
with pets, especially puppies, consumption of unpasteurised
milk or dairy products and drinking water from contaminated/
untreated supplies. Recent evidence suggesting that
Campylobacter has a low infectious dose, implies that cross-
contamination of ready-to-eat foods by raw meats may be an
important source of infection.
C. jejuni and C. coli can be isolated from the intestines of
healthy farm animals, poultry, pets and wild birds. These
organisms rarely cause disease in these animals and the
carriage rate is believed to be quite high, particularly in
poultry. On-farm control measures such as bio-security have
not been as effective in controlling Campylobacter infections,
compared to the success rate with Salmonella. Clear messages
must be given that thorough cooking of meat and good
personal hygiene will help to prevent illness in the home.
In this study, details of speciation and further sub-typing
information were not available for many of the health board
regions. In order to fully understand the epidemiology and
virulence of this organism it is necessary to be able to
accurately identify the isolates that are causing illness in
humans compared to animals. Improved detection methods
and developments in the area of molecular typing of isolates
are also required. A national laboratory study on methodologies
employed for detection of Campylobacter was carried out in
2001 as part of a larger European survey on Campylobacter
surveillance and diagnostics. The findings of that study clearly
demonstrated that there is a need for a European-wide
Campylobacter surveillance network, possibly in combination
with the EU-funded working group ‘Campy-net’.
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Figure 2.  Age standardised incidence rates (AISR), compared to crude incidence rates
(CIR) for Campylobacter enteritis in each health board, 2000. 95% confidence 
intervals included.
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Table 3. Cases by month (2000) for each health board in Ireland
E M MW NE NW SE S W Total
Jan 43 1 5 2 7 21 26 12 117
Feb 18 2 4 9 7 18 37 15 110
Mar 51 5 9 6 12 28 47 33 191
Apr 61 3 4 7 9 13 30 19 146
May 55 6 16 4 6 30 45 40 202
Jun 49 9 5 4 18 22 44 15 166
Jul 47 0 4 4 13 28 34 15 145
Aug 25 2 7 2 7 7 23 18 91
Sept 40 5 7 4 6 22 9 21 114
Oct 42 1 3 5 3 7 8 24 93
Nov 18 3 6 1 7 20 20 18 93
Dec 23 1 3 3 5 10 14 0 59
N/K 25 61 
Total 472 63 73 51 100 226 337 291 1613
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Figure 3. Age-standardised rates of campylobacteriosis in Ireland by health board, 2000
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Table 4. Crude incidence rates (CIR) and age standardised incidence rates (ASIR) 
per 100,000 population by health board in 2000
Health Board CIR [95% CI] ASIR [95% CI]
ERHA 36.4 [33.1-39.7] 32.4 [29.3-35.3]
Midland 30.7 [ 23.1-38.2] 18.0 [12.2-23.9]
Mid-Western 23.0 [ 17.7-28.3] 18.4 [13.7-23.2]
North Eastern 16.7 [12.1-21.2] 10.3 [6.7-13.8]
North Western 47.4 [38.1-56.7] 46.5 [37.2-55.7]
South Eastern 57.7 [50.2-65.3] 56.9 [49.4-64.3]
Southern 61.6 [55.1-68.2] 61.6 [55.0-68.2]
Western 82.6 [73.1-92.1] 65.7 [57.1-74.3]
Ireland 44.5 
Table 5. Age-distribution by health board in 2000
Age group E M MW NE NW SE S W Total
(years)
0-4 92 8 17 12 35 87 140 95 486
5-9 24 1 7 4 12 16 21 20 105
10-14 17 1 2 2 3 20 11 12 68
15-19 16 4 2 0 5 7 11 5 50
20-24 27 0 4 1 6 18 21 19 96
25-34 91 11 8 2 8 25 45 18 208
35-44 79 3 6 4 9 17 27 16 161
45-54 30 2 3 3 4 6 22 15 85
55-64 23 1 3 2 5 10 17 8 69
65+ 28 6 6 2 11 16 18 18 105
NK* 45 26 15 19 2 4 4 65 180
Total 472 63 73 51 100 226 337 291 1613
* NK = not known
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Much work is needed to help to reduce the burden of illness
caused by this zoonotic agent. The Food Safety Authority of
Ireland identified prevention and control of foodborne illness
due to Campylobacter as a key priority and to this end, a
multi-disciplinary group was established by FSAI to identify
control measures to combat Campylobacter infections from
farm to fork. The report from this working group is due to be
published shortly.
Additional investigations are needed in Ireland to examine the
epidemiology of this organism and attempt to provide
answers to the questions that the data presented in this
report pose, such as, the high incidence in very young
children, the bias towards male cases and the geographical
distribution of cases. A recent publication from Australia3
describes a matched case-control study conducted to identify
risk factors for Campylobacter infection in infants and young
children. Ownership of pet puppies and pet chickens and
consumption of mayonnaise were identified as being
independently associated with illness.
Campylobacter is a major cause of human gastrointestinal
illness. Work towards its control must be a priority if 
the burden of human infectious intestinal disease is to 
be reduced.
200
160
120
80
20
0
180
140
100
60
40
N
o.
 o
f c
as
es
Age (years)
< 1 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 5: Cases of campylobacteriosis in children under 5 years in Ireland (2000)
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Figure 4. Age-specific incidence rates for campylobacteriosis in Ireland, 2000
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Figure 6: Age-sex adjusted incidence according to age-group in 2000
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The Epidemiology of
Verocytotoxigenic E. coli
O157:H7 in Ireland, 2001
Key Points
• E. coli O157 is an emerging pathogen and a serious
global public health concern.
• There were 52 confirmed cases of VTEC O157 in 
Ireland in 2001, compared with 42 cases in 2000.
• Haemolytic uraemic syndrome developed in 8% 
of cases in 2001.
• The increasing role of animal contact and
environmental modes of transmission is being
recognised.
Introduction
Strains of E. coli that produce potent cytotoxins active on
Vero cells were first reported in Canada in 1977. These
organisms are described as Vero cytotoxin producing E. coli
(VTEC) but have also been called Shiga-like toxin producing
E. coli and Shiga toxin producing E. coli, and the term
enterohaemorrhagic E. coli was introduced for strains that
cause bloody diarrhoea.
E. coli O157 and other VTEC infections cause a wide range of
illnesses, from mild diarrhoea to haemorrhagic colitis with
severe abdominal pain and bloody diarrhoea. The illness is
usually self-limiting and resolves after about eight days.
However, in one-third to one-half of diagnosed cases the
patient is hospitalised and 2-7% develop haemolytic uraemic
syndrome (HUS), a form of renal failure whose fatality rate
has been reported to be 3 to 17%. HUS is a more likely
complication in young children. In adults, VTEC infection may
be followed by thrombotic thrombocytopaenic purpura (TTP).1
At present in Ireland there is no statutory requirement to
notify E. coli O157:H7. We also do not yet have a national
reference laboratory facility for confirmation of toxin
production and definitive typing of VTEC. However, in 2001,
the ERHA Public Health Laboratory in Cherry Orchard
Hospital commenced provision of a verotoxin testing service
for VTEC isolates.
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Methods
In 1999, NDSC in co-operation with Directors of Public Health
in each health board region established an epidemiological
surveillance system for VTEC O157:H7. Since 1999, Specialists
in Public Health Medicine and Area Medical Officers have
participated in a system whereby a standard dataset of
information is collected on each case identified and reported
to NDSC. This information includes socio-demographic data,
clinical data, possible risk factors and information on links
between cases. An initial notification to NDSC is made on 
the date of notification of the case to the health board, and
follow-up information is returned when available. Several
participants in the system also notify other non-O157:H7
verocytotoxin-producing E. coli.
The case definitions that have been used in this system 
are shown as follows:
Suspected:
• A case of post-diarrhoeal HUS or TTP.
Probable:
• A case with isolation of E. coli O157 from a clinical
specimen (asymptomatic or symptomatic), pending
confirmation of H7 or Shiga toxin or
• A clinically compatible case that is epidemiologically linked
to a confirmed or probable case.
Confirmed:
• A case that has isolation of E. coli O157:H7 from a specimen
or isolation of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli O157:NM 
(non motile) from a clinical specimen.
Probable cases that were subsequently confirmed as not H7
or Shiga toxin producing were removed from the database.
A travel-associated case is defined as one where there has
been international travel within two weeks prior to onset 
of illness.
Results
In 2001, 52 cases of VTEC O157 were notified to NDSC. Two
of these cases occurred in non-Irish residents and therefore
were not included in the estimation of population-based
rates. These cases are however, included in the descriptive
epidemiology.
The incidence of VTEC O157 in Ireland from 1996-2001 is
shown in table 1. There has been some regional variation in
the numbers of cases reported (table 2). The 2001 age-
standardised data are mapped and presented in figure 1
below.
Gender data were available for 47 cases, of which 28 were
female (60%) and 19 (40%) were male. The majority of cases
occurred in young children in the 1-4 year age group, followed
by the 25-44 age-group (table 3). However, when the age-
specific incidence rate in cases in Irish residents is examined,
Table 1. Number of cases of VTEC O157 and crude incidence rate (incl. 95% CI) in Ireland, 
1996-2001
Year Numbers of  Crude incidence rate (incl. 95% CI) 
confirmed cases per 100,000 population
1996 8 0.2 [0.1-0.4]
1997 31 0.8 [0.5-1.2]
1998 76 2.1 [1.6-2.6]
1999 51 1.4 [1.0-1.8]
2000 37 (42) 1.0 [0.7-1.4]
2001 50 (52) 1.4 [1.0-1.8]
In 2000, 42 cases notified, but 5 occurred in non-Irish residents
In 2001, 52 cases notified, but 2 occurred in non-Irish residents
Table 2. Crude incidence rate (CIR) and age standardised incidence rate (ASIR) 
with 95% confidence intervals by health board, Ireland, 2000-2001
2001 2000
Health CIR [95% CI] ASIR [95% CI] CIR [95% CI] ASIR [95% CI]
board per 100,000 per 100,000 per 100,000 per 100,000
ERHA 0.9 [0.4-1.5] 0.9 [0.4-1.5] 0.5 [0.1-0.9] 0.5 [0.1-1.0]
MHB 2.4 [0.3-4.6] 2.4 [0.3-4.6] 3.4 [0.9-5.9] 3.3 [0.9-5.7]
MWHB 0.9 [0.1-2.0] 0.9 [0.1-2.0] 0.9 [0.1-2.0] 0.9 [0.1-2.0]
NEHB 1.3 [0.0-2.6] 1.3 [0.0-2.5] 0 0
NWHB 0.5 [0.5-1.4] 0.6 [0.5-1.6] 0.5 [0.5-1.4] 0.4 [0.4-1.2]
SEHB 2.6 [1.0-4.1] 2.5 [1.0-4.1] 1.5 [0.3-2.8] 1.5 [0.3-2.8]
SHB 1.3 [0.3-2.3] 1.2 [0.3-2.3] 0.5 [0.0-1.2] 0.5 [0.1-1.2]
WHB 2.0 [0.5-3.5] 2.0 [0.5-3.5] 2.8 [1.1-4.6] 2.9 [1.1-4.7]
Total 1.4 [1.0-1.8]  1.0 [0.7-1.4] 
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the high incidence in the 0-4 year olds is more notably
reflected (figure 2).
Seasonality of VTEC O157
The majority of cases were seen to occur in the late summer/
early autumn, with a peak seen in September (figure 3).
Travel-association
Six cases were travel-associated (table 4). The countries
visited within 14 days of onset of illness were Canary Islands
(2), Turkey (2), Finland and Canada.
Clinical features
In total, 40 out of 52 confirmed cases (77%) were
symptomatic, with 12 cases (23%) being asymptomatic.
Reported symptoms included bloody diarrhoea in 24 (60%) 
of cases, and HUS in 3 cases (8%).
The three cases of HUS occurred in children under 12 years 
of age. Two were female and one was male. Only one of the
cases reported bloody diarrhoea. All of the cases recovered
but one required dialysis in hospital for a significant period of
time. This case occurred in a two-year old female child and
was part of an outbreak. The child was attending a crèche
and several other children in the crèche became ill. The
source of transmission for the index case was suspected to 
be consumption of water from a private well.
Microbiological investigation
In 2001, a number of food and water samples epidemiologically
linked to cases were examined for the presence of VTEC
organisms but no positives isolates were found.
Phage typing of isolates revealed that as in previous years,
the predominant type detected was PT 32 (table 5).
The population of phage types was found to be more
homogeneous than that seen in previous years.
Epidemiological investigation
As was the situation in 1999 and 2000, active investigation of
many of the cases in 2001 led to the identification of further,
previously undiagnosed VTEC cases. As a result of following
up apparently sporadic cases, eleven family outbreaks and one
generalised outbreak that occurred in a crèche were detected.
The index case in the crèche outbreak was admitted to
hospital with HUS. As the child attended a crèche all
attendees of this crèche and household contacts were
screened. This investigation revealed 15 people (10 of the
attending children, the proprietor of the crèche, 2 mothers
and 2 uncles) who were identified as having had
gastrointestinal symptoms over a 4-week period. However,
Table 3. Cases of VTEC O157 by age group, 2001
Age group (years) Number of cases Percent
<1 5 9.5
1-4 11 21.0
5-9 7 13.0
10-14 4 8.0
15-24  6  12.0
25-44 10 19.0
45-64 6 11.5
65+ 2 4.0
Unknown 1 2.0
 Total 52 100
Figure 1: Age Standardised incidence (ASIR) rates of VTEC O157 by health board 
in Ireland, 2001.
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the majority of these cases had become ill over a 3-day
period and were directly linked to the crèche. The crèche 
was closed while the investigation ensued. No suspect foods
or other risk factors were identified.
Descriptive epidemiological information is collected on 
cases in order to attempt to identify potential risk factors for
exposure to VTEC. A number of suspect foods were reported
by cases but as the majority of these were from sporadic
cases it was impossible to link them epidemiologically.
No cases reported consumption of unpasteurised milk or
cheese. Of 39 cases where information was collected on
water source, the water supply was public in 27 (69%) cases,
private well water in 11 (28%) cases, and from a group
scheme in one case (3%). Contact with farm animals was
reported in 10 (25%) cases (n=40).
Information on whether the case attended a crèche, or was 
an in-patient in a nursing home, hospital or other institution-
alised setting, was also collected. The index case attended 
a crèche in 7 cases. In 7 cases the index case attended 
a primary school. Three cases were identified as food handlers.
One case was an in-patient in hospital when VTEC was
detected. No cases attended a nursing home facility.
Non-O157 VTEC
There were four cases of confirmed VTEC O26 reported in
2001, three cases from the NWHB and one from the SHB.
All the cases were children and one attended a crèche.
None of the cases developed HUS.
Discussion
Since the establishment of the NDSC Enhanced Surveillance
System for VTEC O157 in 1999, we have been building up a
picture of the epidemiology of this group of organisms in
Ireland and compare trends with other countries. The incidence
rate in the Republic of Ireland in 2001 was 1.4 per 100,000
population compared to 1.45/100,000 in England and Wales,
and 4.6/100,000 in Scotland.
Undoubtedly, VTEC infections cause substantial morbidity and
mortality. The severe complications that can be associated
with infection, namely HUS in children and TTP in adults are
particularly associated with significant mortality. In 2001 in
Ireland, 60% of cases reported symptoms of bloody diarrhoea
and 8% of cases developed HUS.
Studies undertaken worldwide over the past number of years
have revealed the full complexity and ecology of VTEC O157
infection. One notable feature has been the range of modes
of transmission of this organism. Several modes of
transmission from the animal reservoir have been
demonstrated (food-, water-, environmental- and animal-
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person spread). In addition, person-to-person transmission
has been demonstrated in households, crèches, hospitals and
nursing homes. In particular, the emergence of direct or
indirect transmission from animal and/or the environment has
been demonstrated. In Ireland in 2001, 28% of cases
reported drinking water from a private well and 25% of cases
reported contact with farm animals in the period prior to
onset of illness.
The notification of VTEC O26 cases again in 2001 highlights
the importance of extending the enhanced surveillance
system to non-O157 VTEC. A Working Group has been set up
by a sub-committee of the NDSC Scientific Advisory
Committee to review the clinical management and
surveillance of VTEC infections in Ireland. It is hoped that one
of the recommendations of this review will be to extend the
current enhanced system to include all verotoxin-producing
serogroups and also to commence surveillance of cases of
HUS.
Table 4. Phage type, association with international travel and countries visited within 
14 days of onset of illness, for cases of E. coli O157:H7, Ireland, 2001
Phage Not travel Travel Countries Total
type associated associated
14 2 0 2
32 30 3 Turkey, Canary Islands, Finland 33
8  6 2 Turkey, Canada 8
71 0 1 Canary Islands 1
N/A 8   0  8
Total 46 6  52
Table 5. Phage types of cases of E. coli O157:H7 by health board, Ireland, 2001
Health board 14 32 8 71 N/A Total
ERHA 0 8 2 1 1 12
MHB 0 6 0 0 0 6
MWHB 0 3 0 0 0 3
NEHB 0 2 1 0 1 4
NWHB 0 0 0 0 1 1
SEHB 2 6 2 0 0 10
SHB 0 6 1 0 2 9
WHB 0 2 2 0 3 7
Total 2 33 8 1 8 52
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Influenza Activity and
Surveillance, 2001/2002
Key Points
• Influenza activity in Ireland was mild during 
the 2001/2002 influenza season, peaking in 
February 2002.
• Influenza A (H3N2) was the predominant 
circulating strain.
• A new strain of influenza virus, influenza A (H1N2)
was identified by the NVRL this season from
sentinel specimens.
Introduction
Influenza is one of the oldest and commonest diseases known
to man. Cases of influenza occur every winter, but the impact
on morbidity, mortality and health services varies depending
on the circulating strain of virus and the level of pre-existing
immunity in the community.1 2
There are three types of influenza virus A, B and C. Influenza C
rarely causes human illness. The clinical course of influenza B
changes little from year to year and is usually milder than
influenza A. Influenza A varies considerably and is responsible
for epidemics and pandemics.3 Influenza A viruses are divided
into two subtypes on the basis of two surface glycoproteins,
haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N). Minor changes in
the surface glycoproteins are known as antigenic drift.
Antigenic drift occurs between each influenza season. These
minor changes necessitate annual reformulation of the
influenza vaccine, which is based on the current circulating
strains. Major changes in the surface glycoproteins occur
infrequently and are known as antigenic shift, these result in
the emergence of a novel virus that may be capable of
causing an influenza pandemic. The Spanish Flu Pandemic of
1918 is acknowledged as the most devastating, resulting in an
estimated 20-40 million deaths worldwide.3 4 
In February 2002, the World Health Organisation (WHO)
announced the isolation of a new strain of influenza A virus.
Since 1977, two influenza A virus subtypes, A (H1N1) and A
(H3N2) have circulated widely among humans. The new
strain, influenza A (H1N2) appears to have resulted from the
reassortment of genes in the current circulating H1N1 and
H3N2 subtypes. Influenza A (H1N2) has been isolated from
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humans in Ireland, England, Scotland, France, Israel, Egypt, the
US and Canada during the 2001/2002 influenza season. This
strain was previously detected in China during the 1988/1989
influenza season. Further spread of these reassortment viruses
in humans did not occur at the time. As the new strain is a
combination of the two components (H1N1 and H3N2)
present in the 2001/2002 influenza vaccine, vaccinees should
have a good level of immunity. Those not vaccinated should
also have some immunity as the H1N1 and H3N2 strains
have been in circulation for the last two decades. To date, no
unusual clinical illnesses are associated with the new strain.5 6
The identification of this strain by the National Virus
Reference Laboratory (NVRL) is highly significant; it highlights
how effective the sentinel surveillance scheme is in
identifying new influenza strains in a timely manner. This will
be crucial in the event of an influenza epidemic or pandemic.
The composition of the vaccine for the 2002/2003 Northern
Hemisphere influenza season is: A/New Caledonia/20/99
(H1N1)- like virus, A/Panama (H3N2)-like virus (the widely
used vaccine strain A/Panama/2007/99 is an A/Moscow/10
/99-like virus) and B/Hong Kong/330/2001 (a B Victoria-like
virus). The H1N1 and H3N2 components are considered to
provide good protection against the new influenza A (H1N2)
strain.7
Influenza surveillance is essential during a pandemic or
interpandemic period to allow planning of control measures
such as vaccinations. A national surveillance system must be
able to:
• Detect increased influenza activity in the community.
• Report on influenza activity accurately and in a timely fashion.
• Confirm which influenza strains are circulating.3  8 
This is the second year of influenza surveillance using
computerised sentinel general practices in Ireland. The
National Disease Surveillance Centre (NDSC) is working in
collaboration with the NVRL and the Irish College of General
Practitioners (ICGP).
Materials and Methods
Clinical data
Thirty-two general practices were recruited to report
electronically, on a weekly basis, the number of patients with
influenza-like illness (ILI). ILI is defined as the sudden onset of
symptoms with a temperature of 38oC or more, with two or
more of the following: headache, sore throat, dry cough and
myalgia. Patients were those attending for the first time with
these symptoms.
In total, the 32 sentinel general practices cover an estimated
total practice population size of 87,619, representing 2.4% of
the population. The 32 practices include 20 practices from the
2000/2001 influenza season and 12 new recruits. Practices are
located in all health boards with their location based on the
population of each health board (table 1).
The influenza surveillance period runs from week 40 in
October to week 20 in May, with the week running Monday
to Sunday. Sentinel GPs send a report to the ICGP
electronically every Tuesday. All data received are anonymous.
Information recorded includes the general practitioner ID
number and patient data (date of birth, gender, date seen,
diagnosis, weekending, week number and health board). If
there are no cases of ILI, zero reporting is required.
Table 1: Number of sentinel GPs by health board, percentage of total practice population 
and percentage of population in each health board, 2001/2002 season
Health Board/ Number of GPs % of total practice % of population
Authority (n=32) population (n=87,619) (n=3,606,287)
ERHA 12 31.9 35.7
MHB 1 3.4 5.7
MWHB 2 4.8 8.7
NEHB 1 5.7 8.4
NWHB 2 5.1 5.8
SEHB 6 32.9 10.8
SHB 6 11.0 15.1
WHB 2 5.3 9.7
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Figure 1: GP consultation rate for influenza-like illness per 100,000 population by report week, during the 2000/2001 and 2001/2002 influenza seasons.
2000/2001 2001/2002
Virological data
Sentinel GPs are asked to send a combined nasopharyngeal
and throat swab on one patient per week where a clinical
diagnosis of ILI was made. All materials necessary for
swabbing, including instructions, easily identifiable laboratory
forms and stamped addressed envelopes complying with An
Post regulations, were supplied by the NVRL at the
commencement of the surveillance season. Swabs were sent
to the NVRL for testing using Shell Vial and PCR techniques.
The NVRL supplied results on a weekly basis on the number
of swabs received from each of the practices. The date of
swab receipt, sex, date of birth, and positive or negative
results by PCR and/or Shell Vial by type and subtype are all
reported.
Regional influenza activity
The Departments of Public Health send an influenza activity
index (no report, no activity, sporadic-, localised-, regional- or
widespread activity) every week, to NDSC. The activity index
is analogous to that used by the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance System and the European Influenza Surveillance
Scheme. The index is based on sentinel GP ILI consultation
rates, laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza, sentinel
hospital admissions data and/or sentinel school absenteeism
levels. Sentinel hospital data are based on: total admissions
per week, total A & E admissions per week and total
respiratory admissions per week (the definition of respiratory
illness in this instance includes upper respiratory tract
infection, lower respiratory tract infection, pneumonia,
asthma, chronic bronchitis, and exacerbations of chronic
obstructive airways disease). One sentinel hospital was
located in each health board. Sentinel primary and secondary
schools in each health board are located in close vicinity to
the sentinel GPs. Each sentinel school reports absenteeism
data on a weekly basis. The activity index by health board is
included in a map of Ireland in the weekly influenza report.
Weekly influenza surveillance report
NDSC is responsible for producing a weekly influenza report,
which is sent to all those involved in influenza surveillance
and also posted on the NDSC website. Results of clinical and
virological data are reported, along with a map of influenza
activity, and a summary of influenza activity worldwide.
Results
Clinical data
GP consultations for influenza-like illness (ILI) were reported
on a weekly basis per 100,000 population from week 40, 2001
to week 20, 2002 (figure 1). Influenza activity was very mild
during the 2001/2002 influenza season compared to the
previous season. The peak GP consultation rate occurred during
week 12, with a rate of 29 per 100,000 population. This is
compared to a peak rate of 121 per 100,000 during the 2000/
2001 influenza season. It was only during weeks 44, 47, and
48, 2001 and weeks 18, 19 and 20, 2002 that the rates were
marginally higher than the previous season. The peak age-specific
consultation rate during the 2001/2002 season was in the 
35-39 year age group (figure 2), with the overall rate slightly
higher in males. A total of 279 ILI cases were reported by
sentinel GPs during the 2001/2002-influenza season.
Virological data
The NVRL received 242 swabs from sentinel GPs during the
2001/2002 influenza season. Sixty-five (26.9%) of these were
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Figure 2: Cumulative age- and sex-specific ILI rate per 100,000 population between week 40, 2001 and week 20, 2002. The denominator used in the age- and sex-specific consultation rate 
is from the 1996 census data; this assumes that the age and sex distribution of the sentinel general practices is similar to the national age and sex distribution.
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Figure 3: Number and percentage of influenza virus detections during the 2001/2002-influenza season.
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Figure 4: Number of specimens positive for influenza virus by type, subtype and age (years) between week 40, 2001 and week 20, 2002.
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positive for influenza virus (figure 3 and table 2). Influenza
virus was only detected between weeks 3 and 17, 2002. The
highest number of positive swabs was during week 6, with
69% of swabs positive [50% of these were influenza A
(H3N2)]. During the period of peak clinical activity, week 12,
58% of swabs were positive. Only one (1.5%) influenza B
virus was detected this season. Influenza A accounted for 64
(98.5%) of the positive swabs: 5 (7.7%) influenza A (H1N1)
and 15 (23.1%) influenza A (H1N2). Influenza A (H3N2)
predominated this season with 44 (67.7%) swabs positive,
peaking in the 30 to 34 year age group (figure 4).
Influenza A (H1N2)
Fifteen influenza A (H1N2) viruses were detected in Ireland
during weeks 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 17, 2002. Influenza A
(H1N2) accounted for 23.1% of all positive specimens and
23.4% of all influenza A positive specimens. Influenza A
(H1N2) is the new strain of influenza virus announced by the
WHO in February 2002. Eleven of the 15 cases detected
were aged between 9 and 19 (figure 4). Nine of these cases
were not vaccinated, the vaccination status of 6 cases was
unknown. No unusual symptoms were associated with this
new strain.
Antigenic characterisation
The NVRL referred influenza virus isolates to the World Health
Organisation Laboratory in London for antigenic
characterisation. The influenza B virus was antigenically
closely related to B/Sichuan/379/99. Three of seven influenza
A (H1) viruses were antigenically similar to A/New
Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1) and A/Egypt/96/02 (H1N2), whereas
the other 4 were more closely related to A/Egypt/96/02
(H1N2). All isolates were covered by the 2001/2002 influenza
vaccine.
Vaccination status
Of the 65 positive influenza virus cases, 40 (61.5%) were not
vaccinated, 2 (3.1%) were vaccinated and 23 (35.4%) were of
unknown vaccination status (table 3).
Non-sentinel specimens
The NVRL tested 719 respiratory specimens from non-
sentinel sources (GPs and hospitals) during the 2001/2002
influenza season. Seven specimens were positive for influenza
A [four A (H3N2), one A (H1N1) and two A (unsubtyped)], 2
for adenovirus, and 2 for parainfluenza virus type 3. Of the
719 respiratory specimens, 214 (29.8%) were positive for
respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), peaking in week 1, 2002
(figure 5).
Regional influenza activity
Localised, regional or widespread activity was not reported
during the 2001/2002-influenza season. Prior to week 4,
2002, 2 to 4 health boards reported sporadic influenza activity
weekly, with the remainder reporting no influenza activity.
Between weeks 4 and 14, 2002, 4 to 6 health boards reported
sporadic activity weekly. After week 14, the majority of
health boards reported no influenza activity. Figure 6 is a map
Table 2: Sentinel influenza results by type, subtype and report week for 2001/2002
Week number Total swabs  Positive swabs Percentage positive A (H1N1) A (H1N2) A (H3N2)  B
40 4 0 0% 0 0 0 0
41 4 0 0% 0 0 0 0
42 4 0 0% 0 0 0 0
43 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0
44 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0
45 6 0 0% 0 0 0 0
46 3 0 0% 0 0 0 0
47 10 0 0% 0 0 0 0
48 8 0 0% 0 0 0 0
49 6 0 0% 0 0 0 0
50 8 0 0% 0 0 0 0
51 9 0 0% 0 0 0 0
52 1 0 0% 0 0 0 0
1 7 0 0% 0 0 0 0
2 10 0 0% 0 0 0 0
3 11 4 36% 1 0 3 0
4 14 6 43% 0 0 6 0
5 15 3 20% 0 2 1 0
6 16 11 69% 1 2 8 0
7 16 4 25% 0 0 4 0
8 13 7 54% 0 4 3 0
9 13 7 54% 0 0 7 0
10 14 7 50% 0 3 4 0
11 9 4 44% 1 1 2 0
12 12 7 58% 1 1 4 1
13 8 3 38% 0 1 2 0
14 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0
15 6 1 17% 1 0 0 0
16 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0
17 3 1 33% 0 1 0 0
18 1 0 0% 0 0 0 0
19 1 0 0% 0 0 0 0
20 2 0 0% 0 0 0 0
Total 242 65 27% 5 15 44 1
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Figure 5: Non-sentinel RSV positive specimens between week 40 2001 and week 20 2002
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Table 3: Influenza vaccination status of influenza virus positive cases during the 
2001/2002-influenza season (n=65) between week 40, 2001 and week 20, 2002
Influenza type/ Unknown Vaccinated Not Positive cases
subtype vaccination status vaccinated 
A (H1N1) 2 0 3 5
A (H1N2) 6 0 9 15
A (H3N2) 14 2 28 44
B 1 0 0 1
Total 23 2 40 65
of influenza activity by health board during week 12, the
period of peak clinical activity.
The influenza activity index was compiled using sentinel GP
ILI consultation rates, laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza,
sentinel hospital admissions data and/or sentinel school
absenteeism levels. In some health boards increases in the
number of ILI cases were reflected by increases in hospital
respiratory admissions and also occasionally by increases in
school absenteeism, in particular primary school absenteeism.
Influenza activity worldwide
In Northern Ireland, morbidity levels for influenza and ILI were
low during the 2001/2002 influenza season compared to the
2000/2001 influenza season. Influenza A (H3N2)
predominated this season in Northern Ireland. In England,
Scotland and Wales, consultation rates peaked during February
2002. Influenza outbreaks reported in schools in England that
were investigated virologically were due to influenza A
(H1N2).6 Influenza activity across Europe during the
2001/2002 influenza season was mild to moderate. Influenza
A and B were co-circulating this season, with influenza A
(H3N2) predominating in most European countries.5 
In the US, the 2001/2002 influenza season was also mild to
moderate, with influenza A (H3N2) predominating.9 Influenza
B/Victoria/2/87-like viruses have been detected this season.
The B/Victoria lineage has not been identified outside of Asia
since 1991. However, since March 2001, B/Victoria-like viruses
have been detected in Canada, Hawaii, India, China, Hong
Kong, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Oman, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The 2001/2002 vaccine
was expected to provide lower levels of protection against
viruses of this lineage. An influenza B virus belonging to the
B/Victoria lineage will be included in the 2002/2003 influenza
vaccine.
In Canada, influenza A (H3N2) was the predominant
circulating strain during the 2001/2002 season. The B/Hong
Kong/22/01-like viruses detected this season in Canada were
antigenically different from the 2001/2002 vaccine, which
was expected to provide limited cross protection against these
viruses.10 In Hong Kong, influenza B and A (H3N2)
predominated during 2001/2002. Avian influenza A (H5N1)
has been confirmed in a number of farms and markets since
February 2002 in Hong Kong, resulting in the culling of
thousands of chickens and has led to the first chicken
vaccination programme. No human cases of H5N1 virus were
detected during this outbreak.
Discussion
Influenza activity has been mild in Ireland this season. Overall,
influenza morbidity levels are lower this season than the
2000/2001 influenza season (which was not as intense as the
1999/2000 season). Influenza A (H3N2) has been the
predominant strain circulating this season. Of significance for
influenza surveillance in Ireland, the NVRL identified the new
strain of influenza virus, A (H1N2) in sentinel specimens; these
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were not associated with any unusual clinical symptoms.
It is of interest to note that the majority of A (H1N2) cases
identified in Ireland were aged between 9 and 19 years,
particularly as influenza activity associated with A (H1N2) in
the UK mainly affected children and was also responsible for a
number of school outbreaks. Influenza A (H3N2) was detected
in all age groups, which was also reflected in the UK. 2
Influenza activity can be measured not only by GP
consultation rates, and laboratory-confirmed cases of
influenza but also through school and work absenteeism,
hospital admission rates, sales of “over the counter”
medications and deaths.4 Influenza epidemics can cause
considerable social and commercial disruption to healthcare
services. Among school children absenteeism due to influenza
is a useful indirect measure of morbidity. During epidemics in
the UK and the USA in 1976 and 1977, total school
absenteeism and absenteeism specifically due to ILI
corresponded closely with influenza epidemic curves. Influenza
epidemics also place secondary care services under
considerable pressure. Studies have revealed increases in both
the number of emergency room admissions and the
proportion of those attending with respiratory symptoms
during influenza epidemics.4 However, due to the low
incidence of ILI this season a direct relationship between
increases in hospital admissions and school absenteeism and
the incidence of ILI was difficult to ascertain. This was
however, a useful exercise and will be a good indicator in the
future of influenza morbidity levels, in particular during
influenza epidemics.
Further expansion and improvements in the present system
are now being planned for the forthcoming season, including
an increase in the number of sentinel GPs and the number of
swabs. Influenza surveillance is essential in order to minimise
the impact of this fatal infection especially in high-risk
patients: the elderly, very young and people with underlying
health problems. Monitoring of ILI activity in the community
over a number of seasons may help to predict the potential
impact of influenza on the health services.
Figure 6: Map of influenza activity by health board during week 12 2002
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Legionnaires’ Disease, 2001
Key Points
• In 2001, there were 3 cases of Legionnaires’
disease notified to NDSC. All 3 were male and 2 
were travel-associated.
• When compared with other European countries,
Ireland is conspicuous by its low rate. This would
suggest that a major degree of under-diagnosis 
and under-reporting of Legionnaires’ disease 
currently exists in Ireland.
Introduction
Legionnaires’ disease is a notifiable disease in Ireland as
defined by the Infectious Disease Regulations 1981.1 Forty
three Legionella species and 65 serotypes have been
described.2 3 The most common cause of Legionnaires’ disease
is Legionella pneumophila, a gram negative aerobic non-spore
forming bacillus.4 Legionella lives as an intracellular parasite of
amoebae in aquatic environments5 6 and can be found
naturally in environmental water sources such as rivers, lakes
and reservoirs, usually in low numbers. Inadequately
maintained man-made water systems provide a favourable
environment in which the Legionella bacteria can proliferate.
Legionnaires’ disease is a multi-system illness which can have
wide-ranging clinical symptoms, though the principle
manifestation of the disease is pneumonia.
Potential sources of Legionnaires’ disease are shown below:
• Hot and cold water systems.
• Cooling towers and evaporative condensers.
• Respiratory and other therapy equipment.
• Spa pools/natural pools/thermal springs.
• Fountains/sprinklers.
• Humidifiers for food display cabinets.
• Water cooling machine tools.
• Vehicle washes/carpet cleaners/medication nebulizers.
• Potting-compost or soil, especially in warmer climates.
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Materials and Methods
Definitions
Participants in the European Working Group for Legionella
Infections (EWGLI), which includes Ireland, use the following
case definitions:
Confirmed case of Legionnaires’ disease
An acute lower respiratory tract infection with focal signs of
pneumonia on clinical examination and/or radiological
evidence of pneumonia and one or more of the following:
• Culture - isolation of any Legionella organism from
respiratory secretion, lung tissue or blood.
• Seroconversion – a fourfold or greater rise in specific serum
antibody titre to L. pneumophila serogroup 1 by the indirect
immunofluorescent antibody test or by microagglutination.
• Antigen detection – the detection of specific Legionella
antigen in urine using validated reagents.
Presumptive case of Legionnaires’ disease
An acute lower respiratory tract infection with focal signs of
pneumonia on clinical examination and/or radiological
evidence of pneumonia and one or more of the following:
• Serology – a fourfold or greater rise in specific serum
antibody titre to L. pneumophila, other serogroups or other
Legionella species by the indirect immuno-fluorescent
antibody test or by microagglutination.
• Serology – a single high titre* using reagents to L. pneumophila
serogroup 1 or other Legionella species and serogroups.
• Antigen detection – the detection of specific Legionella
antigen in respiratory secretion or direct fluorescent
antibody (DFA) staining of the organism in respiratory
secretion or lung tissue using evaluated monoclonal
reagents.
• PCR-detection of Legionella species DNA by Polymerase
Chain Reaction.
*A single high serological titre: as differing serological testing
methods are used in different countries, and as an
internationally accepted validation exercise has not been
carried out, no specific serological test or titre level can be
specified. It is suggested however, that the single high titre
result considered to indicate recent Legionella infection, in the
presence of compatible symptoms, be set at a sufficiently high
level to be specific for Legionella infection (i.e. to produce a
low level of false positives).
Travel-associated cases
A case is defined as travel-associated if the patient spent one
or more nights away from their home in accommodation
used for commercial or leisure purposes e.g. hotels, holiday
apartments, ships, campsites etc. in the 10 days before the
onset of illness. The onset of symptoms for Legionnaires’
disease must be within ten days of the last date of travel.
Travel-associated cases may involve travel within Ireland or
travel abroad. A case must meet the clinical, microbiological
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and travel history criteria for it to be notified to the European
Working Group on Legionella Infection surveillance scheme
(EWGLINET).
Notification
An enhanced surveillance form is completed by public health
doctors on each case that is notified to the Departments of
Public Health. This form is then faxed to NDSC where details
are entered onto an MS Access database. If the case fulfils the
definition of a travel-associated case, NDSC forwards on
details of the case to EWGLI.
Results
Cases
In 2001, there were 3 cases of Legionnaires’ disease notified.
All 3 were male and were Irish nationals. Admission dates to
hospital were in July, September and December.
Microbiology
All 3 cases were Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1. One
case was positive on urinary antigen detection alone. One
case was positive on serology (4 fold rise in titre). The third
case was positive on urinary antigen, serology and culture of
bronchial washings.
EWGLI
Two cases were travel-associated cases and were notified to
EWGLI. One travelled to Italy and the other to both Spain and
Italy.
Outcome
There were no deaths among these cases.
Discussion
It would appear that Legionnaires’ disease is rare in Ireland
but when compared with other European countries Ireland is
conspicuous by its low rate. This would suggest that a major
degree of under-diagnosis and under-reporting of
Legionnaires’ disease currently exists in Ireland. Table 1 shows
the number of cases of Legionnaires’ disease notified in
Ireland over the last 10 years and table 2 shows the number
of cases notified in some European countries in 2001.7 The
average incidence rate of Legionnaires’ disease in European
countries in 2001 was 7.6  per million population.7
On 1 July 2002, new European guidelines under which the
European surveillance scheme for travel-associated
Legionnaires’ disease will operate were introduced, as was a
new identity for the scheme – EWGLINET.8
Participation in EWGLINET ensures standardised methods of
diagnosis, recording and reporting of disease and permits
direct comparisons from other participating countries.
Outbreaks or clusters of cases of Legionnaires’ disease in
travellers can be quickly identified through this European
network allowing rapid alerts to be communicated to all
participating countries, WHO and other relevant bodies.
Table 1. Number of Legionnaires’ disease cases notified in Ireland, 1991-2001
Year Legionnaires’ disease cases notified Rate per million population
1991 0  -
1992 2 0.6
1993 0  -
1994 1 0.3
1995 1 0.3
1996 2 0.6
1997 6 1.7
1998 2 0.6
1999 2 0.6
2000 9 2.5
2001 3 0.9
1991 population: 3,525,719; 1996 population: 3,626,087
Table 2. Rate of Legionnaires’ disease in European countries in 2001 
Country Number of cases Rate per million population
Spain* 1026 25.48
Denmark 115 21.7
France 800 13.29
The Netherlands 182 11.38
Belgium 109 10.9
Malta 4 10.46
Norway 43 9.56
Italy 302 5.25
Austria 39 4.88
Scotland 19 3.7
England & Wales 175 3.31
Finland 15 2.94
Switzerland 115 1.6
Sweden 78 0.9
Ireland 3 0.83
Northern Ireland 0 0
*The largest ever community outbreak occurred in Murcia in Spain in 2001
7
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Useful Documents
Health and Safety Commission. Legionnaires’ disease: the control of legionella
bacteria in water systems: approved code of practice and guidance. ISBN 0
7176 1772 6, ref. L8. HSE Books, Suffolk, 2000. This document can also be
ordered online at http://www.hsebooks.co.uk
The Management of Legionnaires’ disease in Ireland. ISBN 0-9540177-2-2.
National Disease Surveillance Centre, 2002. Available at http://www.ndsc.ie
European Guidelines for the control and prevention of travel-associated
Legionnaires’ disease. European Working Group for Legionella Infections, 2002.
Available at http://www.ewgli.org 
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Antimicrobial Resistance 
in Ireland, 2001
Key Points
• In 2001, there were 821 reports of invasive S. aureus
infection. The methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA)
rate was 42.5% (n=340).
• Gentamicin-resistance in MRSA has decreased in the
last three years, reflecting the changing profile of
circulating strains. Less multi-drug resistant strains 
of MRSA are becoming more prevalent.
• In 2001, there were 246 reports of invasive
S. pneumoniae infection. The penicillin-non-susceptible
S. pneumoniae (PNSP) rate was 12.2% (n=30).
• Of 23 PNSP isolates examined, 20 were intermediately-
resistant to penicillin and three were high-level
resistant.
• Overall, the resistance rates in Ireland observed in 
2001 are similar to the previous year and remain high
compared to other European countries.
• The Strategy for the Control of Antimicrobial
Resistance in Ireland (SARI) was launched in June 
2001. Initial funding was directed towards staffing for
surveillance and control of antimicrobial resistance.
Expert working groups and regional SARI committees
were established.
Background
The European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System
(EARSS) has been in operation in Ireland since January 1999.
The number of laboratories reporting antimicrobial resistance
data on invasive pathogens of Staphylococcus aureus and
Streptococcus pneumoniae has increased from 12 in 1999 to
21 in 2001. The percentage population coverage is estimated
to be 85-90%.
Data are collected on the first invasive isolate per patient per
quarter of S. aureus (blood only) and S. pneumoniae (blood
and CSF). Laboratories collect routinely generated qualitative
disc diffusion data: oxacillin/methicillin for S. aureus and
oxacillin/penicillin for S. pneumoniae, plus any additional
antibiotics tested locally. All methicillin-resistant S. aureus
(MRSA) isolates are submitted to the National MRSA
Reference Laboratory (NMRSARL) at St James’s Hospital and
all isolates of S. pneumoniae to the Pneumococcal Referral
Laboratory at RCSI/Beaumont where minimum inhibitory
concentrations (MICs) are determined for a number of key
antibiotics. Additional tests, such as extended antibiograms,
are also carried out.
Individual laboratories report their data to the national EARSS
co-ordinating centre at NDSC in one of three ways:
• Isolate report forms;
• A WHONET database file;
• A structured text file from their laboratory information
system, which can be translated to WHONET format via the
allied BacLink software.
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At NDSC, the data are stored in a WHONET database and
duplicate (subsequent) isolates are removed before analysis is
carried out.
Protocol
Case definitions:
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing (AST) data on the first
isolate only from blood of every patient with a S. aureus
infection (confirmed by a coagulase test) and on the first
isolate only from blood or CSF of every patient with a    
S. pneumoniae infection (confirmed by an optochin test).
Resistance definitions, as determined by MIC testing 
using Etests:
S. aureus
(tested and interpreted according to NCCLS guidelines)
Oxacillin susceptible MIC ≤ 2mg/L MSSA1
Oxacillin resistant MIC ≥ 4mg/L MRSA2
S. pneumoniae
(tested and interpreted according to BSAC guidelines)
Penicillin susceptible MIC ≤ 0.06mg/L PSSP3
Penicillin intermediate MIC 0.1 to 1.0mg/L PNSP4
Penicillin resistant MIC ≥ 2mg/L PNSP4
1. Methicillin-susceptible S. aureus, 2. Methicillin-resistant S. aureus,
3. Penicillin-susceptible S. pneumoniae, 4. Penicillin-non-susceptible
S. pneumoniae
Results
S. aureus
In 2001, 821 reports of S. aureus isolates from bacteraemia
were received (Q1, 223; Q2, 177; Q3, 204; Q4, 217). The total
proportion of S. aureus resistant to methicillin/oxacillin was
42.5% (n=340).
The quarterly trend in resistance to methicillin/oxacillin is
illustrated in figure 1. Over the first two years, the rate by
quarter fluctuated between 30 and 50% while annually the
overall rate remained at 38-39%. In 2001, the quarterly rate
has stabilised at approximately 40% while the overall annual
rate has increased to 42.5% (table 1).
There was no significant seasonal variation in the MRSA
quarterly rate however, there was a peak in Q1 and a trough
in Q3 for the total number of S. aureus isolates submitted.
The peak in Q1 coincides with the busy winter period in
hospitals, while Q3 coincides with the less busy summer
season.
For total S. aureus, MRSA and MSSA isolates, there is a greater
preponderance of infection in males to females (males are
twice more at risk than females).
The risk of invasive S.aureus and MRSA infections increases
with age >4 years, peaking in the older age groups >50 years
(figure 2). Children aged 0-4 years also represent a significant
risk group.
Quarter
To
ta
l S
. a
ur
eu
s
11 labs 16 labs 18 labs 20 labs
Q1
1999
Q2
1999
Q3
1999
Q4
1999
Q1
2000
Q2
2000
Q3
2000
Q4
2000
Q1
2001
Q2
2001
Q3
2001
Q4
2001
0
50
100
150
200
250
%
M
RS
A
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Figure 1.  Trends in reported S. aureus bacteraemia/%MRSA by quarter 1999-2001 with 
95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1.  Annual rates of MRSA bacteraemia, 1999-2001, with 95% confidence intervals (CI)
Year n   %MRSA Upper 95% CI Lower 95% CI
1999 514 39.3 38.6 45.3
2000 645 38.8 35.0 42.5
2001 821 42.5 34.9 43.3
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Figure 2.  Breakdown of S. aureus isolates (n=821) by age for 2001.
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Patients in ICU are most at risk of invasive MRSA infection. In
2001, over 20% of all patients with invasive MRSA infections
were from ICUs compared with 11.6% of patients with
invasive MSSA infections.
Figures 3 and 4 show the susceptibility data, based on
participant returns in 2001, to selected anti-staphylococcal
antibiotics for invasive isolates of MRSA and MSSA
respectively.
The antibiogram results of all MRSA isolates (n=316) referred
to the NMRSARL at St James’s Hospital during 2001 are
shown in figure 5.
The changing profile of circulating strains is reflected in
changes in the antibiotic susceptibility patterns and this has
been confirmed by epidemiological typing at the NMRSARL.
Gentamicin resistance among MRSA isolates has decreased
over the three years that the surveillance system has been in
operation. In 1999, the gentamicin resistance rate was 58.4%.
This decreased to 44.2% in 2000 and 33.9% in 2001,
reflecting a growing trend in which epidemic strains of MRSA
are becoming increasingly less multi-drug resistant to anti-
staphylococcal antibiotics.
Most MRSA isolates referred to the NMRSARL in 2001 had
MICs to oxacillin of > 256mg/L. Two isolates demonstrated
MICs of 8mg/L and four isolates had MICs of 16mg/L, which
are close to the NCCLS breakpoint for resistance to oxacillin
(4mg/L). All isolates had vancomycin MICs of ≤ 4mg/L.
The overall annual MRSA rate observed in Ireland is high and
is comparable with rates observed in the UK, France and most
southern European countries (figure 6). The Scandinavian
countries and The Netherlands report lower MRSA rates.
S. pneumoniae
In 2001, 246 reports of S. pneumoniae isolates from
bacteraemia/meningitis were received (Q1, 90; Q2, 79; Q3,
27; Q4, 50). The majority (n=241) of isolates were from
blood but five were from CSF. The total proportion of 
S. pneumoniae non-susceptible to penicillin/oxacillin was
12.2% (n=30).
The quarterly trend in resistance to penicillin/oxacillin is
illustrated in figure 7. In the first year, the rate by quarter was
initially high at 27% in Q1, but dropped off to 10% by Q4,
remaining at this level over the next two years with two
exceptions, Q4 2000 with an increase to 19% and Q3 2001,
with a drop to 7%. Annually, the overall rate dropped from an
initial high in 1999 to 12-13% for 2000-2001 (table 2).
A seasonal variation is seen in the numbers of S. pneumoniae
isolates reported with a peak in Q1 and a trough in Q3. As
observed with S. aureus, the peak in Q1 coincides with the
busy winter period in hospitals, which is also seen for other
respiratory pathogens, while Q3 concides with the less busy
summer period. There was no significant seasonal variation in
the PNSP quarterly rate.
For total S. pneumoniae, PNSP and penicillin-susceptible   
S. pneumoniae (PSSP) isolates, there is a greater
preponderance of infections in males to females (males are
1.3 times more at risk than females).
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Figure 4.  Susceptibility data, based on participant returns, for invasive isolates of MSSA 
reported in 2001.  Percentage resistance is indicated above the bar.
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Figure 3.  Susceptibility data, based on participant returns, for invasive isolates of MRSA 
reported in 2001.  Percentage resistance is indicated above the bar.
Antibiotic codes:  CIP – ciprofloxacin, ERY – erythromycin, FUS – fusidic acid, GEN – gentamicin, 
OXA – oxacillin, MET – methicillin, MUP – mupirocin, PEN – penicillin, RIF – rifampicin, 
TEC – teicoplanin, TCY – tetracycline, TMP – trimethoprim, VAN – vancomycin.
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The highest rates of invasive S. pneumoniae and PNSP
infections are observed in children aged <4 years and adults
>60 years (figure 8). The peak observed for the 35-39 year
age group is most probably not a true peak in that this group
represents one of the most numerous in the population. To
investigate the significance of this, age standardised rates
were calculated using the 1996 census as the denominator.
This peak was found to be markedly reduced, however, it should
be noted that as EARSS coverage for S. pneumoniae in 2001
was approximately 90% of the population, there could be a
bias in the data reported in this manner due to certain age
groups being either under- or over-represented. Thus, caution
would have to be exercised when interpreting such data.
Figures 9 and 10 show the susceptibility data, based on
participant returns in 2001, to selected anti-pneumococcal
antibiotics for invasive isolates of PNSP and PSSP respectively.
Penicillin MIC determination was performed on 183 isolates
referred to the Pneumococcal Referral Laboratory at RCSI/
Beaumont (figure 11). Overall, 23 isolates were found to be
non-susceptible to penicillin (MIC ≥ 0.1mg/L). Of these, 20
were intermediately-resistant to penicillin (MIC 0.1-1.0mg/L)
and three were high-level resistant (MIC ≥ 2mg/L). All isolates
were susceptible to cefotaxime (MIC ≤ 2mg/L) and, apart
from one resistant isolate (MIC = 4mg/L), moderately-
resistant to ciprofloxacin (MIC ≤ 2mg/L).
In addition, in-house penicillin MIC results were available on
five PNSP isolates not referred to RCSI/Beaumont, four of
which were intermediately-resistant while one was high-level
resistant. No MICs were available for two isolates reported to
be penicillin-non-susceptible.
Four penicillin intermediately-resistant isolates were also
found to be resistant to one or more other anti-
pneumococcal antibiotics. One isolate was intermediately-
resistant to cefotaxime (but no MICs available), another was
resistant to erythromycin and tetracycline while two were
resistant to erythromycin only.
Of the five CSF isolates, three were intermediately-resistant
to penicillin but susceptible to other antibiotics tested while
two were fully susceptible to all antibiotics tested.
Figure 11 shows the distribution of penicillin MICs
(determined by Etest) in pneumococcal isolates submitted to
the Pneumococcal Referral Laboratory at RCSI/Beaumont in
2001.
The overall annual PNSP rate observed in Ireland is moderately
high (figure 12). The UK, Scandinavia, and some central
European countries are generally associated with lower PNSP
rates. Higher PNSP rates are observed in Belgium, southern
Europe and some countries of the former Eastern Bloc.
The Future
From 1st January 2002, EARSS in Ireland has expanded to
include collection of data on three additional pathogens,
Escherichia coli, Enterococcus faecalis and Enterococcus
faecium. Antimicrobial resistance data for all five pathogens
surveyed in the 24 countries participating in this surveillance
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Figure 5.  Antibiogram results of MRSA isolates (n=316) referred to NMRSARL at St James’s 
Hospital during 2001. 
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Antibiotic codes:  CHL – chloramphenicol, CIP – ciprofloxacin, ERY – erythromycin, 
FUS – fusidic acid, GEN – gentamicin, LIN – lincomycin, MUP – mupirocin, RIF – rifampicin, 
TCY – tetracycline, TMP – trimethoprim, VAN – vancomycin.
Figure 6.  Map illustrating the distribution of MRSA in EARSS countries in 2001.
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Figure 9.  Susceptibility data to selected antibiotics, based on participant returns, for 
invasive isolates of PNSP reported in 2001.  Percentage resistance is indicated above the bar.
Antibiotic codes: CTX – cefotaxime, CIP – ciprofloxacin, ERY – erythromycin, OXA – oxacillin, 
PEN – penicillin, TCY – tetracycline, VAN – vancomycin.
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Figure 10.  Susceptibility data to selected antibiotics, based on participant returns, for 
invasive isolates of PSSP reported in 2001.  Percentage resistance is indicated above the bar. 
See legend for figure 9 for antibiotic codes.
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Figure 11.  Distribution of penicillin MICs (determined by Etest) in pneumococcal isolates 
submitted to the Pneumococcal Referral Laboratory at RCSI/Beaumont in 2001.
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Table 2.  Annual rates of penicillin-non-susceptible S. pneumoniae (PNSP) 
bacteraemia/meningitis, 1999-2001, with 95% confidence intervals (CI).
Year n  %PNSP Upper 95% CI Lower 95% CI
1999 159 19.5 25.7 13.3
2000 205 12.7 17.2 8.1
2001 246 12.2 16.3 8.1
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Figure 7.  Trends in reported S. pneumoniae bacteraemia/% penicillin-non-susceptible 
S. pneumoniae (PNSP) by quarter 1999-2001 with 95% confidence intervals.
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system can be obtained from the interactive database
available on the EARSS website: http://www.earss.rivm.nl/
PAGINA/interwebsite/home_earss.html
Following the success of the WHONET workshop held in
Dublin in November 2001, more laboratories are now
routinely reporting their quarterly data to NDSC electronically.
Local copies of the WHONET5 software are currently used in
eight laboratories for data collection. Three laboratories
download a structured text file from their laboratory
information system at the end of each quarter, which are then
translated into WHONET format using the allied BacLink
software. The remaining ten laboratories report their data
using paper Isolate Record Forms.
Prior to the introduction of EARSS in 1999, there was no
national surveillance of resistance in Ireland, although some
local and regional surveillance was undertaken. The EARSS
project has proved to be a very valuable source of reliable
resistance data on invasive S. aureus and S. pneumoniae
infections over the past three years and, as such, has played an
important role in informing the national "Strategy for the
Control of Antimicrobial Resistance in Ireland" (SARI).
Strategy for Control of Antimicrobial Resistance 
in Ireland
The Minister for Health and Children launched the Strategy for
the Control of Antimicrobial Resistance in Ireland (SARI) in
June 2001. SARI was developed by a multidisciplinary NDSC
committee, at the request of the Department of Health and
Children (DoHC), and contains a series of recommendations
for the control of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in Ireland.
These include:
• Development of a national framework for AMR surveillance
and control, including local, regional and national tiers.
• Enhanced AMR surveillance in both hospital and community
settings.
• Enhanced monitoring of supply and use of antimicrobials.
• Development of guidelines for appropriate use of
antimicrobials.
• Education for both health professionals, patients and the
general public with regard to rational antibiotic use and
infection control.
• Development of infection control resources and principles in
hospital and community settings.
• Future areas for research in AMR.
Following the launch of SARI, each health board was asked to
set up a regional SARI committee in order to determine local
requirements for controlling AMR and decide on funding
priorities. Considerable funding was made available to SARI by
the DoHC, €6.9 million by the end of 2001, and was distributed
among the individual health boards. Staffing for AMR control
was recognised as an initial priority, particularly surveillance
scientists, infection control nurses, clinical pharmacists and
microbiologists, and a number of appointments have already
been made.
A series of expert working groups were also set up to produce
specific national guidelines and recommendations in the
following areas:
• AMR surveillance.
• Surveillance and antibiotic consumption.
• Community antibiotic stewardship.
• Hospital antibiotic stewardship.
• Infection control.
As SARI inplementation progresses, and the current shortfall in
relevant staffing improves, national guidelines will be produced
that can be adapted for local and regional implementation. At
the same time a regional network for the surveillance of AMR,
antibiotic consumption and hospital-acquired infection will
also be established.
Copies of the SARI report are available on the NDSC website:
www.ndsc.ie.
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Infectious Disease
Notifications, 2001
Key Points
• In 2001, case-based information on infectious 
disease notifications for an entire year was available
for the first time at national level in Ireland.
• Incidence of bacterial meningitis declined in 2001.
• Acute viral meningitis and viral hepatitis type B
notifications continued to rise in 2001.
• Food poisoning, gastroenteritis, salmonellosis and 
viral hepatitis A notifications declined further in 2001.
Introduction
The statutory surveillance of infectious disease in Ireland is
regulated in the 1981 Infectious Disease Regulations, which
were revised in 1985, 1988 and 1996. The infectious diseases
currently notifiable in Ireland are outlined on the NDSC
website.1 Since July 2000, responsibility for the collation 
and analysis of the weekly infectious disease notifications at
national level was transferred from the Department of Health
and Children to NDSC (S.I. No. 151, 2000).
As soon as a medical practitioner becomes aware of or
suspects that a person on whom he/she is in professional
attendance is suffering from or is the carrier of an infectious
disease, he/she is required to transmit a written notification
to the relevant medical officer in his/her health board. For 
a subset of diseases namely, bacterial meningitis (including
meningococcal septicaemia), cholera, ornithosis, plague,
smallpox, typhus, viral haemorrhagic diseases and yellow 
fever or where a serious outbreak of an infectious disease 
is suspected, a medical practitioner is also required to give
immediate preliminary notification by phone or fax to the
medical officer. Once weekly the medical officers forward
notification data to NDSC.
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Materials & Methods
Medical officers furnish to the Director of NDSC by the
Wednesday of each week, cases of infectious diseases notified
to them in the week ending on the previous Saturday.
Case-based information on each notification (ID number,
Community Care Area, county, date of onset, date of
notification, date of birth, age, sex, disease and organism) is
provided to NDSC either on paper or disk. Zero notifications
are also reported. At NDSC data are either imported or
inputted manually to an MS Access database. Data are analysed
weekly and feedback provided in the form of a weekly report.
Following the end of the notification year detailed cleaning
and validation of the 2001 data are undertaken and NDSC
database is reconciled with the health board databases/
records. Data are analysed using MS Access and MS Excel.
The notifiable sexually transmissible infections (STIs) are not
presented in this chapter, but will be discussed in a separate
chapter within this document.
Results
Notifiable infectious diseases
Annual figures on the notifiable infectious diseases (excluding
STIs) in Ireland from 1982-2001 are presented in table 1. The
numbers of infectious diseases notified by health board in
2001 are presented in table 2, while the breakdown by age
and sex are presented in tables 3 and 4, respectively. Changes
in notifications in 2001 are shown in figure 1 as a percentage
change of the 2001 notifications compared with a five-year
mean (1996-2000). Of the infectious diseases currently
notifiable in Ireland no cases of acute anterior poliomyelitis,
anthrax, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), diphtheria,
plague, rabies, smallpox, typhus, viral haemorrhagic disease
and yellow fever were notified in 2001.
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Table 2. Number of notifiable infectious diseases by health board in 2001
Infectious disease ERHA MHB MWHB NEHB NWHB SEHB SHB WHB Total
Acute Encephalitis 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 5
Acute Viral Meningitis 93 13 9 11 5 12 13 5 161
Bacillary Dysentery (Shigellosis) 14  0 1 2 6 1 3 1 28
Bacterial Meningitis (incl. meningococcal septicaemia) 139 26 31 28 20 49 69 34 396
Brucellosis 0 0 7 2 2 3 0 0 14
Cholera ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 1
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 6
Food Poisoning (bacterial other than salmonella) 437 40 22 62 87 176 214 181 1219
Gastroenteritis (children < 2 years of age) 819 49 30 94 74 255 402 334 2057
Infectious Mononucleosis 48 0 53 10 0 9 24 6 150
Infectious Parotitis (Mumps) 22 1 2 2 4 5 2 2 40
Influenzal Pneumonia ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 2
Legionnaires’ Disease ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 3
Leptospirosis 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 9
Malaria 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 11
Measles 184 13 4 10 1 4 17 8 241
Ornithosis ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 3
Rubella 45 2 1 0 2 1 1 5 57
Salmonellosis (other than typhoid or paratyphoid) 159 33 10 37 24 46 85 34 428
Tetanus ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 3
Tuberculosis*** 186 9 34 38 12 20 76 34 409
Typhoid & Paratyphoid ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 4
Viral Hepatitis Type A 66 3 3 11 3 19 1 6 112
Viral Hepatitis Type B 98 14 23 9 8 84 98 8 342
Viral Hepatitis Unspecified 42 2 5 1 5 28 6 1 90
Whooping Cough 75 1 1 7 0 25 23 10 142
** Data not reported to health board level when total figures for ROI less than 5 cases.  *** Taken from the Enhanced TB Surveillance System, figure for 2001 provisional.
Table 3. Number of notifiable infectious diseases by age group (years) in 2001
Infectious disease   0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Unknown Total
Acute Encephalitis 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Acute Viral Meningitis 44 33 34 13 7 14 9 3 0 1 3 161
Bacillary Dysentery (Shigellosis) 6 0 0 1 3 6 6 2 1 3 0 28
Bacterial Meningitis (incl. meningococcal septicaemia) 206 45 34 38 21 24 5 10 4 9 0 396
Brucellosis 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 2 2 0 1 14
Cholera 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 6
Food Poisoning (bacterial other than salmonella) 371 71 34 47 102 200 122 82 49 98 43 1219
Gastroenteritis (children < 2 years of age) 2042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 2057
Infectious Mononucleosis 7 3 22 61 21 20 7 4 1 0 4 150
Infectious Parotitis (Mumps) 14 6 8 3 3 4 1 0 0 0 1 40
Influenzal Pneumonia 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Legionnaires’ Disease 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
Leptospirosis 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 9
Malaria 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 2 4 0 0 11
Measles 205 21 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 241
Ornithosis 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3
Rubella 48 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 57
Salmonellosis (other than typhoid or paratyphoid) 89 37 21 24 48 64 47 28 28 34 8 428
Tetanus 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3
Tuberculosis*** 1 7 6 29 32 75 46 44 48 99 22 409
Typhoid & Paratyphoid 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
Viral Hepatitis Type A 9 26 19 5 10 20 10 6 3 4 0 112
Viral Hepatitis Type B 3 6 8 19 41 162 65 15 4 1 18 342
Viral Hepatitis Unspecified 2 0 3 4 12 40 11 11 2 3 2 90
Whooping Cough 102 28 8 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 142
*** Taken from the Enhanced TB Surveillance System, figure for 2001 provisional.
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Acute anterior poliomyelitis
No case of wild polio was notified in 2001. The last case of
wild polio to occur in Ireland was in 1984.
Acute encephalitis
During 2001, five cases of acute encephalitis were notified
compared to one case in 2001. Four of the five cases were
less than five years of age.
Acute viral meningitis
During 2001, 161 cases of acute viral meningitis were notified
in Ireland compared to 98 cases in 2000. Twenty seven
percent of these cases occurred in children less than five years
of age, with an age-specific incidence rate of 17.6/100,000,
closely followed by 5-9 year olds (11.7/100,000) and 10-14
year olds (10.4/100,000). The incidence rate ranged from 7.2
per 100,000 in ERHA down to 1.4 per 100,000 in WHB, with a
national rate of 4.4 per 100,000. Viral meningitis notifications
increased by 203% in 2001 when compared with the mean
number notified over the five-year period, 1996-2000 (figure
1). The increase in viral meningitis notifications seen from
June 2000 continued into 2001, with a large increase being
observed during the summer months, peaking in August 2001
with 39 notifications for that month (figure 2). The number of
acute viral meningitis notifications has not dropped below 5
per month since May 2000. The increase in notifications seen
over the past 18 months has coincided with an increase in
reports from the Virus Reference Laboratory (VRL) of
laboratory-confirmed non-polio enterovirus (NPEV) isolates.
These increased from 32 in 1999, to 90 in 2000 and to 170 in
2001. Forty nine percent (n=44) of the NPEV isolates in 2000
were echovirus type 13 whereas in 2001 the predominant
NPEV strains confirmed by the VRL were echovirus 30 (41%)
and echovirus 6 (22%). No echovirus 13 isolates were seen 
in 2001.2 A similar pattern has been reported in England and
Wales.3
Bacillary dysentery
In 2001, 28 cases of bacillary dysentery (shigellosis) were
notified compared to 30 in 2000. The majority of the cases 
in 2001 (75%) occurred in those 20 years of age or older.
Of the 28 cases notified 15 were due to Shigella sonnei,
three due to Shigella flexneri and 10 due to Shigella spp.
(species not reported).
Bacterial meningitis (including meningococcal septicaemia)
In 2001, 396 notifications due to bacterial meningitis
(including meningococcal septicaemia) were received.
Notifications due to bacterial meningitis declined by 23% in
2001 when compared to the five-year mean (figure 1). This
decline can largely be attributed to the introduction of the
meningococcal group C conjugate (MenC) vaccine in October
2000. A detailed report on the epidemiology of bacterial
meningitis (including meningococcal septicaemia) in 2001 
and the impact the MenC vaccine has had is presented as a
separate chapter within this document.
Brucellosis
Fourteen cases of brucellosis were notified in 2001, while 15
were notified in 2000. Age was available on 13 of the 14 cases
and all were 20 years or older. Ninety-three percent (13/14)
of the cases were male, reflecting the fact it is occupational
Table 4. Number of notifiable infectious diseases by sex in 2001
Infectious disease Male Female Not known Total
Acute Encephalitis 3 2 0 5
Acute Viral Meningitis 93 65 3 161
Bacillary Dysentery (Shigellosis) 9 18 1 28
Bacterial Meningitis (incl. meningococcal septicaemia) 187 208 1 396
Brucellosis 13 1 0 14
Cholera 0 1 0 1
Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease 5 1 0 6
Food Poisoning (bacterial other than salmonella) 630 562 27 1219
Gastroenteritis (children < 2 years of age) 1102 916 39 2057
Infectious Mononucleosis 68 82 0 150
Infectious Parotitis (Mumps) 19 18 3 40
Influenzal Pneumonia 1 1 0 2
Legionnaires’ Disease 3 0 0 3
Leptospirosis 7 2 0 9
Malaria 6 5 0 11
Measles 128 105 8 241
Ornithosis 0 3 0 3
Rubella 25 31 1 57
Salmonellosis (other than typhoid or paratyphoid) 208 212 8 428
Tetanus 2 1 0 3
Tuberculosis*** 261 148 0 409
Typhoid & Paratyphoid 2 2 0 4
Viral Hepatitis Type A 55 50 7 112
Viral Hepatitis Type B 185 137 20 342
Viral Hepatitis Unspecified 59 28 3 90
Whooping Cough 66 73 3 142
*** Taken from the Enhanced TB Surveillance System, figure for 2001 provisional.
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% change
Figure 1. Comparison of selected disease totals in 2001 with historical data (5 year mean, 1996-2000) expressed as percentage change
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disease of those working with infected animals or their
tissues, especially farm workers, veterinarians and abattoir
workers, occupations traditionally associated with males.
Cholera
One case of cholera was notified in 2001. The country of
infection was India and the causative organism was identified
as Vibrio cholerae serogroup O1 biotype El Tor serotype
Ogawa.
Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (CJD)
Six cases of classical CJD were notified in 2001, while there
were no cases of variant CJD. Five of the classical CJD cases
occurred in males and four of the six cases were >65 years of
of age.
Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease (vCJD)
No case of vCJD was notified in 2001. Since vCJD became a
notifiable disease in December 1996, only once case has
occurred to date in Ireland and that was in 1999.
Diphtheria
No case of diphtheria was notified in 2001. The last case of
diphtheria reported in Ireland was in 1967.
Food poisoning (bacterial other than salmonella)
In 2001, 1219 cases of bacterial food poisoning other than
salmonella were notified as opposed to 1554 in 2000.
Campylobacter spp accounted for 80% (n=971) of these food
poisoning notifications, followed by Escherichia coli (n=118)
which included verocytotoxigenic E. coli (VTEC) such as O157,
O26 and O111, Yersinia spp. (n=22), Clostridium spp. (n=5),
Listeria monocytogenes (n=4), Staphylococcus spp. (n=1).
Organism details were not provided for 8% of the notifications
(n=98). Detailed reports on campylobacter (2000) and VTEC
(2001) are presented as separate chapters within this
document.
Gastroenteritis 
(when contracted by children < 2 years of age)
In 2001, 2057 cases of gastroenteritis in children less than
two years of age were notified, decreasing from 2796 cases 
in 2000. Rotavirus accounted for 52% of these notifications
(n=1077), while 12.6% were due to adenovirus (n=260), 4.9%
to Cryptosporidium (n=102), 0.5% to echovirus (n=11) and
0.2% to Giardia lamblia (n=4). No organism details were
provided for 30% of the notifications (n=605).
Infectious mononucleosis
In 2001, 150 cases of infectious mononucleosis were notified,
which was almost identical to the number notified in 2000,
n=151. Forty one percent of these cases occurred in the 
15-19 year old age group.
Infectious parotitis (mumps)
In 2001, 40 cases of infectious parotitis (mumps) were notified
compared to 52 in 2000. Thirty five percent of the cases
(14/40) were in the 0-4 years age group with an age-specific
incidence rate of 5.6 per 100,000, followed by the 10-14 year
olds (2.5/100,000) and 5-9 year olds (2.1/100,000). Infectious
parotitis notifications fell by 77% in 2001 when compared
with the 5-year mean (figure 1). However, this five-year mean
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would have included 1996 and 1997 figures when infectious
parotitis notifications increased dramatically due to an
outbreak (with the ERHA and SHB being most affected) and
therefore, makes the decline in 2001 look more dramatic than
would be the case if these outbreaks had not occurred. When
the 1996 and 1997 figures are excluded and a three-year
mean (1998-2000) is calculated, infectious parotitis
notifications declined by only 18% in 2001 when compared
with this mean.
Influenzal pneumonia
There were two cases of influenzal pneumonia notified in
2001. One case occurred in a 33 year old the other in a 3
year old.
Legionnaires’ disease
Three cases of Legionnaires disease were notified in 2001
compared to 9 cases in 2000. A more detailed report on
Legionnaires’ disease is presented as a separate chapter within
this document.
Leptospirosis
Nine cases of leptospirosis were notified in 2001 compared to
seven cases in 2000. All nine cases were aged between 18 and
44 years (mean age, 27 years; median age, 24 years) and
seven of the cases (78%) of the cases were male. Eight of the
nine cases (89%) were notified by ERHA. Five of these ERHA
notifications were linked to an outbreak that was associated
with canoeing on a particular stretch of the river Liffey in
October 2001.4 The sixth case in this outbreak referred to in
the Epi-Insight article (March 2002, reference 4) was from
Northern Ireland and therefore not included in the final ERHA
leptospirosis figures.
Malaria
In 2001, 11 cases of malaria were notified. This includes the
10 confirmed cases reported in Epi-Insight in May 20025 and
one additional case. Six cases were male and five were female.
The age of cases ranged from 22 and 64 years of age (mean
age, 42.2 years; median age, 45 years). Seven of the cases
were Irish, three were Nigerian and one was from Cameroon.
The countries where the malarial infection was acquired were
Nigeria (n=5), South Africa (n=2), Cameroon (n=1), Ghana
(n=1), Rwanda/Uganda (n=1) and Zambia/Zimbabwe (n=1) .
The reasons for travel to malarious area were as follows:
holiday, three cases; business/professional travel, two cases;
visitor to Ireland from malarious region, one case; new entrant
to Ireland from malarious region, three cases; Irish citizen
living in malarious region, one case; and visiting family in
country of origin, one case. Six of the cases were diagnosed by
both blood film and clinical presentation, while five were
diagnosed by blood film. The infectious agent was Plasmodium
falciparium in eight cases (P. ovale was also demonstrated in
one of these cases), P. malariae in one case, P. vivax in one
case, while the sporazoan parasite was not reported in one
case. Seven of the eleven cases were reported to have taken
prophylaxis and only one person continued to take
prophylaxis for one month following return from malarious
areas. Nine cases recovered and the outcome was unknown
for the remaining two cases.
1999
N
um
be
r 
of
 c
as
es
Month / year
Figure 2. Monthly number of acute viral meningitis cases notified in Ireland, 1999-2001.
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Measles
In 2001, 241 cases of measles were notified (6.6/100,000),
128 were male, 105 female and gender was not reported for
eight cases. The majority (76%) were notified by ERHA (184
cases, 14.2/100,000), a region where MMR uptake at 24
months was 66% in 2001 and below 60% in some areas
within the region. The age-specific incidence rate was highest
in the 0-4 year olds (81.9/100,000), followed by the 5-9 year
olds (7.4/100,000). Eighty-five of the cases (36%) occurred 
in infants less than 1 year of age. Although, the number of
measles notifications in 2001 was significantly lower than 
the number reported due to the outbreak in 2000 (n=1603),
it still exceeded the annual numbers reported between 1995
and 1999, inclusive. When compared with the five-year mean,
measles notifications in 2001 declined by 50%. However, this
result is skewed, as the 1603 cases in 2000 would have been
included in the calculation. If the five-year mean was calculated
using data from 1995-1999 (when no major outbreaks
occurred) then measles notifications in 2001 actually increased
by 21% compared to this particular five-year mean.
Since the introduction of measles vaccination in Ireland
measles notifications have declined dramatically, whereas
prior to vaccination the number of notifications never
dropped below 1000 cases per year (figure 3). The measles
vaccine was introduced in 1985, followed by the introduction
of the combined MMR vaccine in October 1988. In July 1992,
a second dose of MMR for boys and girls was introduced
replacing the previous selective rubella vaccination schedule
for prepubertal girls. A measles and rubella (MR) campaign for
primary school-age children (4-12 years) was conducted in
1995 and in 1999 it was recommended that the second dose
of MMR be lowered to 4-5 years. However, despite these
initiatives measles outbreaks still occur in Ireland, with 4328
cases notified in 1993 and 1603 cases in 2000 (figure 3).
Such a trend is typical of a country that has only achieved
intermediate MMR uptake levels (between 70-80% nationally
and lower in some regions). The uptake levels are high enough
to lengthen the inter-epidemic period from 1-3 years in the
absence of vaccination to approximately 6 years with
vaccination, but too low to interrupt transmission of the
infection. For successful measles control, immunisation of 
at least 95% of susceptible targets is required with a two-
dose MMR schedule.
Measles had been targeted for elimination by WHO by 2007,
this has since been extended to 2010. Many countries have
implemented innovative immunization and surveillance
strategies in an effort to eliminate indigenous transmission of
measles virus. The efforts of these initiatives have begun to
reap dividends. Finland 6 has eliminated the disease, while
Sweden,7 UK,8 USA9 and Australia 10 have reported record low
numbers of cases. NDSC has been involved in developing
guidelines for the control of measles outbreaks in Ireland and
recommendations have been made to implement an
enhanced surveillance system. These are preliminary steps but
a national measles elimination plan has to be developed,
resourced and implemented as a matter of urgency if
indigenous transmission of measles is to be effectively
eliminated in Ireland by the end of the decade.
Ornithosis
Three cases of ornithosis (psittacosis) were notified in Ireland
in 2001. The three cases were in females with an age range of
15-47 years (median age, 29 years).
Rubella
In 2001, 57 cases of rubella were notified with the highest
age-specific incidence rates occurring in the 0-4 year olds
(19.2/100,000).
Salmonellosis (other than typhoid or paratyphoid)
The number of salmonellosis notifications (other than typhoid
or paratyphoid) continued to decline in 2001, with 428 cases
being notified. In 2001, salmonellosis notifications declined 
by 52% when compared with the five-year mean (figure 1).
Serovar details were not provided for 307 of the cases.
However, for those cases where these details were provided
the breakdown by serovar was as follows: Salmonella
Enteritidis (n=69), S. Typhimurium (n=36), S. Agona,
S. Bredney, S. Dublin, S. Heidelberg, S. Stanley (n=2, each),
S. Brandenburg, S. Derby, S. Java, S. Kentucky, S. Newport 
and  S. Virchow (n=1, each). A detailed report on salmonella 
is presented as a separate chapter within this document.
Tetanus
Three cases of tetanus were notified in 2001, 2 cases were
male and one was female. The age of cases ranged from 
31-69 years.
Tuberculosis
At present only a provisional figure on TB notifications is
available for 2001, 409 cases were notified through the
enhanced national TB surveillance system (NTBSS). A final
figure on TB notifications for 2001 will be available once
follow up information on all cases has been received and a
process of data validation has been completed, which will be
in the latter half of 2002. A detailed report on the finalised
data for 2000 is presented as a separate chapter within this
document.
Typhoid & Paratyphoid
Four cases of typhoid & paratyphoid were notified in 2001.
Two cases were male and two female. The age range was 1-65
years, median age 2.5 years. The infection was acquired in
India (n=1), Africa (n=1), Pakistan (n=1) and the fourth case
was secondary contact of the case who acquired it in
Pakistan.
Viral hepatitis type A
One hundred and twelve cases of viral hepatitis type A were
notified in 2001, compared to 309 in 2000. This was the first
year that hepatitis A notifications did not exceed hepatitis B
notifications. The highest age-specific incidence rates for
hepatitis A were in the 5-9 year olds (9.2/100,000), followed
by 10-14 year olds (5.8/100,000). The overall incidence rate
was 3.1 per 100,000.
Viral hepatitis type B
In 2001, 342 cases of viral hepatitis type B were notified in
Ireland. The number of hepatitis notifications has increased by
over 200% in 2001 when compared with the five-year mean
(figure 1). A detailed report on hepatitis B is presented as a
separate chapter within this document.
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Viral hepatitis unspecified
In 2001, 90 cases of viral hepatitis type unspecified were
notified (2.5/100,000). The highest age-specific incidence 
rates were in 25-34 years (7.7/100,000) and the 20-24 years
(4.1/100,000) age-groups. Fifty-nine cases were male, 28 were
female and gender was not reported for three cases. Hepatitis
C was notified as the aetiological agent in 77% of the viral
hepatitis unspecified notifications (69 of 90 cases).
Whooping cough
The number of whooping cough (pertussis) notifications
continued to decline in 2001, with 142 cases being notified
(3.9/100,000). The majority of the cases (71%) occurred in 
0-4 year olds (40.7/100,000; n=102), followed by 5-9 year
olds (9.9/100,000; n=28) (figure 3). Thirty-eight percent of
the notifications (n=55) were in children less than six-
months of age. Infants are at greatest risk of death or severe
complications from whooping cough therefore, it is vital 
that immunisation uptake levels for pertussis are improved 
in Ireland, not only to protect a greater proportion of the
population but to develop an adequate level of herd immunity
to ensure that those too young to be vaccinated are also
protected. At present in Ireland, pertussis uptake at 24 months
is 81% and is below 70% at 12 months.
Over recent years a resurgence of whooping cough has been
reported by some countries especially in older children and
adults despite sustained high coverage of the pertussis
vaccine in these countries.11 Although this increase has not
been seen in Ireland to date, it raises the question has there
not been a real increase in incidence of the disease or is it a
reflection of under-notification and possible underdiagnosis of
the disease? Underdiagnosis occurs because whooping cough
has mild and atypical forms and many clinicians may not
consider whooping cough as a cause of cough especially in
older children and adults. Over the coming years it is
important that we closely monitor the age-profile of
whooping cough notifications in Ireland to ascertain if a shift
towards an increasing burden of disease in adolescent and
young adults begins to emerge and the possible implications 
this will have on our immunisation programme and the need
for booster doses in these age groups.
Discussion
In 2001, case-based information on all infectious disease
notifications for an entire year was available for the first time
at national level in Ireland. This enabled more detailed analysis
of the data, not only by health board, but also by age and sex
and for some diseases by organism also. With the exception of
the notifiable diseases where enhanced surveillance systems
have been implemented successfully at national level, it is an
accepted fact that a limitation of the notification data is that
it represents only a proportion of the total cases occurring in
the community. However, the present notification system is
useful in that it does detect trends in the occurrence of
notifiable diseases and can provide an estimate of the
magnitude of morbidity related to these diseases. For
example, based on the notification data for 2001 it was
evident that the incidence of acute viral meningitis and viral
hepatitis type B continued to rise, while a decline in
meningococcal disease due to the introduction of the MenC
vaccine was reflected in the decline in bacterial meningitis
(including meningococcal septicaemia) notifications.
Excluding the notifiable diseases where enhanced surveillance
systems have been implemented, there are limitations with
the notification data in its current format. Although there is
no specific requirement for laboratories to report notifiable
diseases, a voluntary system has been initiated in some but
not all health board regions, with the result that it makes the
interpretation of notification data between regions difficult as
some report both clinical and laboratory notifications whereas
others just have clinical notifications. Details on outcome,
notification source and vaccination status for the vaccine-
preventable diseases are not routinely notified at national
level and furthermore agreed case definitions are not used.
A review of the notifiable diseases system has recently been
completed in Ireland. Should the recommendations from this
review be translated into legislation it will have a major
impact in improving the surveillance of infectious diseases
in Ireland.
Figure 3. Annual number (log10) of measles notifications in Ireland 1948-2001.
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Figure 4. Age-specific incidence rates of whooping cough notifications in 2001
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Immunisation Uptake 
in Ireland, 2001
Key Points
• Immunisation uptake rates declined in 2001 
compared with 2000.
• MMR1 uptake at 24 months fell by 6% to 73%.
• D3, P3, Polio3, T3 and Hib3 uptake ranged between 
81-84%.
Introduction 
Childhood immunisation is a safe and effective means of
protecting children and the population in general from a range
of serious infectious diseases. However, to effectively control
vaccine-preventable diseases, it is essential that 95% of
children complete the primary childhood immunisation
schedule by two years of age. The current primary childhood
immunisation schedule recommends that children are
vaccinated against diphtheria (D), tetanus (T), pertussis 
(P, acellular pertussis vaccine), polio, Haemophilus influenzae
type b (Hib) and group C meningococcal disease (MenC, since
October 2000) at 2, 4 and 6 months and against measles,
mumps and rubella (MMR) at 12 to 15 months. It also
recommends that children receive the BCG vaccine at birth or
by one month of age. A booster dose of DTaP/Polio should be
given at 4-5 years of age and the second dose of MMR should
also be given at this stage. Since July 2001, live oral polio
vaccine is no longer recommended as part of the primary
immunisation schedule in Ireland. This change reflects the
reduced incidence of wild polio worldwide due to successful
immunisation campaigns. The small risk of vaccine-associated
paralytic polio with oral polio vaccine is now considered to
outweigh the benefit of offering oral versus inactivated polio
vaccine.
Materials and Methods
Each health board is responsible for maintaining an
immunisation register. In 2001, the health boards provided
NDSC with quarterly immunisation uptake data on children
who reached their first or second birthday (uptake at 12 and
24 months, respectively) during the quarter in question, and
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who had completed the primary immunisation schedule (i.e.
D3, P3, T3, Polio3, Hib3 and MMR1, the latter at 24 months only;
subscript signifies number of doses).
Data on the number eligible for immunisation in each cohort,
the number who completed the primary immunisation
schedule and the percentage immunised were provided. NDSC
collated and analysed these data in MS Excel. The annual
uptake rates presented in this report were calculated from the
quarterly reports submitted by the health boards.
National data on MenC uptake on those targeted by Phase 1
of the campaign i.e. <5 year olds and 15-18 year olds were
also collated. For the <5 year olds health boards provided
data by birth cohort, while for the 15-18 year olds the data
provided were based on school and college registers and/or on
birth cohort.
Results
Immunisation uptake rates at 12 months in 2001
Overall, immunisation uptake at 12 months in 2001 (i.e. for
the cohort born between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2000) was
70% for D3 and T3, 69% for Hib3 and Polio3, and 68% for P3.
Uptake rates at 12 months in 2001 by health board are
presented in table 1. Uptake rates ranged from 60-61% in the
ERHA to 82-83% in the SEHB.
There was a dramatic decline in immunisation uptake at 12
months between Quarter 1 and Quarter 2, 2001. These rates
recovered slightly in Quarter 3 and 4, 2001, but the rates
achieved in Quarter 3 and 4, 2000 were not reached at any
stage in 2001 (figure 1).
Immunisation uptake at 24 months in 2001
Immunisation uptake rates at 24 months in 2001 (i.e. for the
cohort born between 01/01/1999 and 31/12/1999) were
84% for D3, T3, Hib3 and Polio3, 81% for P3 and 73% for MMR1.
Uptake rates at 24 months in 2001 by health board are
presented in table 2. Rates for D3, T3, P3, Hib3 and Polio3 ranged
from 78-80% in the ERHA to 92% in the NEHB, while MMR1
uptake rates ranged from 66% in the ERHA to 87% in the
SEHB.
In 2001, immunisation uptake rates at 24 months declined for
all antigens when compared with previous years (figure 2). D3,
T3 and Polio3 uptake declined by 2% to 84%. P3 and Hib3
uptake declined by 1% to 81% and 84%, respectively. The
most dramatic decrease was seen with MMR1 uptake dropping
by 6% to 73% (figure 2).
The decline in MMR1 uptake commenced in Quarter 1, 2001
and this downward trend continued throughout 2001 (figure
3). A decline in uptake of the other antigens was also
observed throughout 2001, but these reductions were not as
dramatic as that seen for MMR1 (figure 3).
MenC uptake rates in <5 year olds
MenC uptake rates in those aged 1-4 years in 2000 (i.e. when
MenC vaccine was introduced) are presented in table 3 (i.e.
birth cohort born between 1996 and 1999). These statistics
are based on what was recorded on health board systems as
of February 2002. Overall, MenC uptake was 72% in this age
group, ranging from 64% in the ERHA to 84% in the NWHB.
National uptake was slightly higher in the one-year olds
(74%) than in the three to four year olds (71%). MenC uptake
Table 1. Immunisation uptake rates in children 12 months of age in 2001
      % Uptake at 12 months
               Cohort born 01/01/2000 - 31/12/2000
Health Board No. in cohort D3 P3 T3 Hib3 Polio3
ERHA 21,534 61 60 61 61 60
MHB 3,445 67 65 67 68 67
MWHB 4,959 70 68 70 69 69
NEHB 4,113 77 ** 77 78 77
NWHB 2,907 79 ** 79 79 78
SEHB 6,122 83 82 83 83 83
SHB 7,920 73 71 73 73 72
WHB 4,826 75 73 75 73 74
Ireland 55,826 70 68 70 69 69
** P3 uptake could not be accurately calculated as DTaP/DT uptake was reported 
      as a combined value
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Figure 1. Quarterly immunisation uptake rates at 12 months in Ireland
(Note scales range from 60-80% on this figure)
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data on those <1 year of age are not presented as some
difficulties were experienced in extracting accurate information
from the immunisation systems on those within this cohort
who had actually completed the immunisation schedule.
This was due to the fact that, depending on the age the child
presented for vaccination, the number of doses required to
complete the schedule varied between one and three.
MenC uptake rates in 15-18 year olds
These figures are based on data recorded on health board
systems as of February 2002. MenC uptake for those 15-18
years of age in 2000 was 82% in schools and tended to be
much lower in third level institutions at 57%. Overall,
MenC uptake in 15-18 year olds by birth cohort was 77%,
but decreased with increasing age ranging from 85% in
15 year-olds down to 55% in 18 year-olds. The MenC uptake
rates based on school and college registers refers to those
immunised by the health board teams and will not take into
account those immunised by GPs. The uptake by birth cohort
includes those immunised by both the health board teams
and the GPs, where immunisation returns have been made 
to the health boards. However, anecdotal reports would
suggest that the uptake by birth cohort in the 15-18 
year-olds currently underestimates the true MenC uptake 
in this age group as not all returns have been made by GPs
and there have been delays experienced by some health
boards in imputing data on the immunisation systems.
Discussion
In 2001, as in previous years immunisation uptake rates at 24
months did not reach the target 95% uptake rate. Uptake
rates of D3, P3, Polio3, T3 and Hib3 were at least 11% below the
target rate. In the case of MMR1 the results were even more
worrying with uptake 22% below the national target. It is a
widely held view that the current registers in operation in
Ireland underestimate immunisation uptake. This has been
attributed to data quality issues such as duplicate records on
the systems, delays with data entry and not receiving returns
from GPs in a timely fashion. However, since these quality
issues are not recent manifestations, the downward trend in
immunisation uptake has to be interpreted as a real effect.
The decline in MMR uptake throughout 2001 can more than
likely be attributed to the adverse publicity surrounding the
vaccine and the alleged association between the MMR vaccine
and autism, despite the fact that the body of scientific
evidence refutes such a causal association. A number of
initiatives have recently been undertaken in Ireland to assist
parents and health professionals to review the evidence
around MMR and to help provide the basis for informed
decision-making. An MMR discussion pack – an information
guide for health professionals and parents - was produced by
NDSC and the Department of Public Health of the SHB and
was published by The Health Boards Executive in early 2002.1
The National Immunisation Advisory Committee of the Royal
College of Physicians of Ireland produced a booklet on
Measles, Mumps & Rubella – Frequently Asked Questions and
was published in March 2002.2 NDSC has devoted a section of
its website to vaccination, providing information and
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Figure 2. Annual immunisation uptake rates at 24 months
(Note scales range from 70-95% on this figure)
1999 2000 2001
Table 2. Immunisation uptake rates in children 24 months of age in 2001
       % Uptake at 24 months
                Cohort born 01/01/1999 - 31/12/1999
Health Board No. in cohort D3 P3 T3 Hib3 Polio3 MMR1
ERHA 21,276 80 78 80 80 80 66
MHB 3,447 82 78 82 81 82 72
MWHB 5,086 83 81 83 82 83 74
NEHB 5,175 92 ** 92 92 92 79
NWHB 3,084 89 ** 89 88 89 78
SEHB 6,204 89 86 89 89 89 87
SHB 7,893 85 82 85 84 85 76
WHB 4,793 87 85 87 87 87 76
Ireland 56,958 84 81 84 84 84 73
** P3 uptake could not be accurately calculated as DTaP/DT uptake was reported 
      as a combined value
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factsheets on measles, mumps, rubella, the MMR vaccine and
on vaccination in general.3
Immunisation uptake rates in Ireland compare poorly with
other countries. Vaccination coverage for children in the UK
who reached their first birthday in Quarter 4, 2001 was 91%
for D3, P3 and Hib3 and 90% for MenC, while coverage for
children who reached their second birthday in the same
quarter was 94% for D3 and Hib3, 93% for P3, 91% for MenC
and 84% for MMR1.4 Although adverse media publicity is a
contributory factor for Ireland’s recently declining MMR
uptake figures, it does not explain the consistently low uptake
figures in general. Since the national collation of cohort-based
immunisation uptake data commenced in Quarter 1, 1999 D3,
P3, Hib3 and Polio3 uptake at 24 months has never exceeded
87% and MMR1 uptake has not exceeded 83%. Such low
immunisation uptake rates are a cause for concern as a
substantial proportion of the population are left at risk of
contracting serious infectious diseases that could otherwise
be prevented by vaccination. A national review of
immunisation/vaccination programmes was initiated by the
Chief Executive Officers of the health boards in February
2001, to review all immunisation/vaccination programmes’
policy, practice and procedures with the view to maximising
uptake. The report of the National Steering Committee was
published in January 2002 and made recommendations on
communications, materials management, I.T. systems and
policy, planning and organisation.5 Should these
recommendations be implemented it will be a major step
towards strengthening the childhood immunisation
programme in Ireland.
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Table 3. MenC uptake rates (%) in children 1-4 years of age in 2000 
                Age (year cohort born)
Health Board 1 yr 2 yrs 3 yrs 4 yrs Total*
[1999] [1998] [1997] [1996]
ERHA 67 62 61 67 64
MHB 70 68 66 65 67
MWHB 81 80 80 75 79
NEHB 80 79 79 73 78
NWHB 86 83 83 86 84
SEHB 81 82 81 74 79
SHB 79 77 76 74 76
WHB 76 76 75 75 76
Ireland 74 72 71 71 72
* Cohort born in the years 1996-1999, i.e. aged 1-4 years when 
   MenC campaign commenced
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Figure 3. Quarterly immunisation uptake rates at 24 months in Ireland
(note scales range from 60-95% on this figure)
MMR1 P3D3 Hib3
NDSC Annual Report 2001 – Page 86
Bioterrorism and Agents 
of Deliberate Release
Key Points
• Infectious diseases have been used for centuries to
frighten and harm.
• Following September 11th and the anthrax releases 
in the US, many countries including Ireland have put 
in place systems to address such threats.
• The anthrax alerts in Ireland were costly, putting 
a great strain on response services and the general 
public alike.
• Whether deliberate or natural, outbreaks of 
infectious disease are addressed in the same way;
relying on effective surveillance systems, rapid field
epidemiological response, strong laboratory capacity
and powerful systems of public health management,
and this capacity must be available 24 hours a day,
7 days a week.
• Limiting the effects of deliberate release of biological
agents will involve strong leadership, forward planning,
repeated training and practice, central coordination 
and clear definitions of roles and responsibilities.
• It is necessary to plan to have a certain amount 
of flexibilty in the system to allow for an effective
response.
Infectious diseases have been used deliberately to infect
people and animals for centuries in order to produce illness
and fear – military strategists have long known the
effectiveness of the deliberate use of disease to incapacitate
one’s enemy. Technological advances during the 20th century
meant that it became possible to incorporate many existing
and novel diseases into weapon systems. During the late
1990s, the US experienced frequent hoax incidents involving
the mailing of powder claimed to be anthrax. These were
generally used to intimidate organisations or agencies.
The likelihood of such agents being used was considered to be
remote until the attacks in the US on September 11th, 2001
and the mailing of finely milled anthrax spores to agencies
and individuals in the US during October 2001. Systems for
dealing with such incidents and with people who have been
exposed to or infected with bioterrorist agents, have been put
in place by governments across the world in order to address
the unlikely widespread use of such tactics by terrorist
organisations.
A country such as Ireland is thought unlikely to be a target for
a primary bioterrorist attack. What is more likely is that those
who have been unknowingly exposed to bioterrorist agents
abroad could enter this country before they have had time to
develop signs of illness and would require diagnosis and
treatment in Ireland. If, in addition, this infectious disease
were communicable – capable of being transmitted from one
person to another – methods to control its spread would be
necessary.
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The systems to detect, diagnose and control natural or
deliberately spread infectious disease are the same - effective
surveillance systems, a strong laboratory network and a
responsive public health system to address threats and to
ensure the controls necessary to protect people’s health.
Early detection is essential for ensuring a prompt response to
biological attacks.
In the aftermath of September 11th, many countries
developed contingency plans to address the threat of the
deliberate release of biological agents. In Ireland, the
Government established a high-level committee to plan the
national response to the threat posed by the deliberate
release of biological agents. An Expert Committee –
responsible for the contingency planning for biological threats,
was established following the deliberate release of anthrax
spores in the United States which led to 22 cases of anthrax,
11 of which were inhalational and leading to the deaths of 5
people.
This deliberate release of anthrax came to the attention of
the authorities in the US on October 4th, 2001 with the
infecting and subsequent death from inhalational anthrax of a
63-year-old British journalist in Boca Raton, Florida. Many
countries around the world, including Ireland, had, in the
weeks following the anthrax attacks in the US, to deal with
numerous ‘anthrax’ alerts; many innocent mistakes made by
worried members of the public and a few, deliberate hoaxes.
In Ireland, the first alerts were made on 16/10/02. There were
over 120 alerts to the security and civil forces during the
following six weeks, 77 of which involved the intervention of
the Regional Departments of Public Health. Initially, there
was health professional involvement in all incidents, but as
expertise was rapidly developed it became possible to
prioritise incidents and involve health professionals in only
those that posed a credible risk. As a result, there was
progressively less health professional involvement as time
passed. The National Disease Surveillance Centre was alerted
to all those in which public health and clinicians were
involved. The final episode involving health personnel was on
28/11/02 (figure 1).
These incidents put primary responder services (health and
ambulance, fire, Garda and military) under great pressure and
resulted in significant consumption of resources.
The majority of incidents took place in the Eastern Region,
but all health board areas reported incidents (table 1).
A range of premises were involved (figure 2). Most involved
the offices of private Irish companies, but 10 postal sorting
offices were involved. The offices of three political parties, a
government department and two embassies were involved.
All alerts turned out to be innocent or hoaxes. Anthrax was
not isolated from any of the 62 environmental samples sent
for analysis.
In total, 438 people were exposed to the contents of suspect
packages during the anthrax incidents (table 2). Of these, 307
(70.1%) underwent decontamination by showering and 312
(71.2%) were commenced on prophylactic antibiotics
(Ciprofloxacin).
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Figure 1.  Distribution of anthrax incidents involving the intervention of health personnel, 
Ireland: October-November 2001
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Table 1.  Distribution of anthrax incidents involving the intervention of health personnel,
Ireland by health board region.
Health board region No. incidents %
Eastern Region 52 67.5
Midland Health Board 5 6.5
Mid-Western Health Board 5 6.5
North Eastern Health Board 3 3.9
North Western Health Board 2 2.6
South Eastern Health Board 2 2.6
Southern Health Board 4 5.2
Western Health Board 4 5.2
Total 77 100
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These incidents, although they involved neither the release 
of dangerous substances nor the causing of a single case of
illness illustrated the importance of a national and regional
response capacity and provided many lessons. The core lesson
learnt in Ireland and in every other country affected by these
incidents was that of the crucial importance of health
protection.
1. Whether outbreaks of infectious diseases are natural or
man-made, very similar processes, namely strong disease
and risk factor surveillance systems, the capacity to
undertake prompt epidemiological investigation, strong
laboratory capacity and effective systems of public health
management, are necessary to manage them.
2. This capacity must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week.
3. The necessity of planning for such eventualities, ensuring
that resources are available and that first responders have
been adequately trained is fundamental to the successful
management of such episodes.
4. The importance of central coordination of national episodes
was clearly underlined by these incidents.
5. The vast potential for disruption of normal life was plainly
demonstrated.
6. Local leadership and coordination emerged as being vital
components of any response.
7. Given the degree of stress on services, it became obvious
(in Ireland as in the US, UK and other EU countries) that it
was necessary to have some degree of flexibility and surge
capacity in the system to permit it to respond effectively 
to challenges such as these.
8. The importance of ensuring clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, written down and understood by all was
highlighted; everybody must know what has to be done,
how it should be carried out, who is responsible for seeing
that it gets done and by when it must be done.
The experience of other countries has taught us that clear
planning, explicit roles and responsibilities and repeated
rehearsal will be necessary to overcome the danger of
threatened or actual deliberate release of biological agents.
Although attention was focussed on anthrax, contingency
planning was undertaken to deal with other possible threat
agents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the
US has identified 6 agents as being priority threats because
they:
• Are easily disseminated or transmitted person-to-person.
• Have high mortality; potential for major public health
impact.
• Produce public panic and social disruption.
• Require special action for public health preparedness.
These agents are Category A biological agents, those
producing the diseases as shown in table 3.
Table 2. Number of people exposed to the contents of suspect packages, the number 
decontaminated and the number given chemotherapy, Ireland, October-November 2001
 Number %
Number exposed 438 100.0
Number decontaminated 307 70.1
Number given chemotherapy 312 71.2
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Figure 2. Types of premises involving the intervention of health personnel, Ireland, 
October-November 2001.
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Guidance produced by the Expert Committee – responsible
for the contingency planning for biological threats addressed
the threats posed by the above agents. The National Disease
Surveillance Centre produced a document giving an overview
of the clinical management and public health implications of
selected bioterrorist agents thought most likely to be used in
terrorist attacks.
The early clinical features of many of these diseases can
appear quite innocent or commonplace. Features that should
alert healthcare providers to the possibility of a bioterrorism
related outbreak include:
• A rapidly increasing disease incidence in a normally healthy
population.
• An unusual increase in the number of people seeking care,
particularly with fever, respiratory or gastrointestinal
complaints.
• An endemic disease rapidly emerging at an uncharacteristic
time or in an unusual pattern (e.g. an increase in what
appears to be chickenpox-like illness among adult patients,
but which might be smallpox).
• Clusters of patients arriving from a single locale.
• Large numbers of potentially fatal cases (e.g. a large number
of cases of acute flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar
palsies, suggestive of a release of botulinum toxin).
• Any one patient presenting with a disease that is relatively
uncommon and has bioterrorism potential.
Ireland is an unlikely target for such release but we must be
vigilant to the possibility.
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Table 3. Category A biological agents 
Agent Disease
Variola major Smallpox
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax
Yersinia pestis Plague
Clostridium botulinum Botulism
Francisella tularensis Tularaemia
Filoviruses and Arenaviruses Viral Haemorrhagic Fevers
NATIONAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
CENTRE
BIOLOGICAL THREAT
AGENTS
National Disease Surveillance Centre. Biological Threat Agents document
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Key Points
• CIDR is a national multi-agency partnership project 
to introduce an integrated electronic system for
surveillance of both clinical and laboratory information
on communicable diseases in Ireland.
• CIDR will provide high quality timely information for
surveillance and control of communicable diseases,
and for surveillance of antimicrobial resistance.
• CIDR will be a robust, enterprise-strength solution that
will be adaptable with changing surveillance needs.
Introduction
Surveillance and control of communicable diseases is of major
importance in protecting the public’s health. At present this
important function is undertaken in the absence of a national
electronic means of sharing information on communicable
diseases. The databases of communicable diseases that exist
are stand alone and difficult to maintain.
All those involved in the surveillance and control of
communicable diseases want a quality information system for
communicable diseases. By that is meant a timely, accurate
information system that combines both clinical
epidemiological information and laboratory information in the
one system. It also means an efficient system, where there
are no islands of information, and no multiple non-
integratable databases.
CIDR is a Computerised Infectious Disease Reporting (CIDR)
system being developed by the National Disease Surveillance
Centre in collaboration with its partners, the Department of
Health and Children, the Health Boards, the Food Safety
Authority of Ireland and the Food Safety Promotion Board,
and with the help of external IT consultants who advise on
each step of the process. CIDR aims to provide an integrated
and standardised electronic surveillance system to collect,
collate, analyse and disseminate good quality laboratory-
based and clinical notification data on communicable disease
in a timely manner in Ireland.
Computerised Infectious
Disease Reporting System
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This will allow for:
• Timely monitoring of trends in infectious disease.
• Earlier detection of outbreaks.
• Meaningful comparison of trends across regions as a result
of having a nationally agreed standard data set.
• Appropriate public health action to be taken at local,
regional and national levels.
• Monitoring of the effectiveness of preventive and control
measures.
• Ireland to meet its obligations to provide data to EU
networks for communicable diseases.
As CIDR is a joint initiative of a wide range of stakeholders, a
distinct CIDR logo has been developed. We hope that the
final design underscores the cooperative nature of the CIDR
initiative.
Benefits of CIDR
CIDR will bring many benefits.
For patients and the public, CIDR will ensure that high quality
information on communicable diseases is available to the
public, patients and policy makers.
From the laboratory perspective, CIDR will allow for
transmission of information electronically to public health and
other CIDR partners securely, following authorisation by the
laboratory, thus reducing paperwork for laboratories. It will
allow the review of epidemiological information by the
laboratory, enabling comparisons within region, and with
national information. There will be potential for CIDR to act as
a quality feedback tool, and it may help with laboratory audit
and accreditation.
For GPs and clinicians, CIDR will bring timely information on
communicable diseases into the surgery and clinic, and will be
a user-friendly way of entering and receiving relevant
information.
For public health professionals, CIDR will provide timely
information for public health action. It will provide automated
secure linkage of laboratory and clinical information. In other
words, clinical and laboratory information on the same event
will be merged. There will only be one surveillance system to
maintain, not many as at present. It will be possible to
evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and control
programmes locally and regionally, and it will enable
comparison of local information with neighbouring and
national information. It will provide information to plan
prevention and control programmes.
For NDSC, the Department of Health and Children and
national agencies, CIDR will provide accurate, timely
information on the incidence and burden of communicable
diseases nationally. This information will be used to describe
the epidemiology of communicable disease and to provide
information to influence national policies related to
communicable disease and vaccine-preventable disease.
Project Organisation
Work on planning the development and implementation of
national electronic surveillance was initiated in September
1999 with the establishment of a CIDR development
committee. This committee was instrumental in identifying
and clarifying NDSC and partners’ needs with regard to
communicable disease surveillance. An external review was
commissioned to aid in this process, and by December 2000,
NDSC Board agreed that a new system should be developed.
It was recognised that a dedicated full-time project team was
needed to manage this large national multi-agency project,
and in addition, the project team needed expert advice on:
selection of suitable software developers, contract
negotiation, project planning, project control, implementing
the system, assistance with development of business rules,
working with the selected developer to agree the system, and
user acceptance testing.
The CIDR project manager and team were assigned from
NDSC staff in June 2001, and following an open tender EU
procurement procedure, Astron Consulting was awarded the
contract in October 2001. The senior surveillance scientist
position on the CIDR Project Team was filled in June of this
year (2002).
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CIDR Development Committee
This committee was established in 1999 as a working group
to advise on the development of electronic surveillance in
Ireland; to assist and advise NDSC and other CIDR partners on
the development and introduction of a national system for
electronic surveillance; to act as an advocate and promote
CIDR within his/her own organisation; and to be the quality
assurance group for CIDR. Representation from medical
laboratory scientists and microbiologists on the group has
increased, in recognition of the importance of laboratory
information for CIDR.
National Supervisory/Business Rules Committee
A CIDR National Supervisory Committee (subsequently
renamed the National Business Rules Committee) was
established during 2001 to help to determine the appropriate
access to information within CIDR together with the levels of
service and resource required to participate in CIDR. Each
health board / authority / agency is represented by the
chairperson of the relevant regional / agency business
committee, nominated by their Health Board / Authority /
Agency Chief Executive Officer.
Regional and National Agency Business Rules
Committees
In 2001, regional and agency business rules committees were
established representing the relevant CIDR stakeholders within
that region or agency, with the role of preparing and agreeing
business rules for participation in CIDR. This process is
ongoing.
CIDR Project Board
A CIDR Project Board was established in 2001 to provide
overall direction and management for the CIDR project and 
to approve all major plans for the project within the budget
allocated to CIDR capital development by NDSC Board. The
Project Board’s responsibilities include the authorisation of
deviations from the agreed plans within budget, and to seek
to ensure that the required resources are available for and
committed to the project. The CIDR Project Board include
nominees of the Health Board Chief Executive Officers, the
Department of Health and Children, and the Food Safety
Promotion Board, and includes expertise in the areas of public
health, information and communications technology, and
finance.
CIDR System Development and Build 
In October 2001, a EU tender for detailed design of CIDR core
system, including specification of the hardware configuration
and software infrastructure required to operate CIDR was
initiated. By July 2002, Fujitsu Consulting completed the
design, including the uploading of data from Laboratory
Information Management Systems (LIMS) and CIDR. A second
restricted EU tender is in progress to develop, implement and
support the system. It is hoped to have completed
development by mid 2003.
Liaison with Other National Agencies/Initiatives
In addition to extensive consultations with CIDR stakeholders,
the CIDR Project Team has continued to make considerable
efforts to inform and be informed by other national and
international initiatives.
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These include:
• Meeting the Data Protection Commissioner, including
representation from the Department of Health and Children,
to confirm that there is no data protection impediment to
the concept behind CIDR.
• Meeting the National Health Information Strategy project
group to inform them about CIDR, and to ensure that CIDR
is in line with the recommendations of the National Health
Information Strategy.
• Consulting with the e-government initiative, REACH to
confirm that CIDR was potentially compatible with this
project.
• Ongoing involvement with the General Practice Information
Technology (GPIT) group to help to identify appropriate
coding and pathology messaging standards.
• Ongoing consultation with related initiatives around the
country and abroad, including: the multi-board procurement
of laboratory information systems being led by the Western
Health Board, the Irish Cervical Screening Programme, the
Laboratory Infection Control and Public Health system (LIPS)
initiative in the Midland Health Board, the national
Healthlink project and the Tallaght Hospital initiative that
allow patient information to be safely transferred
electronically via the Internet to General Practice.
• Discussing with SNOMED, a not-for-profit branch of the
College of American Pathologists, regarding the possible use
of SNOMED coding in CIDR. SNOMED is a clinical
terminology i.e. a comprehensive structured list of terms for
use in clinical practice by healthcare professionals. The use of
SNOMED to facilitate electronic laboratory reporting has
been advocated by the US Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). The UK Department of Health and the US
Department of Health and Human Services have recently
agreed to adopt and develop SNOMED Clinical Terms (CT)
as a standard clinical terminology to support data capture,
retrieval and analysis.
• Ongoing communication with the Georgia (US) Division of
Public Health who are developing a statewide infectious
disease surveillance system (SENDSS – State Electronic
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System) similar in principle
to CIDR. SENDSS has provided the CIDR Project team with
technical documentation about their system.
The continuing support and hard work of all the partner
organisations involved in developing and delivering this major
public health initiative is much appreciated by the CIDR
project team.
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Information and
Communications
Technology
The National Disease Surveillance Centre continued to grow
through 2001 both in terms of the number of staff and the
range of activities carried out. The expansion in staff numbers
through the year needed to be accommodated across three
separate locations and this required significant investment in
information and communications infrastructure to ensure that
all staff had access to the resources they required whilst at
the same time ensuring network security was safeguarded.
Hardware and Software Developments
New Network Servers
To accommodate the increasing requirements of NDSC for
network data storage and to support network-based printing
new Windows 2000 Advanced Servers were installed. This
increased the resilience of the NDSC network to
accommodate hardware and software failure by the provision
of RAID, uninterruptible power supplies, together with
redundant power supply units and network interface cards.
New Email Server
The expansion in the number of users and in the volume of
emails necessitated the installation of a more robust email
solution. A Microsoft Exchange 2000 email server was
installed and existing email accounts were migrated from the
existing cMail server and Outlook Express clients. The
Exchange 2000 server also facilitated the sharing of contact
information and diaries, some of which was migrated from
the Palm Desktop software previously used. The Palm
handheld Personal Organisers used extensively by NDSC staff
were integrated into this solution, allowing a single solution
for recording contact details and diary scheduling. The
installation of the new email system was accompanied by
support staff and user training.
New Terminal Services Server
A new Terminal Services server was installed to support NDSC 
staff whose access to the main NDSC network was constrained
by limited bandwidth i.e. staff accessing the main NDSC
network from home or from the CIDR Project office in Lower
Baggot Street. This server allowed users to access and edit
files and run applications  on the main NDSC network
without the need to transfer high volumes of data.
Other Hardware
Other hardware purchases included laser printers, including 
a colour laser printer.
Communications Links
The NDSC local area networks in Sir Patrick Dun’s Hospital
and in Warrington Place were connected into a wide area
network with a leased line. This leased line supported both
voice and data communications and was backed up by a
failover ISDN connection.
It was not possible to install a conventional wired local area
network in the CIDR Project offices in Baggot Street so an
alternative wireless solution was implemented. Despite
somewhat lower bandwidth than a wired Category 5 network
and some authentication problems attributable to limitations
in the Windows 2000 server operating software, this solution
worked well.
Network Security
The increase in size of the NDSC both in terms of staff and
locations during 2001 resulted in a more complex IT
infrastructure and potentially increased the risk of
unauthorised access to the NDSC network. To minimise the
risk to confidentiality and security of information NDSC
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implemented several changes and upgrades to IT security
during the year.
A new virus scanning system was installed which
automatically downloaded updates from the Internet. It also
scanned incoming and outgoing emails. This system
substantially reduced problems associated with computer
viruses.
Partly because of NDSC’s accommodation arrangements and
partly because of increased staff numbers, the requirement for
remote access to the NDSC network rose substantially in
2001. A security gateway was installed to ensure proper
validation of remote users by checking the credentials of
requests for dial up conections before allowing logon to the
NDSC network.
A number of external consultants were invited to review the
security of NDSC’s IT network and to recommend appropriate
changes. A consultancy called Vnet Technologies was chosen
to assist in implementing security upgrades commencing at
the end of 2001 and reaching completion in 2002. In
December 2001, an Intrusion Detection System was
configured and installed to monitor attempts to hack into the
NDSC network from the Internet.
Application Development
The WANDA (Weekly Analysis of Notifiable Data) Microsoft
Access-based database designed for NDSC to support the
collection of data and the production of reports on the
statutory notifiable infectious diseases continued to be
developed despite problems with the original supplier. This
was supported by hiring contract staff who developed the
application further and documented the structure and use of
the application.Some additional work on specifying a similar
MS Access-based database to support the collection of data
and preparation of reports relating to the notifiable sexually
transmitted infections (STIs) was also carried out.
Selection of Statistical Software
To support the analysis of data collected by NDSC, a number
of statistical software applications were evaluated. As a result
the SPSS statistical software application was selected,
primarily on the basis of its extensive functionality coupled
with relative ease of use.
NDSC Website
The NDSC website developed significantly in both size and
content throughout 2001. The content of the NDSC website
was migrated into the new Terminal4 web content
management application purchased from Creative Online and
the hosting of this site was transferred from our existing
Internet Service Provider.
To ensure that the website addressed the needs of NDSC and
its intended viewership an NDSC Web Committee was
established.
IT Support
As the IT systems in NDSC continued to grow in size and
complexity throughout the year, increased support for these
systems was required. Our existing helpdesk and support
arrangements with Cara continued in conjunction with in-
house NDSC IT staff. The increasing workload associated with
the CIDR (Computerised Infectious Disease Reporting system)
project necessitated the recruitment during the year of an IT
Specialist as interim IT Manager for NDSC.
NDSC
Lower Baggot Street
Dublin 2
(CIDR Project Office)
NDSC
Warrington Place
Dublin 2
PSTN Dial-up Leased Line / ISDN Backup
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Sir Patrick Dun's Hospital
Dublin 2
Internet
FI
R
EW
A
LL
NDSC Annual Report 2001 – Page 96
Website
www.ndsc.ie 
The National Disease Surveillance Centre’s website has 
been running since Spring 2000 and was revamped in 2001
resulting in a new site in December 2001. It carries electronic
versions of all reports and press releases issued from NDSC 
as well as details of current committees, weekly and annual
infectious disease statistics, disease facts and other general
information. The site’s homepage is dedicated to public 
health issues currently in the news and is updated regularly.
Data available from Q4, 2001 shows there were over 17,000
separate logons to the site and connections from domains
registered in 58 different countries.
An in-house website group, with representatives from all 
areas of responsibility within NDSC, was formed in August
2001 to manage the introduction of the new website and 
to provide a forum for continuing development and
improvement of the site.
In December 2001, after transfer of all data from the old 
site to the new, consultation with all NDSC staff,
reorganisation and new material added, NDSC’s new website
went live. The new site is managed and maintained by the
NDSC using Sitemanager software provided by Terminal4.
This has not only visually enhanced the site but also added 
a search engine, improved navigation around the site and
simplified site management and maintenance by providing 
a user friendly interface.
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ERHA – Eastern Regional Health Authority
(Dublin, Kildare, Wicklow)
MHB – Midland Health Board
(Laois, Offaly, Longford, Westmeath)
MWHB – Mid-Western Health Board
(Clare, Limerick, Tipperary NR)
NEHB – North Eastern Health Board
(Cavan, Monaghan, Louth, Meath)
NWHB – North Western Health Board
(Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim)
SEHB – South Eastern Health Board
(Carlow, Kilkenny, Tipperary SR, Waterford, Wexford)
SHB – Southern Health Board
(Cork, Kerry)
WHB – Western Health Board
(Galway, Mayo, Roscommon)
ACE – Assistant Chief Executive
CSSD – Central Sterile Suppliers Department
EHSS – Eastern Health Shared Services
FPHM – Faculty of Public Health Medicine
FSAI – Food Safety Authority of Ireland
FSPB – Food Safety Promotions Board
IBTS – Irish Blood Transfusion Service
IMU – Information Management Unit
NDSC – National Disease Surveillance Centre 
OLHSC – Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children
TCD – Trinity College Dublin
UCD – University College Dublin
Glossary of Terms
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